Focus on Arts and Ecology

Developing countries like Pakistan must grasp the finance architecture for operationalising loss and damage, as it will be key at the upcoming COP. 

By Ali Tauqeer Sheikh, October 10, 2024

The announcement of the Loss and Damage Fund (LDF) at the 2022 UN Climate Change Conference (COP27) in Egypt was a significant diplomatic victory for Pakistan, as was its formalisation at COP28 last year in the United Arab Emirates. In the last two years, Loss and Damage (L&D) – referring to irreversible costs of climate change beyond ecosystems’ adaptive capacities – has emerged as a central focus of L&D finance, even if it has yet to become operational. Regrettably, the allocated funds remain woefully inadequate, amounting to approximately USD 700 million against an estimated need of USD 290-580 billion by 2030.

To fully leverage the potential of L&D, countries like Pakistan have to understand the two foundational mechanisms which preceded the LDF: the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) and the Santiago Network. Together, these three mechanisms form the core architecture for enabling developing countries to respond to Loss and Damage. WIM and the Santiago Network are not financing entities. WIM is a coordinating platform that provides technical support and guidance on approaches to address L&D. The Santiago Network, on the other hand, is a L&D capacity-building initiative. Their interconnectedness and respective mandates will be pivotal in the discussions at COP29 in Baku, Azerbaijan.

WIM, established in 2013, offers an overarching framework from which both the Santiago Network and the Loss and Damage Fund were developed. Mandated as the conceptual umbrella, it has spearheaded technical studies across five key L&D areas: i) slow-onset climate events, ii) non-economic losses, iii) comprehensive risk management, iv) displacement and v) action and support. These studies have fostered the development of several methodologies and guidelines that enable the testing and piloting of community-led projects in diverse ecosystems.

These studies have enhanced the technical capacities of participating countries, as they help in distinguishing L&D from adaptation, demonstrating how the latest climate science can inform policymaking relevant to averting, minimising and addressing L&D. This body of literature has also sparked a process of distinguishing L&D from adaptation in order to facilitate a distinct financing stream under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.

Regrettably, Pakistan’s weak technical capacity and lack of coordination between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which represents Pakistan in the WIM Executive Committee, and the Ministry of Climate Change (MOCC), which represents Pakistan in the Santiago Network, have hindered its effective engagement. As a result, our climate and other sectoral policies, including the Nationally Determined Contributions and National Adaptation Plan, are not informed by these five crucial areas of L&D action. Pakistan’s absence from technical groups has been a missed opportunity in augmenting national capacity.

Established under the WIM in 2019, the Santiago Network is a vital initiative aimed at providing technical assistance to particularly vulnerable countries like Pakistan. Its mandate is to facilitate technical assistance, connecting nations with relevant organisations, networks and experts. At present, it is still trying to scale up its activities since its operationalisation in 2022.

Despite its limitations, including limited staffing and financing, the network remains critical in supporting vulnerable nations in their efforts to cope with adverse climate effects through targeted technical assistance, knowledge sharing and capacity-building. The network’s efforts will assume a greater importance in helping countries develop the capacity to effectively access and utilise financial support from the LDF. This will extend the network’s role beyond mere technical assistance. The review of the WIM has been a contentious issue since COP24, with ongoing debates over COP/CMA governance. This lack of agreement has stalled meaningful progress on WIM’s long-term vision.

Last year’s climate summit, COP28, in Dubai, marked a critical juncture for these climate finance mechanisms. For the Santiago Network, the discussions also touched on how to integrate it more closely with the LDF to ensure seamless support from technical assistance to financial support. Pakistan successfully secured a seat on the governance structures of both the LDF and the Santiago Network, represented by this author at the LDF and by the climate ministry secretary at the Santiago Network. Frequent posting and transfers of officers at MOCC has further hampered Pakistan’s participation in the Santiago Network.

While the WIM serves as the overarching framework, the Santiago Network focuses on technical assistance, and the LDF represents the financial backbone required to implement robust climate action. This tripartite structure reflects a holistic approach to tackling climate vulnerabilities. The existence of these three mechanisms encourages policy coherence at national and international levels, enabling countries to align their climate strategies and leverage support across all three areas. As these mechanisms evolve and mature, they have the potential to bridge the gap between those most affected by climate change and the resources they desperately need.

At COP29 in Baku, the interplay between these three mechanisms is expected to resurface. Key discussions will likely involve establishing clear criteria for accessing support and ensuring transparency in decision-making processes. There will likely be a strong push for greater integration among the three mechanisms, focusing on strengthening the WIM’s capacity to provide strategic guidance to the other two mechanisms, ensuring coherence and maximising their collective impact. This could involve creating streamlined processes for countries to access technical support through the Santiago Network in tandem with financial aid from the LDF.  Developing robust methodologies for measuring the impact of interventions, in such areas as non-economic loss and Damage (NELD), supported by these mechanisms will be vital for demonstrating their value and securing ongoing support.

Additionally, expanding the network of partners involved in the Santiago Network and diversifying funding sources for the LDF are likely to be on the agenda. There may be increased attention on how these mechanisms can better address non-economic losses and damages, such as the loss of culture and biodiversity. Another key aspect is ensuring that LD finance is integrated into the New Collective Quantified Goals (NCQGs). However, developed countries have so far resisted including any specific L&D financing targets within the NCQG framework.

As climate impacts intensify, the global community’s ability to operationalise and harmonise these mechanisms will be critical. The discussions at COP29 in Baku will play a pivotal role in shaping the future of climate finance for L&D. The effectiveness of these mechanisms in delivering timely, efficient and comprehensive support to those on the frontlines of climate change will serve as a litmus test for global solidarity.

Bangladesh’s interim government remains dependent on India as a dollar crisis limits its ability to generate its own electricity. 

By Kamran Reza Chowdhury, October 23, 2024

Fifteen years ago, the election of Sheikh Hasina as Bangladesh’s prime minister marked the start of the country’s bilateral cooperation with India on various fronts, including energy.

In October 2013, the two countries connected their electricity grids, allowing Bangladesh to buy electricity from India for the first time and paving the way for more energy cooperation. By financial year 2022-23, Bangladesh had signed three deals to buy 2,656 megawatts (MW) of electricity from Indian power plants. These include the Adani power plant in Jharkhand (1,496 MW), as well as the Bohorampur (1,000 MW) and Tripura (160 MW) power plants.

Beyond electricity imports, the two countries have been building their shared production capacity with the 1,320-MW coal-powered Rampal power plant in south-western Bangladesh, an equal joint venture. The first unit of the plant came online in December 2022, and the second unit started its trial run in October 2023.

But the ouster of Sheikh Hasina in August 2024 after weeks of protests has put a question mark on future energy cooperation.

A possible meeting between the head of the interim government in Bangladesh, Muhammad Yunus, and the Indian prime minister Narendra Modi on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly did not happen. Although the two governments explained it as a timing issue, there has been intense speculation as to why such a meeting could not be arranged.

A meeting between the foreign secretary of Bangladesh and the Indian high commissioner on Sunday highlighted the strained relations, with visa processing still not normalised and no date for the next Foreign Office Consultation between the two countries.

Both a dollar crisis and unusable installed electricity capacity means energy imports from India remain crucial to the health of the Bangladeshi economy, especially the ready-made garment industries, government sources and business figures told Dialogue Earth. But in the face of political tensions, they expressed concern about the stability of the imported supply.

The dollar crisis and Bangladesh’s big import bills

The dollar crisis has been key in driving Bangladesh’s import of electricity. Bangladesh’s foreign reserves shrank drastically from USD 48 billion in August 2021 to USD 13 billion by May 2024, partly due to global volatility after the Ukraine war, though it has since bounced back to USD 24 billion as of September.

The low foreign reserves have meant the country’s ability to pay for expensive imports, especially of coal, gas and other fuel needed to produce its own power, has been sharply limited, says Ijaz Hossain, a professor at the Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology.

In theory, Bangladesh has enough installed capacity for 27,791 MW. Sixty-two state-owned companies can produce a total of 11,821 MW (43% of total installed capacity), with 80 private sector plants able to produce 10,836 MW (39%). Two joint venture thermal plants – one with India and one with China – account for another 2,478 MW of capacity (9%). Finally, 2,656 MW (9%) can be imported from India.

But the reality is different, according to Md. Shamim Hasan. Hasan oversees public relations of the Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB), and says Bangladesh can only supply about 14,000 MW because of the fossil fuel shortage. The current demand is around 15,500 MW, and this leads to a shortfall of 1,000-1,500 MW a day.

With the imports from India, “we are paying more, but we are getting ready-power supply,” notes Hossain.

“Otherwise, the power supply in Bangladesh would be in big trouble,” he adds, and given the load-shedding of “up to 1,500 MW” in Bangladesh, “if supply from India comes down, the situation would worsen”.

But Hasan also expressed concerns about the long-term stability of the supply from India due to the change in government.

“Adani’s Jharkhand thermal plant was set up exclusively to supply power to Bangladesh,” he says. “We have come to know, after the fall of the previous government, [that] the Indian government changed a law allowing Adani Group to sell the Jharkhand power to its domestic market. This indicates that Bangladesh is unlikely to get dedicated power supply from the plant unless we are on good terms.”

Meanwhile, the Adani Group last month sent a letter to the Bangladesh government over its unpaid USD 800 million power supply bill.

BPDB officials told Dialogue Earth that they had already paid USD 150 million of this to Adani Group despite its dollar crisis, and was hoping to pay the full amount.

More renewables needed in India-Bangladesh energy cooperation

Hossain is concerned about Bangladesh importing “nearly 15%” of its total electricity requirement from India.

“This is not a good decision,” he says, pointing out that power generation from Bangladesh’s own gas-fired plants was much cheaper at about BDT 6 (USD 0.05) per unit compared to BDT 14 (USD 0.12) for a unit of electricity imported from the Adani power plant, once the capacity charge was factored in.

“We will not need the coal-fired power from India when we can restore gas, coal and diesel supply to our power plants. In the long run, I think, import of coal power from India would cease,” Hossain says.

Nonetheless, Bangladesh must remain engaged with India in energy cooperation to transform itself into a low-carbon economy, he adds. This would require “importing hydropower from India, Nepal and Bhutan in the future,” meaning Bandladesh “must get India’s approval to import electricity from Nepal and Bhutan via Indian territory”.  

In June, the Bangladesh government signed a deal to import 1,000 MW of renewable power from India and 40 MW of hydropower from Nepal via Indian territory, but this is a small share of the larger needs to transform Bangladesh’s growing energy needs.

However, Humayun Kabir, president of the Bangladesh Enterprise Institute and former deputy high commissioner to India, said he did not expect that power cooperation with India was likely to continue in “an open way” as it had in the past.

He also expects the government of Bangladesh “will evaluate the power-purchase deals with India and may even go for renegotiating with them,” but adds: “The interim government has no other option but to continue power purchase from India for now.”

“Even if we import power from Nepal, we must use Indian land to get it,” Kabir adds. “Against this background, the government must not stop buying electricity from India.”

He agrees with Hossain that future energy cooperation needs to move away from fossil fuel-generated power. “We should aggressively endeavour to develop the renewable energy sector,” Kabir says. “We should target to generate at least 50% from renewable energy sources by 2050. Now it is only 4%.”

Coal power plants such as Rampal have invited intense criticism from environmental groups due to being sited near mangrove forests, and along with others such as Adani, have been denounced for charging high prices.

Businesses suffer with uneven electricity supply

A steady supply of electricity, and possible lack thereof, will be of particular interest to the country’s ready-made garment sector, which accounts for over 80% of its total exports and employs nearly four million people, mostly poor rural women.

However, Mir Nasir Hossain, a former president of the Federation of Bangladesh Chamber of Commerce and Industry, said impacts of load-shedding would be contained.

“Most of the ready-made garment factories have their own captive power plants as the government cannot ensure uninterrupted supply of quality power,” he says, emphasising that it was voltage fluctuations that “hamper production”. Nonetheless, he pointed out that such private plants meant higher costs.

“If the government could ensure uninterrupted quality power supply, the business competitiveness of our industrial units, including the ready-made garment sector, would be enhanced,” Mir Nasir Hossain adds, and the country’s global competitiveness would increase.

“The current electricity crisis hits the small and cottage industry [most] because they cannot afford [to install] dedicated independent power plants,” he added, noting that such small industries employ a very large number of people in Bangladesh.

Mita Bose, managing director of leathercraft company Goose Limited, said larger businesses would also be impacted. While acknowledging that smaller businesses could not afford the generators that allowed bigger businesses to continue production, she said that the additional costs made even big businesses uncompetitive.

“Increasing the cost of business is like stabbing a businessperson,” she tells Dialogue Earth. “The bottom line is that power shortages affect everyone, be it big or small. When costs shoot up, business becomes tougher and eventually unviable.”

Secluded areas are being prepared for tourism growth despite environmental protections, prompting fears of unsustainable development. 

By Athar Parvaiz, October 15, 2024

The Gurez Valley lies on the Indian side of the Line of Control, which separates the two parts of the former princely state of Jammu & Kashmir between Indian and Pakistani administration.

Its location – in a militarised zone between two nuclear-armed adversaries – might be one of the reasons why this area has seen limited infrastructural development. But in the years since Covid-19 emerged, a drive to increase tourism is compromising what is an important ecosystem.

“Uncontrolled concrete construction [is] happening in Gurez,” says local resident Muzammil Khan. He recalls when there was just one wooden, six-room guest house in Dawar village. In the last three to four years, “more than 20 guest houses, 10 multistorey hotels and numerous homestays” have sprung up in the small valley. Khan, 29, presides over the Youth Association of Gurez, an NGO working to preserve the area’s environment and culture.

Khan’s association has no problem with development in the area, only the way it is being done. Arsalam Aslam, another member of the association, tells Dialogue Earth the “core and immediate demand of our association is that our area should be developed strictly in light of environmental laws”.

Gurez is home to a rich array of flora and fauna, including musk deer, and the endemic fish species that populate the area’s Kishanganga River. Khan says increased tourism and its associated infrastructure will put pressure on these habitats and the river’s water quality, “especially in the absence of a sewage treatment facility”.

Underused laws

The weak implementation of environmental laws is a significant problem in the Kashmir Valley, according to environmental experts. Faiz Bakhshi, a noted environmentalist, says “there is nothing wrong” with the Jammu & Kashmir Forest (Conservation) Act and the Environment (Protection) Act, but “they are not being implemented strictly.” This, says Bakhshi, “results in serious environmental damage as it is now being witnessed in Bungus Valley and Gurez”.

Like Gurez, the Bungus Valley is environmentally significant. “The Bungus Valley is unique in offering the peculiar attributes of a grassland ecosystem typically characterised by short grasses, and habitat to a rich biodiversity of flora and fauna, including musk deer, pheasants and monal,” says Sami Ullah Bhat, an environmental expert and professor at Kashmir University’s environmental science department. He expects improved access and subsequently higher visitor numbers to increase solid waste pollution. 

Dialogue Earth also spoke to Saleem Beg, a prominent conservationist and former director general for tourism in Jammu & Kashmir. He now heads the Jammu & Kashmir department of the Indian National Trust for Art and Cultural Heritage (INTACH). “What I have observed is that environmental laws are given a pass during tourism infrastructure creation and tourism promotion,” Beg says.

Beg recalls efforts to protect the region in 2006. “The Ministry of Tourism commissioned a study for the development of Bungus Valley,” he says. “INTACH was asked to do the study, and we proposed declaring Bungus a biosphere, where the main Bungus would be a core area protected from man-made intervention, such as infrastructure development. But today, Bungus is facing a threat like Sonamarg and Doodhpathri [developed tourist destinations].”

Environmental protections are accommodated in the government of Jammu & Kashmir’s tourism policy, established in 2020. It says the tourism department “will ensure development of sustainable and eco-friendly tourism by considering social and environmental aspects”, and “high standards of sanitation and hygiene will be maintained in all tourist destinations.” It also says “new structures and expansions” in “ecologically sensitive zones” must be undertaken in accordance with the Forest Conservation Act, the Environment Protection Act, and any other pertinent acts or rules.

In practice, these guidelines are often not followed. That is according to Rasikh Rasool, a local environmental activist who filed a public interest litigation case with India’s National Green Tribunal in May. He seeks its intervention over haphazard construction in and around the Bungus Valley. “There are clear guidelines in the Forest Conservation Act that a road should be only constructed through a forest if there is no alternative,” explains Rasool. “But the concerned department of the government chose to construct a road through an unlocked, thick forest, despite two other roads leading to Bungus Valley.”

Rasool alleges the road project included felling at least 25,000 forest trees. However, in its June 2024 report to the National Green Tribunal, the government acknowledged the removal of “1,023 deodar, kail and fir trees” only.

Furthermore, Rasool says over half a million tourists have visited Bungus in the past two years, without any arrangements in place for treating the resulting solid and liquid waste.

In recent weeks, both the local and national press have highlighted how the Gurez and Bungus regions are suffering from pollution and mismanagement.

The impact of mass tourism

At the end of August, India’s tourism minister proclaimed that the sector’s contribution to the national economy would rise from 7.9% to 10% before the end of the decade. Ten days later, Jammu & Kashmir’s commissioner secretary of tourism, Yasha Mudgal, pushed this agenda at a World Bank gathering, saying: “The need for development of additional tourist spots [is] to relieve pressure on the traditional ones, which are being explored beyond their carrying capacity.”

Citing Bungus and Gurez, Beg says the government’s promotion of lesser-known tourist destinations means “ecologically sensitive areas are being heavily intervened [in].”

Evidence of tourism surges outpacing the government’s efforts to regulate or plan can be seen in traditional sightseeing areas like Sonamarg. A 2020 scientific study used high-resolution satellite data to discover that, by 2015, Sonamarg had already “crossed the level of the projected developmental activities set out under the Master Plan for 2025”. The plan proposes using approximately 60 hectares of land for infrastructure development through to 2025; the study identified approximately 58 hectares in Sonamarg that had already been used for this purpose by 2015.

Several attempts by email, telephone and in person have been made to obtain comments from Mudgal, as well as from Kashmir’s director of tourism, and its divisional commissioner. At the time of publication, Dialogue Earth had yet to receive a response.

Heeding the disasters of Himachal and Uttarakhand

In Gurez, Muzammil Khan is concerned about the future. In response to an application for information, local government officials told him Gurez received 46,026 tourists in the 10 weeks between 1 May and early July. Khan estimates that, before 2019, tourist numbers for the whole year would remain in the thousands, and not reach the tens of thousands.

According to Sumit Mahar, similar tourism surges have “already been disastrous” for the Indian Himalayan state of Himachal Pradesh. Mahar represents the area’s Himdhara Environment Research and Action Collective. He points to the opening of the Atal tunnel in 2020, which enabled annual visitor numbers to grow from 130,000 to 740,000 by 2022. Mahar adds that alleged substandard road construction also exacerbated the impacts of the state’s 2023 floods.

In Uttarakhand, another Himalayan state in India, Mahar claims “mountains were cut indiscriminately” for the Char Dham road project, “ignoring environmental standards to bring more tourists”. He says “its consequences are witnessed in the form of landslides, cracks [in houses] in villages and the drying up of water sources.”

Mass tourism, observes Beg, “cannot be stopped in a country like ours, where hoteliers, travel agents, the burgeoning middle class and – above all – the government is fuelling tourism promotion”. He urges the government “to not facilitate cheap accommodation” as one way to stem the sprawl of low-quality development.

Khan says these are warnings that Kashmir cannot afford to ignore. “There is an urgent need for controlling and regulating tourism in Gurez Valley. Who will come to see Gurez if this destruction continues?”

As crops ripen in northeast India, elephants migrate closer to farmlands, sparking conflict with farmers. Anti-depredation squads aim to reduce these clashes. 

By David Smith, Aniruddha Dhamorikar, October 18, 2024

Tara, a young elephant in Assam’s central-northern Sonitpur district, spends most of her time in the forests of the Sonai Rupai Wildlife Sanctuary. This ancient elephant habitat, nestled along the foothills of the Himalayas, boasts a lush landscape of both evergreen and deciduous forests, and riverine grasslands.

For much of the year, Tara’s herd remains largely invisible in this dense environment. With abundant food and water, they roam within a modest 30-40 square kilometres, not needing to move more than a few kilometres every day.

However, come October, Tara’s movement patterns change. Following historical migration patterns, her herd leaves the forest, venturing into the district’s many tea plantations and following the path of the Jia Gabharu River, where they are joined by other elephant families. From here, they travel down to the Brahmaputra River, expanding their home range tenfold to encompass farmland and tea plantations. As their daily movements double, their interactions with humans also increase.

Motiram Boro, a farmer in the village of Chariduar in Sonitpur district, is no stranger to these encounters. Elephants once ravaged his paddy fields, leaving the farmer devastated. Boro responded by installing a solar-powered electric fence, a cost-effective barrier that has protected his crops since 2018.  

Nearby, forest staff hold an informal ceremony to pray for fewer human-elephant interactions. This period, known locally as hathi (elephant) season, aligns with the ripening of rice in the paddy fields.

Historically, elephants in Assam migrated along river corridors like the Jia Gabharu, moving between forests and feeding on crops from October to December. However, during the past 40 years, forest cover in the districts of Sonitpur and Udalguri has been reduced by encroachment and deforestation, significantly eroding the elephants’ habitat. This pushes them into conflicts with humans.

Anti-depredation squads   

In response, local communities and forest officials have organised anti-depredation squads (ADS) to manage human-elephant interactions. They work as informal, voluntary, but well-connected groups of villagers who are on the lookout for elephants year-round.

This solar-powered electric fence on the edge of a farm is a cost-effective way of keeping elephants out (Image: David Smith / WWF-India)

An anti-depredation squad member uses a powerful torch to keep an eye on an elephant in a tea plantation (Image: David Smith/WWF-India)

Ajit Bhengra, a leader in Rangapara, a town in Sonitpur district, is a key member of his local ADS. He recalls how elephants used to destroy crops and property, but through their local squad, quick communication and proactive measures such as WhatsApp alerts and coordinated drives, human injuries and deaths have significantly decreased. In addition to driving elephants away, the squads help people apply for compensation for crop or property damage and get people to safety if elephants enter a settlement.

Despite the best efforts of the ADS and preventive measures like solar-powered fencing, conflicts cannot be fully avoided. Elephants will continue to seek food in one area or another. The goal is to minimise conflict by keeping critical passageways open and ensuring that elephants can move safely between habitats. Bhengra, for instance, has been working with landowners to maintain a local crossing point for elephants, keeping the path free from obstructions.

These pathways have been used by elephants for many years to travel from the Sengelimari Reserve Forest to tea gardens in Rangapara (Image: Maxar Technologies via Google Earth)

Staff from the Sengelimari Reserve Forest and WWF-India join members of the local anti-depredation squad to inspect the elephant pathways (Image: David Smith / WWF-India)

Potentials for coexistence

Between 2014 and 2022, an average of 23 elephants a year died from unnatural causes, while 70 people a year died in encounters with elephants.

Nevertheless, there are stories of hope. In Rangapara, a town surrounded by tea plantations and farmlands, solitary bull elephants are a common sight. Bhengra introduces us to the elephant Lachit (named after the celebrated Assamese warrior, Lachit Borphukan), who has become a local fixture. Now in his 40s, Lachit was once an aggressive young bull. Over time, however, the community has developed a sense of kinship with him. When he ambles through the villages during the day, people recognise and accept his presence. His story is a testament to the possibility of peaceful coexistence, even in areas where human-elephant conflicts are frequent.

Lachit’s presence has important ecological implications, too. Solitary bulls like him play a critical role in passing genes between increasingly isolated elephant populations when they do mate, helping to maintain the genetic diversity necessary for the species’ long-term survival.

Elephants sheltering from the hot sun in a tea plantation in Rangapara (Image: David Smith / WWF-India)

With hathi season here once again, however, tensions between humans and elephants will inevitably rise. For elephants like Tara and Lachit, this time of year brings abundance. But in the Amarbari Forest Range office, under whose jurisdiction the management of wildlife falls in Rangapara, a stack of elephant-related property damage and injury claims builds up, representing the challenges ahead.

For the people of Assam, hathi season is a time of vigilance and adjustment. It is a period where they not only protect their livelihoods, but also find ways to integrate these majestic creatures into their everyday lives.

David Smith

David Smith works as the associate coordinator for WWF-India’s Brahmaptura Landscape, based out of Tezpur. He engages with communities in devising measures to mitigate negative human-elephant interactions, particularly in Assam, at the same time working to ensure elephant passages remain viable. He has over a decade of experience studying the relationship between elephants and the Brahmaputra River.

Aniruddha Dhamorikar

Aniruddha Dhamorikar works as lead for Species Conservation for WWF-India’s Brahmaputra Landscape based out of Tezpur. He studies the ecological and social dynamics of human-nature relationships, from ecosystem services to adverse interactions.

(Sources: Dialogue Earth)