Focus on Arts and Ecology

China-backed projects are helping smallholders with their yields as the climate changes, but the partnerships are also raising harder questions. 

By Duncan Mboyah, February 17, 2026

Many Kenyan farmers work fertile land close to fast-growing urban markets. But they are struggling as rainfall gets less predictable, heat stress rises and pests and diseases spread.

For smallholders, a single outbreak can wipe out years of savings. While for policymakers, each failed harvest carries reputational consequences.

Into this uncertainty has stepped a growing number of external partners offering technical fixes, with China now among the most visible. Across Kenya, Chinese companies, universities and development partners are backing projects that promise climate-resilient crops, reduced losses and steadier incomes.

Some farmers say the resulting improvements are tangible. The wider implications, however, are more complex. Bringing in new technology can strengthen local capacity but also entrench reliance. And for countries trying to build their own agri-tech ecosystems, important questions shadow the success stories: is progress sustainable and will the benefits be fairly shared?

A greenhouse bet in the Rift Valley

Benard Koech’s greenhouses sit on a small plot in Keberesit village, south-western Kenya. Inside, rows of tomato plants climb neatly toward the light. The setup looks relatively modern with plastic sheeting, drip irrigation lines, careful spacing. But the core innovation is less visible: each plant is built from two Chinese varieties joined by hand.

Koech, 28, tells Dialogue Earth he began growing tomatoes outdoors in 2020 as a pastime, after graduating in agribusiness management from Kenya’s Machakos University. About 95% of Kenya’s tomatoes are grown in open fields.

He has benefitted from a pilot programme to support rural youth to grow grafted tomatoes around Nakuru county, about 160 km north-west of Nairobi. The programme, a collaboration between China’s Nanjing Agricultural University and Kenya’s Egerton University, is about improving responses to disease and climate stress.

Stories like Koech’s are often presented as evidence that “South-South” cooperation between Global South nations can deliver practical solutions where traditional aid models have struggled. In Kenya’s case, the claim is that farmers are not only receiving inputs, but also learning techniques to manage climate shocks more effectively.

In this instance the technique involves joining the shoot, or scion, of a high-yielding but disease-prone tomato variety with the rootstock of a more resilient one. The aim is to keep producing desirable fruit while strengthening resistance to pathogens and water stress.

Joshua Ogweno, an associate professor of horticulture at Egerton University, says the tomato-grafting project emerged after bacterial wilt devastated tomato production in parts of the Rift Valley.

The wilt “spread like bush fire in the region as a result of climate change”, he says, adding that the grafted tomatoes have reduced crop losses by 80%.

The grafting is done at Egerton University and seedlings are then sold in agricultural supply shops. The plants can be harvested continuously for up to eight months, Ogweno says, compared to a roughly two-month harvesting window for ordinary plants grown in open fields.

Ogweno points to broader capacity-building outcomes. Since 2018, more than 1,100 “agricultural extension officers” – who teach farmers modern techniques – have received training on managing bacterial wilt and related threats, he says.

If these gains hold at scale, the implications are significant: fewer crop failures, less pesticide use and more predictable incomes. But success at pilot level does not automatically translate into long-term resilience. Greenhouses depend on imported plastic, fittings, irrigation systems and technical know-how, all of which carry costs, potential environmental risks, and risks if supply chains falter or funding ends.

Hybrid fodder grass and seedlings gain traction

Chinese involvement in Kenya’s agri-tech space is not confined to public-research partnerships. Private companies are also expanding their footprint.

Juncao grass is a hybrid fodder crop introduced in 2021 by Chinese entrepreneur Jack Liu. Grown in Kenya, it is resilient to drought and grows faster than normal Napier grass. Mwangi Kinyanjui, a lecturer in natural resource management at Kenya’s Karatina University, says the grass “has double protein”. He calls it “a saviour for livestock farmers who are witnessing low production of milk”.

However, juncao is grown on some of the most fertile arable land in Kenya, in Nakuru county, putting it in potential competition with staple food production.

Juncao has not solved Kenya’s persistent livestock feed shortages, since the majority of livestock farmers today import feeds from neighbouring Uganda.

“Technology transfer in agriculture can offset many problems that are affecting farmers, but the knowledge of the technology is still low,” Kinyanjui adds.

For farmers facing climate stress, speed matters. New varieties that establish quickly can mean the difference between survival and collapse. But rapid uptake also raises ecological questions about introducing new crops at scale, and whether local plants and seed systems are being strengthened or sidelined.

Boson Agri Ltd, which operates farms in Kenya, Zambia and Tanzania, supplies hybrid seedlings across the region. Leon Qu, the company’s chief executive, says: “We produce virus-free seedlings that reduce diseases and make seedlings and crops stable during dry seasons.”

For farmers, hybrid seedlings can sharply reduce risk. For policymakers, they raise familiar development questions: who controls seed systems, who captures value along the chain, and can domestic breeding and manufacturing capacity keep pace?

John Macharia, Kenya country director for the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), says partnerships that expand access to technology are urgently needed.

“Kenya has limited and unaffordable technology while climate change continues to affect farm production in the country,” he tells Dialogue Earth.

That reality explains the appeal of Chinese collaboration. But reliance on external solutions can deepen vulnerabilities if local institutions are not strengthened alongside them.

The trade imbalance behind the rhetoric

Kenya-China agricultural cooperation is unfolding against a starkly uneven trade relationship. In the first half of 2025, Kenya imported goods worth about KES 500 billion (USD 3.9 billion) from China, while exporting just KES 4.5 billion (USD 34.9 million), according to Guo Haiya, China’s ambassador to Kenya.

Guo argues however that, thanks to recent policy changes, African agricultural products are gaining better access to Chinese markets.

China has stated it will expand its tariff-free trade arrangements so all products from all 53 African countries it has diplomatic relations with can enter China without tariffs. This would make African products more competitive on the Chinese market.

“With the new zero-tariff arrangements, products such as Kenyan avocados, Zimbabwean blueberries, Ethiopian coffee, Ghanaian cocoa, and Tanzanian cashew nuts will enjoy easier and more competitive access to the Chinese market,” she told Dialogue Earth during the Africa International Agricultural Expo held in Nairobi in October 2025.

But market access alone does not guarantee exports. Cold storage, logistics, quality standards, financing and reliable production remain major barriers. These constraints have long limited African agricultural trade.

African countries can learn from China’s experience but only by adapting it, says Bob Wekesa, director of the African Center for the Study of the United States, at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg.

“China has done well in transforming production of tea and bamboo through the use of agricultural technology, something that African farmers can also borrow to benefit fully in balancing its trade with the Chinese,” he says.

He adds that persistent policy and implementation failures have constrained Africa’s agricultural potential. Progress requires planning across the entire value chain, from land preparation to storage and market access, he says.

No silver bullets

For Gordon K’achola, founder of the Africa Center for Diplomatic Affairs, the risk lies in overselling technology as a cure-all. Chinese partnerships, he says, are often framed as solutions to food insecurity while ignoring deeper structural issues in host countries.

He argues that China, like any external partner, benefits primarily through trade, while outcomes for smallholders depend on how African governments integrate new technologies into local value chains.

Without supportive credit systems, extension services and accountability mechanisms, he adds, technology transfer alone will not correct trade imbalances or transform rural livelihoods.

China, K’achola notes, provides financing, equipment and training as part of its broader cooperation agenda. Whether those inputs translate into durable benefits ultimately depends on domestic governance.

Duncan Mboyah

A series of new guidelines aim to standardise and mainstream ESG reporting by Chinese mining companies, but gaps remain. 

By Jiang Mengnan, Tom Baxter, February 16, 2026

On 1 December 2025, the Chinese Mining Association released two documents to guide mining companies on their environmental, social and governance (ESG) performance.

Though voluntary, they are the first attempt by a Chinese industry body to standardise ESG practices in the Chinese mining sector.

The sector includes some of the world’s largest mining companies, which are widely involved in extracting critical minerals. The environmental and social impacts of these minerals are currently poorly governed. A number of them are central to the global transition away from fossil fuels, due to their use in renewable power equipment and electric vehicles.

The documents, which cover information disclosure and governance capability, could affect Chinese mining companies’ operations both at home and abroad, experts and industry representatives have told Dialogue Earth.

Aligning Chinese and international norms

The first guideline document lays out principles for ESG disclosure, and provides a detailed structure for reporting. It uses a four-tier system of indicators, from broad themes down to 115 granular metrics, to guide companies on what information to disclose and how.

The second offers a way to rate companies’ ESG governance, with scores ranging from C to AAA, creating a benchmark for comparing how well companies manage sustainability.

They were launched by the Chinese Mining Association (CMA) and primarily drafted by the Development Research Center of the China Geological Survey (CGS). According to the documents, which are not yet publicly available, a wide range of voices were consulted during their creation, including government research bodies, leading mining companies, and investors who contributed insights both as stakeholders and as users of ESG data.

Sun Renbin from the CGS is lead contributor to the new standards. He tells Dialogue Earth they were developed in the context of rising ESG requirements both internationally and domestically. He mentions the EU’s 2022 and 2024 directives on sustainability reporting and supply chains, which have made sustainability disclosure mandatory.

“The international ESG ratings of Chinese mining companies show weakness – around 80% are rated as industry laggards by agencies such as MSCI, limiting their access to global capital,” Sun explains, referring to Morgan Stanley Capital International, a leading provider of financial information.

“At the same time, China has rolled out its own national frameworks for sustainability reporting, and mining companies are increasingly expected to adapt,” he says.

Sun notices differences between how Chinese companies and international ratings agencies understand ESG and the frameworks they use to codify it.

Up until now, the most prominent environmental concept that Chinese mining companies have been encouraged to focus on has been “green mines”. In 2017, China issued an implementation plan for green mines, and later provided a detailed scoring framework. The system is primarily environment-focused but does include a limited number of social and governance-related elements, such as indicators on community relations and poverty alleviation. China had established more than 5,100 green mines at the provincial level or above by November 2025, according to Xinhua.

Because of the framework’s environmental focus, it fits poorly with global ESG standards, leading to “the risk of misinterpretation by global rating agencies”, Sun explains. “One of the key motivations behind developing the new standards is to align more closely with international norms.”

Progressive or performative?

Deng Yaowen, an independent ESG consultant, says the CMA’s guidelines are a “very positive development”. He notes that the documents largely align with international ESG frameworks used in mining.

“They appear to cover most of the key material risks people would expect to see, from climate and tailings, to safety and community issues,” he tells Dialogue Earth.

Chen Yu, senior China advisor at Global Witness, tells Dialogue Earth the new guidelines represent China’s first ESG disclosure framework specifically for mining.

“They turn the Ministry of Finance’s national sustainability principles into practical, sector-level guidance,” she says.

“For mining companies, these two sets of standards hold much significance,” says a representative from the ESG office of Zijin, one of the world’s top three multinational metals mining company by market capitalisation. “They … put forward relatively complete framework requirements for ESG information disclosure and governance capabilities.”

Chen highlights the attention the guidelines pay to social issues, which is progressive in the Chinese context. “The standards require companies to promptly disclose major ESG events to all stakeholders, including local communities,” she explains. This goes beyond both the Ministry of Finance’s 2024 Corporate Sustainability Information Disclosure Principles and existing guidance from China’s stock exchanges, she notes.

However, Deng Yaowen says the guidelines’ focus show that many Chinese mining companies are still early in their ESG journey. “The emphasis seems [to be] very much on whether management systems and policies are in place, and on the quality of information disclosure, rather than on evaluating outcomes on the ground,” he says.

He adds that while the standards could provide a foundation for more constructive dialogue with civil society, they “have limits in showing the real-world impacts of mining operations”.

Deng says there is an increasing expectation internationally for mining companies to carry out regular risk-based ESG assessments at the site level, and communicate important findings to key stakeholders, including affected communities and civil society groups. He pointed out that many mining-related ESG risks are long-term and cumulative, and understanding them often requires being on the ground and having genuine conversations with affected stakeholders.

Towards international best practice

Chen adds that the guidelines align closely with the mining standard of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). Known as GRI 14, this is considered the world’s leading standard for ESG in the mining sector. However, gaps remain in the Chinese guidelines’ coverage and depth, especially regarding local communities. “GRI 14 requires detailed reporting on both positive and negative impacts on local communities, whereas the Chinese rules do not explicitly distinguish between these,” she explains.

She also notes that while the Chinese rules recommend disclosing community-complaint mechanisms and the frequency of communication, they lack GRI 14’s level of detail. That includes grievance data such as the percentage addressed and resolved, site-level health and safety impacts, and agreements on community development. Chen further highlights the absence of guidance on Indigenous peoples, reflecting China’s cautious use of the term in regulatory and industry contexts.

Zijin’s representative also notes slight discrepancies between the guidelines and international standards relating to differences in context. “While they share common principles such as governance accountability and continuous improvement, differences remain in the practices of certain topics, particularly social issues like human rights and community engagement. This partly reflects differences in [national and economic] development stages, values and cultural contexts between China and the west.”

He adds that the guidelines offer a “clear starting point” for which Chinese mining companies can build their ESG governance and disclosure systems. “However, companies with international operations will need further alignment with international disclosure standards and rating frameworks to meet the expectations of wider stakeholders.”

Going global

Chen Yu says the CMA’s guidelines are notable for addressing Chinese mining companies’ overseas operations, providing clear guidance on reporting local impacts and related actions.

Chinese miners are increasingly expanding into global markets. As of end-2025, Zijin Mining has operations in 15 countries outside of China. Other major players include CMOC Group, the world’s largest producer of cobalt, and Ganfeng Lithium, the world’s third largest lithium producer, with operations in Australia, Argentina and Mexico. Demand for cobalt and lithium, for use in batteries and other electronic and industrial goods, is booming due to energy transitions around the world.

The Zijin representative says that for Chinese companies investing overseas, the guidelines offer a number of benefits. Firstly, they can help companies steer their way through global ESG requirements, which are increasingly important for securing finance and project approvals.

Secondly, they can help companies manage project risks at an early stage. If left unaddressed at the outset, ESG issues can quickly escalate into systematic risks, he emphasises.

Lastly, they will help transform Chinese companies operating overseas from “participants in compliance” to “partners in responsible development”, the representative says.

Further momentum

On 30 December, a third set of guidelines relating to environmental and social impacts was released. This one came from China’s Ministry of Commerce (Mofcom), a central government body with much greater power than the CMA.

The guidelines, which relate specifically to Chinese companies’ overseas operations, break down responsibilities regarding support for economic development, improvement of livelihoods and social cohesion, environmental protection and green transitions, as well as the promotion of “healthy and sustainable development”.

Under the environmental section, the guidelines highlight the need for mining companies to improve environmental protection standards, encourage recycling and low-carbon technologies, and implement ecological restoration.

Global Witness’s Chen Yu sees Mofcom’s guidelines as “a positive signal of a regulatory tendency … ‘testing’ China’s green mining practices overseas”.

She cautions that they lack enforceability, however – a weakness we have seen across Chinese government attempts to strengthen the environmental and social credentials of companies’ overseas operations.

Jiang Mengnan

Jiang Mengnan is the strategic communications officer at Dialogue Earth, based in London. She joined in 2022 and is also a journalist specialising in sustainable finance and ESG development. She used to work in ESG consulting and communications in both private and non-profit sectors, and holds the title of Certified ESG Analyst (CESGA) from the European Federation of Financial Analysts Societies (EFFAS).

Tom Baxter

Tom Baxter is project manager for Dialogue Earth’s global China and learning programme, based in London. He joined the organisation in 2018 and was based in Beijing until 2022. Tom holds an MA in history from the University of Glasgow and an MSc in economic policy from SOAS, University of London. He worked in China for a decade and speaks and reads Chinese. Tom’s interests include the interactions between climate and development, China’s role in global development and environmental governance, and socio-economic issues such as industrialisation, migration and labour.

(Sources: Dialogue Earth)

Development projects globally must answer a burning question as rising temperatures threaten workers’ health and productivity, write three academics. 

By Jiayong Liang, Maria Adele Carrai, Xiaojiao Wang, February 18, 2026

In December 2022, fireworks lit up the sky over Lusail stadium, north of Doha. At the centre stood Lionel Messi, arms raised, World Cup trophy in hand, as thousands celebrated around him. It was a moment of triumph for Messi, for Argentina and for Qatar, the first Middle Eastern country to host one of the world’s most iconic sporting events.

Qatar had won the bid in 2010. In the 12 years that followed, the country underwent an infrastructural transformation. Stadiums rose from scratch, highways were laid, hotels reshaped the skyline. A nation readied itself to be seen.

And yet, as the World Cup unfolded, another group became impossible to ignore. Not those inside the stadium that December night, but those who had built it. Hundreds of thousands of migrant workers who had laboured under a desert sun worsened by climate change. Many died. They showed what extreme heat can do to those who construct the world’s grandest visions.

This is more than a cautionary tale. It is a glimpse into a future where extreme heat disrupts labour forces, reshapes economies and challenges the very foundations of global infrastructure development schemes.

One such scheme is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) launched by China in 2013.

The scale is clear. Thus far, China has allocated around USD 1 trillion in loans and investments to BRI projects, including power plants, railways, ports, telecommunications networks, and other large infrastructure developments. But what is also clear is that the BRI is unfolding in some of the world’s most heat-vulnerable regions, spanning Africa, South Asia, and the Middle East.

Many nations along these corridors already struggle with fragile infrastructure and limited resources to combat climate shocks. As the heat intensifies, the cost of strategies to keep workers safe – cooling systems, adjusted work schedules, reduced hours – will rise, straining the very projects meant to drive economic development.

Construction, agriculture and extraction depend on long hours of outdoor work. Yet our modelling suggests that by the end of the century, heat stress could reduce feasible working time by up to 25% in the worst-affected sites.

Because much of the BRI is financed through long-term loans that mature decades after completion, these chronic hits to output can translate into weaker cash flows and delayed repayment. The economics of labour-intensive projects could be undermined by the rising cost of keeping workers safe.

Such pressures raise a critical question: Can China’s BRI remain financially and operationally sustainable under intensifying heat stress? As temperatures climb, so too does the likelihood of the answer being no.

Rising temperatures push down productivity

We have modelled two possible futures. The first follows a low-emission pathway, where aggressive climate action drives global CO2 emissions to net zero by around 2075. The second envisions a world without effective climate policies, leading to a medium-to-high emission trajectory.

The contrast between these scenarios is stark.

Under the high-emission pathway, labour productivity could plummet by more than 30% in some regions by the late 21st century. Productivity losses in industries such as agriculture and construction could be three times greater than in a low-emission future.

Desert coal miners face an uncertain future

Take the Thar Desert in south-eastern Pakistan, a region with relentless heat, minimal rainfall and land too parched for cultivation. Here, amid the sand and the dust, lies one of the world’s largest lignite coal deposits.

In 2014, the Engro Thar coal power project (Thar-II) was launched to help alleviate Pakistan’s chronic energy shortages. This cornerstone of the BRI’s China-Pakistan Economic Corridor was completed five years later, but now faces a future increasingly imperilled by rising temperatures.

Our model shows that if emissions continue on a medium-to-high scenario, labour productivity at the Thar Engro project could drop by nearly a quarter. This will mean about three months of lost work each year by 2100, as rising heat makes it harder for workers to endure long hours outdoors.

For those who call the Thar desert home, life has always been precarious, dependent on the success of an unpredictable monsoon. Locals rely on rearing livestock and seasonal agriculture. Women walk miles to collect water. And a single failed monsoon can mean acute fodder shortages for livestock. In this world, the promise of a stable job offers a way out of the cycle of drought.

Since operations began in 2019, drawn by this promise, young men have flocked to the open-air Thar mine, working even during the hottest part of the day. Last summer, temperatures reached 44C at the nearest official weather post to the coalfield – the Chhor station in eastern Sindh, on the edge of the Thar region. That reading, from 12 June 2025, captures only the ambient air temperature; wet-bulb conditions at the open-pit mine, factoring in humidity and direct sun exposure, would be considerably more punishing for workers on shift. The relentless heat blurs the line between economic opportunity and physical peril.

In the Thar Desert, heat shapes how the mine operates. Reporting from the site by media outlet Dawn describes a workday structured around peak temperatures, including long pauses in the middle of the day. One driver told Dawn his dumper cab is air‑conditioned and noted strict safety protocols, including carrying water.

Such adaptations – adjusted shifts, cooling infrastructure, hydration protocols – are the minimum required to keep operations running. But they add cost, and if temperatures continue to climb, they raise hard questions about the long-term financial viability of coal mining in one of the hottest places on Earth.

Adaptation, transition and greening BRI

While coal remains central to Pakistan’s energy strategy, the escalating burden of climate adaptation signals a pressing need to rethink the country’s reliance on fossil fuels. The Thar region faces a dilemma: whether to continue exploiting one of the world’s largest lignite deposits or to accelerate a transition toward cleaner, more sustainable energy sources.

Coal burning causes an estimated 1.1-1.3 million global deaths annually from pollution, with women and children living near coal mines being particularly vulnerable due to soil and water contamination. Worse still, Thar’s lignite, has a lower heating value than many other types of coal, so more must be burned to generate the same amount of power, meaning higher CO2 emissions.

Global momentum is also shifting toward just energy transitions, with many countries and regions actively moving away from fossil fuels. China, too, has pledged to build a greener Belt and Road. Our research adds another crucial reason to support this transition: unless emissions are curbed quickly, rising temperatures could make regions like Thar too hot for workers to operate safely.

For policymakers and investors, this underscores a broader reality: climate risk must be integrated into every stage of major project planning. Without substantial investment in resilience strategies, these projects face significant risks to their sustainability and profitability. Climate-conscious infrastructure, improved building codes, and disaster-resistant design are increasingly essential.

The Thar coal power project serves as an urgent reminder that infrastructure built today must be resilient enough for the climate of tomorrow. By embracing green technologies, strengthening adaptive infrastructure, and reforming unsustainable practices, the BRI has an opportunity to not only survive climate risks, but to lead the way toward a more resilient and equitable future.

By Samantha Burchard, February 17, 2026

Each time someone asks ChatGPT a question, the exchange feels nearly invisible: just text appearing on a screen. But behind that response lies a massive physical infrastructure drawing electricity, consuming water, and producing carbon emissions at an unprecedented scale. As generative artificial intelligence becomes embedded in everyday life, the environmental footprint of the system powering it is growing just as rapidly.

OpenAI has acknowledged that users now send roughly 2.5 billion prompts per day to ChatGPT. Each prompt requires computation inside energy-intensive data centers, where servers run continuously to process, store, and generate responses. While a single query may seem insignificant, the cumulative demand of billions of interactions translates into real and measurable environmental costs.

While a single AI query may feel insignificant, everyday use adds up quickly at scale. A typical office worker might use ChatGPT about 20 times a day to summarize a meeting, draft emails, brainstorm ideas, and outline a report. Each prompt uses an estimated 0.34 watt-hours of electricity — roughly the amount of energy needed to run a standard LED lightbulb for about two minutes. Over a day, that adds up to about 6.8 watt-hours per person. 

On its own, 6.8 watt-hours per day is minimal, but scaled to one million daily users, that becomes 6,800 kilowatt-hours — enough to power roughly 225 U.S. homes for a full day. At 100 million users, the number jumps to 680,000 kilowatt-hours daily, comparable to the electricity consumption of more than 22,000 households. Small individual actions, multiplied globally, begin to resemble the energy footprint of the entire community. 

Data Centers and the AI Boom

Generative AI relies heavily on hyperscale data centers, the largest category of computing facilities in the world. As of 2024, there were 1,136 hyperscale data centers globally, with the United States accounting for 54% of global capacity. These facilities are expanding in both size and power density, driven largely by AI workloads that require constant, high-performance computing. 

The environmental implications are already visible. At more than 4%of total U.S. electricity consumption, data centers now use roughly as much power as all residential lighting nationwide — and more electricity than many individual states consume in total. Projections cited in the same analysis suggest that figure could rise between 6.7% and 12% by 2028 as AI systems continue to scale.

This surge in electricity demand presents a challenge for both U.S. national climate targets and global climate goals under the Paris Agreement, which depend on rapidly reducing fossil fuel use even as electricity demand grows. While renewable energy capacity is expanding, much of the U.S. grid still relies on fossil fuels. As a result, increased electricity use by data centers often corresponds directly with higher greenhouse gas emissions.

Carbon Emissions at Scale

The climate impact of AI infrastructure is no longer speculative. A roadmap study from Cornell University estimates that AI-driven data center expansion could generate between 24 and 44 million metric tons of carbon dioxide emissions annually by 2030. That range is comparable to adding millions of gasoline-powered vehicles to U.S. roads each year.

The emissions stem from multiple sources: the electricity required to run servers, the energy used for cooling, and the upstream carbon footprint of power generation. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, fossil-fuel power plants also consume substantial amounts of water, linking carbon emissions and water use in ways that amplify environmental stress.

PULLQUOTE: “In recent years advances in AI systems and services have largely been driven by a race for size and scale, demanding increasing amounts of computational power — and generally without much regard for resource efficiency.” – Prof. Tom Rodden, University of Nottingham, quoted in The Guardian on AI data center energy and water use

AI’s Thirst for Water

While electricity consumption often dominates discussions about AI’s climate impact, water use is an equally pressing concern. Data centers rely on water-based cooling systems to prevent servers from overheating. Research summarized by MIT Technology Review shows that AI servers operating within standard “cool” temperature ranges — typically between 18°C and 27°C (64-81°F) — can require one to two liters of water per kilowatt-hour of electricity consumed, depending on system design and local climate conditions. At one to two liters per kilowatt-hour, generating the electricity for a single AI-heavy household’s daily energy use can require the equivalent of an entire person’s daily drinking water — just to keep servers cool.  

In 2023, U.S. data centers consumed an estimated 17 billion gallons of water. Given that the average American uses between 30,000 to 36,500 gallons of water annually, that volume could meet the full yearly water needs of roughly half a million people. In effect, data centers now “drink” as much water each year as a mid-sized American city. 

The consequences are especially severe in arid regions. A Bloomberg analysis found that many new AI-driven data centers are being built in already water-stressed areas, including the American Southwest. In Reno, Nevada, a growing data center hub, climate assessments show high long-term drought risk, raising concerns about the sustainability of continued industrial water use — and putting residents at greater risk of water restrictions, rising utility costs, and heightened vulnerability during prolonged drought conditions.

Local investigations have already documented these pressures. Reporting by The New York Times found that a Meta data center in Georgia uses roughly 500,000 gallons of water per day — enough to supply the daily water needs of several thousand residents. Similar conflicts are emerging nationwide as communities grapple with competing demands for limited freshwater.

Transparency Gaps and Policy Challenges

Despite the scale of energy and water consumption, reporting requirements remain limited. Most technology companies do not publicly disclose facility-level data on water withdrawals or cooling practices. Experts cited by The Guardian have warned that the lack of mandatory reporting for data center energy and water use makes it difficult for regulators and communities to assess environmental risks or plan for infrastructure strain.

Without transparency, local governments may approve new facilities without fully understanding long-term impacts on water systems, electricity prices, or emissions targets.

Paths Toward Sustainable AI

There are viable ways to reduce AI’s environmental footprint. Research from Cornell indicates that strategic siting of data centers, renewable energy integration, and advanced cooling technologies could significantly lower emissions and water use if adopted at scale. In some scenarios, improved cooling efficiency alone could reduce water consumption by nearly a third.

The United Nations has repeatedly emphasized electrification — shifting cars from gasoline to electric vehicles, replacing gas heating with electric systems, and digitizing infrastructure — must be paired with rapid expansion of renewable energy sources like wind and solar. Without decarbonizing the grid at the same pace that electricity demand grows, increased digital and AI infrastructure risks locking in higher emissions rather than reducing them. 

Innovation With Accountability

AI systems like ChatGPT offer real social benefits, from education and accessibility to research and communication. But as adoption accelerates, so does the responsibility to ensure that innovation does not come at the expense of climate stability and water security. 

EARTHDAY.ORG has long focused on making environmental costs visible. The infrastructure behind AI is no exception. As billions of daily prompts translate into rising energy use, water withdrawals, and carbon emissions, the future of AI will depend not just on technological advancement, but on whether its growth aligns with the planet’s ecological limits.

Powering AI Without Polluting the Planet

You can help ensure that all energy infrastructure — including the power behind AI — is clean, renewable and responsibly built.

Sign the Renewable Energy Petition urging world leaders to triple renewable energy generation by 2030 — a benchmark climate scientists say is essential to meeting global emissions targets. Past public pressure has helped accelerate renewable commitments at both national and corporate levels, and continued engagement remains critical.
In the U.S.? You can also send a message to your local lawmakers urging them to invest in renewable energy and grid modernization so that digital innovation doesn’t deepen the climate harm.

(Sources: Earthday.org)