Focus on Arts and Ecology

An important environmental story from China, synthesised from local and international media, March 28, 2026

The central government will reward five city clusters (as yet unselected) with up to CNY 1.6 billion (USD 232 million) each for reaching hydrogen targets like bringing down the price per kg to CNY 25.

The incentive is part of a four-year hydrogen pilot programme launched by three government ministries on 16 March.

Most hydrogen in China is used in oil refining, ammonia production and methanol, with transport accounting for only a minor share, according to the National Energy Administration. 

While previous hydrogen policy focused on transport, the pilot programme reflects real demand by considering a broader range of applications. It invites city clusters to set out plans across transport (such as hydrogen fuel cells), industrial applications (like green ammonia and hydrogen-based steelmaking), as well as emerging areas (including shipping, aviation and mining).

China’s hydrogen sector is approaching a “tipping point” for large-scale deployment, but still struggles to scale commercially and needs national-level support, stated an official from the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology.

The country has already built the world’s largest hydrogen-vehicle system, with nearly 40,000 fuel-cell vehicles and 574 refuelling stations by the end of 2025, according to Xinhua News. The new programme sets a target of 100,000 fuel-cell vehicles by 2030.

However, the sector is heavily dependent on subsidies. In Foshan, Guangdong province, use of hydrogen buses was suspended after local subsidies expired, as refuelling costs were too high, Yicai reported earlier this year.

Lowering costs is a central goal of the new programme. It sets a target of cutting end-user hydrogen prices from CNY 35-50 (USD 4.80-6.90) per kg to below CNY 25 (USD 3.50) by 2030. In advantageous regions with high renewable energy potential, the target is CNY 15 (USD 2.10).

The programme also stresses the need for a genuinely low-carbon supply chain. It bans coal-based ammonia or methanol projects from being labelled “green” and encourages hydrogen production linked directly to renewable power, including off-grid wind and solar projects.

The programme echoes China’s 2026 government work report, released on 13 March, which identifies hydrogen and green fuels as future growth industries, alongside the imminent creation of a national low-carbon transition fund.

As well as decarbonisation, energy security is another key reason for the hydrogen push. The crisis around the Strait of Hormuz is affecting global energy supplies, shipping costs and food prices, highlighting the need for energy autonomy and supply diversification, Lu Chenyu, secretary general of the Zhongguancun Hydrogen Energy and Fuel Cell Technology Innovation Industry Alliance, told Beijing News.

“As a renewable energy source, hydrogen is expected to accelerate the replacement of traditional oil and gas to meet the needs of energy security and carbon reduction. Furthermore, its derivative ammonia industry chain can provide new supply routes for fertiliser production," he said.

(Sources: Dialogue Earth)

Trusted journalism is increasingly vital as the energy transition becomes a defining geopolitical arena, our CEO discovered at a Sustainable Markets Initiative meeting. 

By Marek Pruszewicz, March 24, 2026

It's a huge problem, a real and present threat.”

That was former US secretary of state John Kerry’s answer when I asked him last week about the shrinking space for trusted, fact-based climate reporting.

We were talking at the Sustainable Markets Initiative event in London’s Hampton Court Palace. The line stayed with me, not least because of where I was hearing it: in a Tudor setting, amid an extraordinary concentration of capital and influence.

As I walked through the gates of what was once King Henry VIII’s palace, I found myself thinking about the many gatherings of power it must have seen over the centuries. And I couldn’t help but wonder if any had matched the array of influence, and wealth, that had collected under the aegis of an organisation run by Henry’s great nephew nine times removed, King Charles III. Monarchy may no longer be absolute, but it certainly still has convening power.

In this case, the stated theory of change behind the initiative is clear enough: bring together business, finance and governments to help unlock the trillions needed for a greener future.

But what really struck me, seeing it at close quarters, was not just the scale of the gathering but the certainty of the mood.

The palace was filled with more than 200 global CEOs. In the first session I attended, three senior figures from the nuclear industry were making the case for nuclear as part of a carbon-free portfolio. Googling quickly I found that they likely represented, conservatively, around USD 100 billion of capital between them.

The message repeated, again and again, was that the transition to a clean, profitable future is no longer a matter of aspiration. For many in the room, it is already strategic and commercial fact.

That is what made Secretary Kerry’s warning about climate journalism so striking. Because we are living in an increasingly fractured world: geopolitically, economically, informationally. Public space for reasoned, fact-based reporting is shrinking. Think of the cuts at the Washington Post including most of its award-winning climate team, or the closure of Thomson Reuters Foundation’s Context Newsroom as two examples. And this contraction is occurring just as climate becomes more deeply entangled with war, trade, industrial policy and great-power rivalry.

A few minutes after the session from the nuclear executives, Secretary Kerry made a point that’s been heard often over these past few tumultuous months but bears repetition. The war in the Gulf could accelerate the clean energy transition. “There is no security if you are dependent on the Strait of Hormuz,” he said. “You need energy independence.”

The argument was clearly resonating. Repeatedly, fossil fuel dependence was described not just as an environmental liability, but as a strategic vulnerability. Renewable energy, by contrast, was framed as resilience: a route to sovereignty, stability and long-term economic advantage.

“We stand here at a point of very considerable opportunity; we have a breakdown in an order which has had its day… I see fossil fuels as a weapon of war. Renewable energy is a weapon of peace.” That quote came not from a Green politician, but from Andrew Forrest, founder and executive chair of Australian mining giant, Fortescue.

The geopolitics of the transition were visible in another way too: the prominence of China.

There were two panels dedicated to green partnerships with China. Forrest spoke about Fortescue’s agreement with Chinese steel group Tisco on green steel technology. Chinese participants, led by Ren Hongbin of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, stressed China’s role as a partner in global sustainability.

In a conversation with me, Kerry put it clearly and succinctly: “Climate is a universal issue and everyone in the world has an interest in what the two largest economies and the two largest emitters are doing, not to mention the dominant country in clean energy.”

For all the confidence in the room, the real test of this transition will not be whether it can command applause at elite gatherings, but whether capital, technology and political attention flow to parts of the world where the stakes are highest. That means the Global South: where climate vulnerability is greatest, energy demand is rising, and where a “just transition” will mean very little if finance remains slow, conditional or out of reach.

There was also a conspicuous absence at the gathering. There were very few business figures from the United States in attendance, and no political representation that I could see. Given Washington’s current direction, that absence was understandable. What was more interesting was how little it seemed to trouble the people present.

The prevailing view appeared to be that the transition would move forward anyway – that capital, industry and geopolitical necessity are already pushing it on.

Let’s hope so. But that is precisely why Kerry’s first warning matters so much.

If the sustainable transition is becoming a defining arena of economic and geopolitical power, then the need for trusted journalism only grows. We need reporting that can do more than cheerlead: reporting that can explain, scrutinise, humanise and connect the dots in a world where climate is no longer a siloed issue, but bound up with security, trade and power.

At Hampton Court, I saw plenty of confidence that the transition is coming. I left thinking just as much about who will explain it honestly to the wider world.

The ultra-high-voltage technology is ready, but policy and planning need to catch up, write three energy experts. 

By Yu Aiqun, Huang Ye, Christine Shearer, March 25, 2026

China’s network of ultra-high-voltage (UHV) transmission lines is often described as a pillar of the country’s clean-energy transition. With relatively low losses, it can move power thousands of kilometres, from renewable energy megabases in the country’s north and west, to demand hotspots along the populous eastern seaboard.

But much of the electricity it carries still comes from coal. A system widely seen as essential for delivering clean power, now risks locking in fossil fuel.

With China set to invest roughly RMB 5 trillion yuan (over USD 700 billion) in its power grid by 2030, the next five years are a critical window to raise the renewable share on these UHV lines. The technology to do so exists – from storage to more flexible grid configurations – but the outcome will depend on whether policy frameworks in China shift to support its deployment.

Built for distance, not decarbonisation

No country has deployed UHV technology on a comparable scale to China. According to our research at Global Energy Monitor, by the end of 2025, the country had commissioned 45 UHV lines, totalling 52,300 km and with a transmission capacity of about 300 gigawatts (GW). This accounts for over 70% of China’s inter-regional and inter-provincial power-transmission capacity.

The huge scale of UHV development reflects China’s geography as much as its climate ambitions. Energy resources are concentrated in the north and west, while electricity demand is highest in the east and south. UHV has therefore become the backbone of China’s long-standing “west-to-east power transmission” strategy.

But China’s UHV system was not originally designed for wind and solar. Early projects were built mainly to transmit hydropower, with a small share of coal. Both of these sources offer stable, high-output electricity well suited for transferring large amounts of electricity over long distances.

A major shift came in 2014, when severe air pollution in northern cities prompted the government to plan 12 “air pollution control transmission corridors”. The strategy sought to reduce coal-fired power generation in eastern regions by relying on electricity imports from the west.

Nine of these corridors were built as UHV projects and eight of those were designed to transmit coal-fired electricity. According to our Global Coal Plant Tracker, between 2016 and 2019, they were commissioned alongside nearly 50 GW of new supportive coal capacity, more than a quarter of China’s coal additions during that period.

The UHVs did help shift pollution away from cities in the east, but they also locked coal into long-distance power flows. Even today, wind and solar account for only around one-fifth of electricity transmitted through UHV lines – a share that has barely increased since 2021, despite the rapid growth of renewables nationwide.

Under China’s 14th Five Year Plan, for 2021-2025, new UHV corridors were required to carry at least 50% renewable electricity. That represented significant progress from the current average of 21%, yet it means new corridors still could remain heavily backed by coal. Planned electricity output is often split evenly between fossil and renewable sources, making it difficult for renewables to dominate the transmitted power.

Policy and market need to accommodate renewables

Long-distance UHV power transmission typically involves sending regions, receiving regions and transmission operators that often belong to more than one power grid. Adding more wind and solar power necessitates increasingly complex coordination, including flexibility on both ends of the grid, “demand-side response” and greater use of power markets to trade electricity across regions and balance supply and demand in real time.

The higher the share of renewables, the more difficult and costly system dispatch, grid management and cross-regional coordination become.

By contrast, transmitting coal power remains a familiar and simple solution, easing grid operators’ accountability burden of operational safety, supply security and price affordability.

The Qing-Yu UHVDC line highlights these complexities. Commissioned in 2020, it was the world’s first UHV corridor designed to transmit 100% renewable electricity, from Qinghai to Henan. Yet it has never delivered more than half of its designed annual transmission volume of 41.2 terawatt-hours.

Pricing in Henan – which is based on subsidised local coal power, including “capacity payments” plus a fixed transmission tariff – systematically disadvantages renewable power delivered through the line.

Meanwhile, local flexibility resources are dominated by coal units, which struggle to absorb variable renewable output, limiting Qing-Yu’s potential to deliver more.

Technology is not the real constraint

From a technical perspective, this reliance on coal is not inevitable. High shares of renewables can create stability challenges for UHV systems, especially at the sending end, where local grids are weak. But coal is only one way to stabilise volatility and support the grid.

Alternatives such as pumped-storage hydropower, battery storage and concentrated solar power (CSP) with thermal storage can provide flexibility with minimal emissions. CSP plants usually use molten salt to store heat from concentrated sunlight, can ramp output faster than coal and provide stable generation after sunset.

The Lu-Gu UHVDC line linking eastern Inner Mongolia to Shandong shows what is possible by strengthening the AC grid at the sending end. Commissioned in 2017, the line does not rely on dedicated coal plants. Instead, it draws support from the wider north-east grid, allowing the flexible dispatch of thermal, hydro and renewable sources. In 2024, wind and solar supplied nearly 59% of the electricity transmitted, making Lu-Gu the only UHVDC corridor in China that achieves both high transmission volumes and a high share of wind and solar.

Beyond strengthening local grids, voltage-source converter (VSC) HVDC technology offers another approach. VSC-HVDC can operate without strong AC grid support and respond to power fluctuations in milliseconds. Unlike conventional UHVDC systems, which rely on robust local grid support, VSC-HVDC enables large-scale transmission and high levels of wind and solar integration.

China has already demonstrated this potential. The Zhangbei ±500 VSC project supplied the Beijing 2022 Winter Olympics with 100% renewable electricity. Yet some newer UHV projects with VSC technology – for example, the Gansu–Zhejiang UHV-DC project currently under construction – continue to add large amounts of coal capacity, reflecting planning choices rather than technical necessity.

Unlocking renewable potential in China’s UHV grid

By 2030, China’s wind and solar megabases are expected to reach around 455 GW, equivalent to the total utility-scale wind and solar installation capacity across the Americas as of February 2026. Of this capacity, 315 GW is planned to be transmitted to the east through UHV transmission. Under current planning assumptions, delivering that electricity would require 104 GW of additional coal capacity at the sending end, 8% of China’s current operating coal capacity, effectively making renewables a driver of new coal construction.

On the receiving end, provinces importing large volumes of electricity continue to approve new coal plants to strengthen the regional grid and balance variability associated with imported electricity. An analysis published in November 2025 by Xue Xiaokang, a Green Finance campaigner at Greenpeace East Asia, describes this dynamic as “dual coal lock-in”: coal expansion at both the sending and receiving ends of UHV transmission, driven by risk-averse planning rather than system-wide optimisation.

China plans to add 15 new UHVDC lines, bringing total operating transmission capacity to over 420 GW by 2030. As wind and solar capacity soars, UHV transmission needs to become greener, allowing fewer UHV lines to carry more renewable energy. The technology exists. What’s needed now is a decisive shift in priorities across technology, policy and market. Done right, UHV can help phase out coal rather than lock it in, and play a pivotal role in China’s energy transition and climate goals.

Chinese environmental films trying to bring viewers closer to nature are struggling to win the attention game. 

By Jiang Mengnan, March 18, 2026

Last year, a short play in a Chinese variety show sparked debate. The Sheep Comes! seemed to be an absurdist sketch with talking animals firing off one-liners and rapid retorts. But it reached into more serious themes, including animals’ changed behaviour in nature reserves and how humanity and wildlife relate to each other.

This is not something commonly seen in China. Art with nature-related themes abound, but film and performance pieces exploring environmental topics are rare. All you’ll find on the subject in mainstream channels are official news reports and analysis of the “dual carbon” goals. The situation is different overseas. Last year, a play about the 1997 Kyoto climate talks ran in London’s West End. In 2023, a production depicting reflections and anxieties about the climate crisis debuted in Australia, with a Singapore adaptation.

Some people are trying to fill this gap, including Ding Dawei, who founded the Beijing International Short Film Festival (BISFF) in 2017. The festival includes environmentally themed works in its programming, and has since 2023 maintained a dedicated environmental section, hoping to attract new audiences with films responding to the times.

Dialogue Earth interviewed Ding, as well as Wang Jue, a public and culture campaign specialist at Greenpeace’s Beijing office, to find out about the role film is playing in communicating climate and environmental issues in China.

What’s right vs what’s easy

In 2025, there were 23 films shown under BISFF’s environmental section, “Future Ethics”. One story, My Name is Oil, is told in the voice of an offshore drilling rig. Another is about a woman who leaves the city to spend time with a tree, and writes a journal documenting it. A film about traditional willow weaving, shot on Super 8, explores how crafts rely on natural materials.

“A wide variety of people came to watch the environmental films, including young people from big internet firms and older retirees,” Ding notes. He chose the films based on a gap he had noticed. Over the past ten years, films coming out of Europe and the US were focusing more and more on the changes the Earth is going through, as well as ecosystem relationships and silence on climate issues. An increasing number of works were re-examining how people and nature relate, but these themes were still considered niche in China.

Ding thinks people are realising the importance of protecting the environment but finding it hard to act in their already busy lives. “Everyone knows excessive packaging is a form of waste, but when you’re rushed, takeaway food wrapped up in plastic bags and boxes remains the easiest option.”

He says that disconnect comes down to a lack of real-life experience. “You need to go touch a tree. Feel a cow’s breath, feel its heartbeat. Only when you have that lived experience, rather than just ideals, will your thinking change.” Films can come closer to providing that lived experience.

The festival team prepared some “climate postcards” to get attendees to stop and think. The question on the most popular postcard, the one which brought the biggest response, was: “Does picking up a camera and filming nature mean you have changed nature?” Feedback received by the BISFF team discussed in detail the conflict between the “eternity of film” and “the limited Earth”.

In search of micro-narratives

A line in a famous Chinese road comedy film goes: “I’ve heard all the advice and I still can’t live right.” Chinese audiences have a similar attitude to nature and climate topics. BISFF used a popular online joke as the title of one of its social media posts: “Never mind zero carbon, I’m struggling to get to zero stress.”

Ding said that too much of the discussion around environmental topics is confined to professional circles: “The public know how important it is, but they struggle to access those circles and can’t participate in the debate or the action.”

This year’s BISFF is being held in partnership with Greenpeace’s Beijing office. Wang Jue of Greenpeace told Dialogue Earth she thinks narratives that focus on life instead of national policy are vital to reduce people’s sense of alienation from environmental topics. “Climate change is often seen as something political and technical, happening over long timescales in faraway places. People feel it has nothing to do with them. By focusing on specific stories and details, films can create direct links between the topic and people’s lives and cultural identities.”

One example is The Tigress of Manchuria, from Chinese director Huang Jiayi. The film connects the lives and cultures of the people of the north-east with the local tiger population as it retraces the route of a Russian author in exile.

Wang also points out that in the past, short environmental films tended to hold up examples to be followed. But a heroic tale of someone spending decades planting trees or saving wildlife only has brief motivational value. They create concern but no action, as audiences quickly return to their – very different – day-to-day lives. Film should reflect the complexities of reality, with ordinary people telling relatable stories to create empathy and longer lasting conversations, Wang says.

She also mentions some more down-to-earth climate content that Chinese audiences have taken to: global warming’s impact on the prices of coffee and lemons, and how it extends the pollen season; the impact of the shifting seasons on agriculture; the dangers delivery riders face working during extreme weather events; and the damage humidity causes to cultural heritage sites.

The fight for attention

When it comes to mass audiences, the climate still has to fight it out with other economic and cultural issues.

Open a social media app or site and you’ll find pages filled with posts about luxury lifestyles and adverts for all kinds of products, telling stories of how to be a better you. Those might bring momentary intrigue, but they also increase the longing for a life that is faster and more optimised – and, accordingly, more anxiety-filled.

Asked how to combat that type of excessive consumption, Wang says people need to draw energy from nature and choose a simpler and more environmentally friendly lifestyle. That energy can also come from short films: one of those showing at BISFF, Fabulous Cow Ladies, chronicles three generations of cows being tenderly cared for by three women vets. “From nature we can draw simpler, more basic experiences.”

But the dazzling array of information we are presented with in our daily lives makes it harder for us to make our own choices. Getting away from the screen and into nature is no easy task for most.

Looking for discussion on the BISFF environmental section on social media is also disappointing – there is barely any. One audience member told Dialogue Earth: “I was really interested in the environmental section, but I missed it. I hope to catch it next time.” That person, along with others who posted online, were more interested in films in the feminist and international competition sections.

The festival reflects real life: when there are so many pressing issues to worry about, the climate and nature are always told to wait their turn.

Plans for 2026 indicate they will continue to pull industrial levers to bring about the green transition, but with a primary focus on economic growth. 

By Cui Qiwen, March 25, 2026

China’s new Government Work Report, presented by Premier Li Qiang on 5 March, includes a “green development” aim for the year ahead: 

“Guided by our goals of achieving peak carbon emissions and carbon neutrality, we will make coordinated efforts to cut carbon emissions, reduce pollution, pursue green development, and boost economic growth, while strengthening our green development drivers.”

The previous month, the 31 provincial-level governments had published their plans for 2026. Dialogue Earth reviewed the energy and technology sections of these plans and discussed them with experts.

With over half of the provinces expecting reduced GDP growth and revenue, encouraging economic growth and demand is seen as a key task. Overall, there is a focus on integrating into existing industries the roll-out of energy storage, hydrogen power, wind and solar power, and AI and robotics.

Energy storage, hydrogen power and nuclear power grab attention

Until early 2025, rapid expansion in energy storage had relied on rules requiring storage to be part of new wind and solar projects. When that requirement was removed, storage became dependent on market forces. That did not lead to a significant fall-off in energy storage expansion and the sector is still growing, as Dialogue Earth has reported.

This is borne out by the provincial plans. Of the 31 provincial governments, 19 are planning battery-based energy storage projects. If pumped hydro storage is included, 25 of the plans include energy storage projects.

However, of the 19 with battery storage plans, only Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, Shanghai and Heilongjiang have set quantified installation targets, with the others focused more on associated manufacturing and technology. Of these, Guizhou, Hunan, Anhui and Sichuan mention development of electric vehicle batteries, along with robotics and energy storage.

Jiangxi is to develop solid-state battery technology, while Liaoning is to focus on boosting its manufacturing of green hydrogen and ammonia, which can store renewable energy in chemical form for later use.

Anders Hove, a senior research fellow at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, told Dialogue Earth that “energy storage is now driven by the market rather than targets or regulations… Currently, spot market liquidity is weak and mechanisms encouraging the use of energy storage are lacking. Nevertheless, the energy storage market has performed well since the changes early last year.”

Perhaps the most interesting focus is hydrogen power. Projects related to the gas feature in 21 of the provincial plans, with a shift from pilot projects to industrialisation.

For example, Jilin, Inner Mongolia, Yunnan, Liaoning and Ningxia all talk about “green hydrogen” – made using renewable power and synthesised into green ammonia and ethanol for use as fuel.

Jilin is preparing to advance five large “integrated green-hydrogen-based energy projects”, that can generate renewable power and use it to manufacture hydrogen fuel. While Ningxia is working on a “hydrogen and ammonia valley” project combining production, distribution, use and storage.

In some cases, the hydrogen sector is working across provincial borders. In 2025, Inner Mongolia and Liaoning completed a long-distance hydrogen pipeline. This year they are planning parallel hydrogen, ammonia and methanol pipelines from Chifeng to Jinzhou, to support Liaoning’s construction of a storage, distribution and refuelling facility for green shipping fuels. Also last year, a “hydrogen corridor” was created linking Chongqing, Guizhou and Guangxi.

China’s nuclear power sector grew rapidly last year and it features in the new annual plans of coastal provinces Guangdong, Shandong, Liaoning, Fujian, Zhejiang, Guangxi and Hainan. Each has multiple nuclear power plants under construction, due for expansion, or in the planning.

While the inland provinces of Anhui and Sichuan aren’t building nuclear power plants, their technology plans do include research into nuclear fusion. Anhui is due to complete the infrastructure for an experimental nuclear fusion reactor this year.

Solar and wind still important

China’s solar power manufacturing sector experienced cut-throat competition in 2024 and 2025. For 2026, 14 provinces have specific plans for solar projects but there is now more of a focus on making use of the power generated and on manufacturing, rather than building big solar farms.

Only Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Gansu and Qinghai now mention large solar farms. These are all in the less densely populated north-west of China, which has rich wind and solar resources. Most of the projects are carried over from the last five-year plan period (2021-2025), rather than being new additions. Inner Mongolia, though, is preparing to build six major solar farms and hoping to plan for another three.

Others are emphasising complementarity rather than simple expansion. Sichuan, Shanxi, Fujian, Shandong and Guizhou all stress the construction of large solar and wind farms but with a focus on integration with hydropower, wind power and coal power, reducing curtailment and creating a new electricity system. Shanxi, a major coal-mining province, stresses the combined development of coal power, renewables and energy storage, along with green industrial zones and encouraging the take-up of green electricity.

Yunnan, Anhui, Zhejiang and Liaoning, which could be regarded as the “industrial” group, all plan to develop their solar manufacturing industries and exports. Yunnan aims to use its cheap hydro, wind and solar power to drive silicon refining and manufacturing. Liaoning, meanwhile, plans to use solar to drive development of green hydrogen and ammonia industries.

The story is similar with wind. Thirteen provinces have explicit plans for wind projects, only some of which also have solar plans. These can be divided into three types: wind power farms, consumption of wind power, and manufacturing.

There is, however, still a trend towards big wind farms, especially offshore. Big offshore projects are included in the palns of Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, Shandong and Liaoning. In Zhejiang, private investment is being encouraged, with a required minimum 10% stake.

Hu Min, chair and joint founder of the China Institute for Global Decarbonization Progress, says that ending unhealthy competition within the renewables sector requires technological innovation and high-quality growth. She says China still does not have enough wind and solar power for carbon neutrality, and consumption and curtailment issues still need to be addressed.

‘Zero-carbon parks’ to bloom

“Zero-carbon parks” and industrial zones are planned or already being built in 28 provinces. The idea is that production from businesses within the parks and zones will produce “near zero” carbon emissions and, where possible, none. Guidelines require 90% of consumed power to come from clean sources and 80% of solid waste to be recycled.

Of China’s industrial businesses, 80% are located within an industrial zone, according to the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology. Data from early 2025 shows there are over 2,500 provincial or national-level industrial zones nationwide.

Tsinghua University’s Li Xiaofeng has written that those provincial and national industrial zones contribute more than half of all industrial value – but also account for 31% of carbon emissions. In 2025 and again this year, “zero-carbon zones” was somewhat of a buzzword.

In December last year, the government published a list of 52 pilot zero-carbon zones. According to Yicai.com, these will be completed between 2027 and 2030. Once up and running, carbon intensity of energy used will apparently be only one-tenth of today’s average for industrial zones. While at least 50% of the electricity used must come from “captive” green sources, meaning generated exclusively for use by the zone, according to a spokesperson for the National Development and Reform Commission.

However, there are few details on these zones in the provincial plans, just some numerical targets: Shandong says it will have 20 provincial or national zero-carbon zones by the end of the year; Zhejiang aims for 20 provincial zero-carbon zones and 150 green factories. More common are statements of intent. Guangdong, for example, says it will “promote the construction of national zero-carbon zones.”

Electricity supply remains a challenge. Nan Cunhui, director of the Chint group, which makes electrical appliances, says there are no mechanisms in place for setting power prices for zero-carbon zones. The captive power they use is supplied directly to the zone rather than via the grid. It usually comes from power plants close by, but sometimes travels across a provincial border, making pricing complicated.

Powering AI and robotics

AI, robotics, and the associated “smart economy” were the real star of this year’s provincial work reports. Dialogue Earth found 30 provinces mentioned AI, 20 robotics, and 17 “embodied AI” – that is, robots with AI capabilities.

Many provinces have detailed plans for these, linked to economic benefits and existing local industries. For example, Guangxi is developing AI models for the nonferrous metals and sugar industries, and is considering exporting robots to Southeast Asia countries, which it neighbours. It is also to build a training ground for embodied AI, with a target of producing 5,000 humanoid robots this year. Shanxi, meanwhile, is looking to use AI in its coal-mining industry.

All this will require a lot of electricity. According to Pangoal, a Chinese policy think-tank, data centre power consumption will continue to see big increases during the 15th Five Year Plan period (2026-2030). It estimates a maximum consumption of 600 terawatt-hours, or 5-6% of all national generation, in 2030. China is already responding, for example by requiring data centres powering AI to use green electricity for at least 80% of their consumption. Some provinces, such as Shandong, are using AI technology to optimise their power grids.

Anders Hove says China’s data centres may need to make more use of renewable energy, but a lack of grid flexibility is the key issue. “Currently, guidance is that monthly and annual contracts should dominate nascent power markets and transmission scheduling, which leads to inflexibility, and AI and smart grids can’t change that.”

Other issues

The most important task for the next five years is hitting the 2030 peak carbon goal. The provincial plans only give an indication of what’s happening with carbon emissions – specific policies at the industry and province level will come later.

Hu Min thinks provincial governments may already have been given specific emission cap targets by Beijing. But he thinks these won’t be made public because the State Council had earlier said the focus of the next five years will be on carbon intensity (emissions per unit of GDP). It will therefore be necessary to look at provincial emissions-reduction and energy-saving plans, and how those are implemented, she says.

Anders Hove thinks changes in market signals are more worthy of attention: “Just looking at government plans may not give enough insight into the future developments in the sector, especially when these are driven by the market, technology cost improvement (renewables, batteries, EVs), or when the government at local or central levels make ad hoc adjustments”.