Focus on Arts and Ecology

By Samantha Burchard, February 17, 2026

Each time someone asks ChatGPT a question, the exchange feels nearly invisible: just text appearing on a screen. But behind that response lies a massive physical infrastructure drawing electricity, consuming water, and producing carbon emissions at an unprecedented scale. As generative artificial intelligence becomes embedded in everyday life, the environmental footprint of the system powering it is growing just as rapidly.

OpenAI has acknowledged that users now send roughly 2.5 billion prompts per day to ChatGPT. Each prompt requires computation inside energy-intensive data centers, where servers run continuously to process, store, and generate responses. While a single query may seem insignificant, the cumulative demand of billions of interactions translates into real and measurable environmental costs.

While a single AI query may feel insignificant, everyday use adds up quickly at scale. A typical office worker might use ChatGPT about 20 times a day to summarize a meeting, draft emails, brainstorm ideas, and outline a report. Each prompt uses an estimated 0.34 watt-hours of electricity — roughly the amount of energy needed to run a standard LED lightbulb for about two minutes. Over a day, that adds up to about 6.8 watt-hours per person. 

On its own, 6.8 watt-hours per day is minimal, but scaled to one million daily users, that becomes 6,800 kilowatt-hours — enough to power roughly 225 U.S. homes for a full day. At 100 million users, the number jumps to 680,000 kilowatt-hours daily, comparable to the electricity consumption of more than 22,000 households. Small individual actions, multiplied globally, begin to resemble the energy footprint of the entire community. 

Data Centers and the AI Boom

Generative AI relies heavily on hyperscale data centers, the largest category of computing facilities in the world. As of 2024, there were 1,136 hyperscale data centers globally, with the United States accounting for 54% of global capacity. These facilities are expanding in both size and power density, driven largely by AI workloads that require constant, high-performance computing. 

The environmental implications are already visible. At more than 4%of total U.S. electricity consumption, data centers now use roughly as much power as all residential lighting nationwide — and more electricity than many individual states consume in total. Projections cited in the same analysis suggest that figure could rise between 6.7% and 12% by 2028 as AI systems continue to scale.

This surge in electricity demand presents a challenge for both U.S. national climate targets and global climate goals under the Paris Agreement, which depend on rapidly reducing fossil fuel use even as electricity demand grows. While renewable energy capacity is expanding, much of the U.S. grid still relies on fossil fuels. As a result, increased electricity use by data centers often corresponds directly with higher greenhouse gas emissions.

Carbon Emissions at Scale

The climate impact of AI infrastructure is no longer speculative. A roadmap study from Cornell University estimates that AI-driven data center expansion could generate between 24 and 44 million metric tons of carbon dioxide emissions annually by 2030. That range is comparable to adding millions of gasoline-powered vehicles to U.S. roads each year.

The emissions stem from multiple sources: the electricity required to run servers, the energy used for cooling, and the upstream carbon footprint of power generation. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, fossil-fuel power plants also consume substantial amounts of water, linking carbon emissions and water use in ways that amplify environmental stress.

PULLQUOTE: “In recent years advances in AI systems and services have largely been driven by a race for size and scale, demanding increasing amounts of computational power — and generally without much regard for resource efficiency.” – Prof. Tom Rodden, University of Nottingham, quoted in The Guardian on AI data center energy and water use

AI’s Thirst for Water

While electricity consumption often dominates discussions about AI’s climate impact, water use is an equally pressing concern. Data centers rely on water-based cooling systems to prevent servers from overheating. Research summarized by MIT Technology Review shows that AI servers operating within standard “cool” temperature ranges — typically between 18°C and 27°C (64-81°F) — can require one to two liters of water per kilowatt-hour of electricity consumed, depending on system design and local climate conditions. At one to two liters per kilowatt-hour, generating the electricity for a single AI-heavy household’s daily energy use can require the equivalent of an entire person’s daily drinking water — just to keep servers cool.  

In 2023, U.S. data centers consumed an estimated 17 billion gallons of water. Given that the average American uses between 30,000 to 36,500 gallons of water annually, that volume could meet the full yearly water needs of roughly half a million people. In effect, data centers now “drink” as much water each year as a mid-sized American city. 

The consequences are especially severe in arid regions. A Bloomberg analysis found that many new AI-driven data centers are being built in already water-stressed areas, including the American Southwest. In Reno, Nevada, a growing data center hub, climate assessments show high long-term drought risk, raising concerns about the sustainability of continued industrial water use — and putting residents at greater risk of water restrictions, rising utility costs, and heightened vulnerability during prolonged drought conditions.

Local investigations have already documented these pressures. Reporting by The New York Times found that a Meta data center in Georgia uses roughly 500,000 gallons of water per day — enough to supply the daily water needs of several thousand residents. Similar conflicts are emerging nationwide as communities grapple with competing demands for limited freshwater.

Transparency Gaps and Policy Challenges

Despite the scale of energy and water consumption, reporting requirements remain limited. Most technology companies do not publicly disclose facility-level data on water withdrawals or cooling practices. Experts cited by The Guardian have warned that the lack of mandatory reporting for data center energy and water use makes it difficult for regulators and communities to assess environmental risks or plan for infrastructure strain.

Without transparency, local governments may approve new facilities without fully understanding long-term impacts on water systems, electricity prices, or emissions targets.

Paths Toward Sustainable AI

There are viable ways to reduce AI’s environmental footprint. Research from Cornell indicates that strategic siting of data centers, renewable energy integration, and advanced cooling technologies could significantly lower emissions and water use if adopted at scale. In some scenarios, improved cooling efficiency alone could reduce water consumption by nearly a third.

The United Nations has repeatedly emphasized electrification — shifting cars from gasoline to electric vehicles, replacing gas heating with electric systems, and digitizing infrastructure — must be paired with rapid expansion of renewable energy sources like wind and solar. Without decarbonizing the grid at the same pace that electricity demand grows, increased digital and AI infrastructure risks locking in higher emissions rather than reducing them. 

Innovation With Accountability

AI systems like ChatGPT offer real social benefits, from education and accessibility to research and communication. But as adoption accelerates, so does the responsibility to ensure that innovation does not come at the expense of climate stability and water security. 

EARTHDAY.ORG has long focused on making environmental costs visible. The infrastructure behind AI is no exception. As billions of daily prompts translate into rising energy use, water withdrawals, and carbon emissions, the future of AI will depend not just on technological advancement, but on whether its growth aligns with the planet’s ecological limits.

Powering AI Without Polluting the Planet

You can help ensure that all energy infrastructure — including the power behind AI — is clean, renewable and responsibly built.

Sign the Renewable Energy Petition urging world leaders to triple renewable energy generation by 2030 — a benchmark climate scientists say is essential to meeting global emissions targets. Past public pressure has helped accelerate renewable commitments at both national and corporate levels, and continued engagement remains critical.
In the U.S.? You can also send a message to your local lawmakers urging them to invest in renewable energy and grid modernization so that digital innovation doesn’t deepen the climate harm.

(Sources: Earthday.org)

By Shanna Hanbury, 10 Feb 2026

Brazil has suspended a decree on dredging and privatizing the Tapajós River, a major tributary of the Amazon, after protests shut down a grain terminal — but Indigenous groups are pressing for its full revocation.

Hundreds of Indigenous protesters have since Jan. 22 blockaded the Cargill grain facility in the Amazonian city of Santarém over the threats they say the decree poses to the 14 Indigenous territories and hundreds of riverine communities living along the Tapajós.

The decree was a part of an infrastructure project called the Tapajós waterway, which plans to allow private sector actors to expand sections of the Tapajós, Madeira and Tocantins rivers. The project would make the rivers navigable year-round for large barges carrying soy, corn and other grains from Brazil’s agricultural states in the Cerrado and the Amazon to ports on the Atlantic coast.

After almost three weeks of protests, the federal government suspended the decree on Feb. 6, but protesters continue to demand that the decree be revoked entirely.

“The suspension was announced but for us it is insufficient,” Indigenous leader Alessandra Munduruku told Mongabay in an audio message. “It doesn’t guarantee our rights, our lives or our river. This is what we want.”

According to Munduruku, as of Feb. 9 an estimated 800-900 protesters are still blocking access to the Cargill facility. The U.S.-based multinational would be one of the main beneficiaries of the proposed Tapajós waterway expansion, which would allow it to export more grain at a lower cost.

Protesters say affected communities were not consulted, despite Brazil’s Constitution requiring the free, prior and informed consent of affected Indigenous communities.

The affected Indigenous nations represented in the protest include the Arapiuns, Apiaká, Arara, Borari, Jaraqui, Cara Preta, Cumaru, Maytapu, Munduruku, Tapajós, Tapuia, Tupayú, Tupi and Sateré-Mawé.

Four local civil society organizations sent the government a joint letter in October 2025 criticizing the social and environmental impacts of the waterway project. In November, smaller protests were held in boats along the Tapajós River. 

Local communities say the 250-kilometer (155-mile) infrastructure project would increase dangerous river traffic for locals for whom the river is a lifeline. Already, waves caused by barges have made river navigation unsafe for smaller boats used by residents for daily activities like fishing and transporting children to and from schools.

“If there is already damage now, imagine the impact once the river is dredged to allow large ships to pass through all year round. How will these populations survive?” Haroldo Pinto, regional coordinator at the Indigenist Missionary Council, a Catholic organization that advocates for Indigenous rights, told Mongabay reporter André Schröder by phone in November 2025.

Local right-wing politician Malaquias Mottin nearly ran over an Indigenous protester on Feb. 5 while trying to drive through the blockade. Protesters filmed the incident, and a citizen’s report was lodged with Santarém City Hall demanding Mottin be removed from office.

(Sources: Mongabay)

Importing more sustainable produce and boosting green finance could help accelerate the greening of agriculture across developing Asia, write three experts. 

By Ma Jun, Shao Danqing, Huang Leike, February 11, 2026

Palm oil is almost everywhere – from the snacks we eat to the shampoo we use – and increasingly as biofuel. Indonesia and Malaysia dominate global production but decades of oil palm expansion have, in some instances, been associated with deforestation, biodiversity loss, pollution and greenhouse gas emissions.

Sustainable palm oil offers a way to break this cycle. By following strict environmental standards, producers can ensure forests, peatlands and wildlife are protected. China, currently the world’s second largest palm oil importer, is beginning to use green procurement to drive the industry towards sustainability.

In 2024, China imported 4.36 million tons of palm oil. Nearly 500,000 tons of this was certified sustainable by the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), the leading certification body for promoting ethical palm oil. By July 2025, 480 Chinese companies were members of the RSPO.

There is huge potential for China to support green agriculture like this across Asia’s developing countries.

At the Institute of Finance and Sustainability, a think-tank based in Beijing, we recently published a report on the issue. We found that China stands at a turning point: it has the opportunity to go from being just a source of demand for agricultural produce to a catalyst for the region’s shift to green farming.

In a nutshell, China can buy more sustainable agricultural products, creating green value chains. While on the supply side, it can use and improve green finance mechanisms to invest in sustainable farming practices.

Agriculture needs a faster green transition

As well as providing nourishment, farming accounts for a large share of jobs and GDP in the Asian developing nations our report covered. These nations are also highly vulnerable to climate change and will suffer some of its worst impacts.

Currently, in parts of these countries, agricultural expansion may involve land conversion, inefficient water use and overapplication of agricultural chemicals. A coordinated transition to greener farming models is urgently needed in these countries. This is not just to meet environmental and climate goals, but also to provide inclusive growth for people in rural areas.

More buyers and investments are needed

Two main things are hampering the green transition of agriculture in Asia’s developing nations.

The first is a lack of buyers for sustainable agricultural products, both at home and abroad. This makes it hard for projects to get investment and means farmers and firms lack motivation to shift to greener models.

When it comes to selling overseas, these countries struggle due to a lack of detail in their sustainability standards and because their certification regimes are not well established or widely recognised. Few mechanisms exist to aid mutual recognition with standards in target markets, such as China and the European Union, or green-trading mechanisms that might be built on that alignment. Such markets increasingly demand sustainable food products but buy little from Southeast and South Asia.

The second problem is a lack of commercial investment. This comes down to an unfavourable risk-reward ratio for green agriculture projects. Green finance tools and policy support are sorely needed.

The need to improve green finance

In Asia’s developing nations, much of green finance is anchored in debt instruments – green loans and green bonds. The ecosystem for green investment funds and climate-linked insurance remains nascent. It is mainly governments and a handful of big financial institutions that participate in green finance markets. The market lacks vigour due to a paucity of smaller institutional and private investors.

In these nations’ agriculture sectors, sustainable finance standards are not yet fully formed and policies incentivising use of green finance are lacking.

Green finance from overseas could do much more. This kind of investment in Southeast Asia up to 2023 stood at USD 45 billion – far less than the estimated USD 1.5 trillion the region needs until 2030 to fund its green transition. In any case, little of that went to agriculture.

Investment is constrained by the lack of common standards for sustainable agricultural financing and associated certification, as well as product labelling. This increases risk and compliance costs for international companies.

Sustainable agriculture projects tend to be small, diverse and scattered. International investors find it difficult to package them up for large-scale investments and to use standardised financial instruments, as they can in the energy and transportation sectors.

Something that can help is the blended finance mechanism. This sees public or philanthropic funds helping to mobilise private investment, for example through subordinated debt so smallholder farmers can make green upgrades. But less than 10% of blended finance in Southeast and South Asia is spent on agriculture, according to a 2024 report by Convergence.

China’s strengths: Purchasing power and green finance

China imported USD 215 billion of agricultural products in 2024, but only 16% came from Southeast Asian nations.

As China is importing large amounts of agricultural products from developed economies like the US, EU and Australia, a portion of those purchases could be shifted to developing Asian nations, with a focus on certified sustainable agricultural products, demand for which is growing in China.

China’s leading agri-food companies could create the necessary supply chains, from field to factory to port. They have predictable market demand, can use contract farming embedded with sustainability requirements, provide technical guidance and build processing and cold-storage facilities.

These companies could then support smallholders and small food businesses in meeting sustainability requirements, through transfers of agricultural technologies and capacity building.

If China establishes mutual recognition of sustainability certification for key products such as rice, fruit and palm oil, and simplifies certification and customs processes, green imports from Asia’s developing nations will jump.

China has the world’s largest green loans and green bonds markets and a good range of green financial products. However, these are mainly used domestically. Most Chinese agri-food companies have not yet used innovative green financial instruments, like sustainability-linked loans, to promote a green transition in Southeast and South Asia.

Such loans depend on the performance of the borrowing company. The interest rate will fall if it hits given targets, such as 50% of its output or purchases being certified sustainable.

Most Chinese agri-food companies still lack awareness of such financial products. Across developing Asia, basic climate and environmental data is generally lacking for agricultural products, while sustainability certification and green trading mechanisms are not yet in place.

Changing this situation could empower Chinese firms to drive a wholesale green transition in Asian agricultural value chains.

China as the green catalyst

As China’s engagement in green finance, trade rules and regional cooperation continues to grow, the country can help accelerate Asia’s agricultural green transition as a catalyst.

First, China can collaborate with regional partners to promote greater alignment of sustainability standards and enhance mutual recognition of agricultural products and financial mechanisms. These collaborations could reduce compliance costs and lower entry barriers to green products and financial markets. Linking these efforts with measures to facilitate green trade, such as by lowering tariffs and raising import quotas for certified sustainable products, would incentivise producers to shift practices.

Second, China can play a constructive role in supporting sustainable market practices and promoting corporate engagement. Strengthened sustainability disclosure requirements for large agri-food companies would help promote a green transition along value chains, rather than at isolated production sites. Combined with large-scale green procurement and greater outbound investment in sustainable agriculture across Asia, these efforts could send a clear demand signal to producers. Expanding the use of green financial instruments – along with RMB-denominated financing for agricultural trade and logistics – would also help lower the cost of capital for the green transition, particularly where RMB financing offers relatively lower borrowing costs.

Finally, China can help de-risk investment through regional financial cooperation. Favourable lending terms remain crucial for agricultural production and trade infrastructure in developing Asian countries, particularly when blended finance mechanisms are used to crowd in private capital. China can play a role in such lending through multilateral development banks it plays an important role in, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, as well as through its national development banks. At the same time, improving “interoperability” among Asia’s voluntary carbon markets, especially for agricultural carbon credits, could improve the bankability of green agriculture projects and unlock new revenue streams for farmers.

Taken together, these actions would help to turn Asia’s agricultural green transition from a policy aspiration into an investable reality.

With the right policy, coal is not essential to ensuring a reliable electricity supply. 

By Song Wanyuan, January 29, 2026

When California stopped using coal power late last year, the momentous departure was the culmination of long-term policy designed to transition the state to clean energy.

On climate action California has consistently maintained a cooperative stance with China, unlike the US federal government.

As China watches its partner make major progress towards an energy transition from fossil fuels, what lessons can it draw from the experience?

Coal’s historical role in California

In December 2025, the city of Los Angeles stopped importing coal-fired electricity from the Intermountain power plant in Utah. This cut the city’s, and California’s, final link to coal-fired generation.

Mayor Karen Bass described the move as a “defining moment” in Los Angeles’ clean energy transition and a “milestone” that will “accelerate our transition to 100% clean energy by 2035”.

Christine Shearer is project manager of the Global Coal Plant Tracker at Global Energy Monitor, a California-based NGO. She tells Dialogue Earth the state only had limited in-state coal generation to begin with, “which reduced some of the political and economic barriers seen elsewhere”.

According to state data, coal accounted for just 2% of the power mix in 2024, compared with 34% from natural gas, a share that itself is steadily declining.

Meanwhile, the share of renewable energy grew from 22% in 2015 to 41% in 2024.

“California’s political will in pursuing the energy transition has remained consistent, at least by American standards, through multiple administrations and governors,” says Li Shuo. He directs the China Climate Hub at the Asia Society Policy Institute, a nonprofit headquartered in New York City.

California has raised its renewable-energy targets several times since 2002, when it set the goal of 20% of electricity sales being served by renewables by 2017.

That goal later became 33% by 2020 and currently stands at 50% by 2030. By 2045, the aim is for renewables to supply 100% of retail sales of electricity to “end-use” customers, and 100% of state agencies’ power needs.

Shearer explains that California’s exit from coal followed “an incremental process” spanning two decades. Clear renewable targets and measures, multiple policies, and market developments all reduced coal’s role in California.

California, the federal government and China

The state’s path away from coal is quite distinct in the US context.

Yang Fuqiang is senior adviser on the Climate Change and Energy Transition Programme at the Beijing Rock Environment and Energy Institute. He tells Dialogue Earth: “Under the US constitution, states and the federal government exercise distinct powers. California can formulate its own coal-reduction policies and measures, but it cannot speak for the federal government.”

US president Donald Trump has described coal as “clean” and “beautiful” and his government has repeatedly extended the operation of ageing coal power plants.

At the end of 2025, the last coal-fired facility in Washington received an emergency order to continue burning coal for 90 days, despite plans to switch to gas-fired generation.

US energy secretary Chris Wright explained the decision resulted from increasing electricity demand and “accelerated retirement of generation facilities”. However, Dennis Wamsted, energy analyst at the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, tells Dialogue Earth there was no “emergency situation” with the electricity supply.

“Historically, ‘emergency situations’ have only been used in truly imminent crises, like the grid might collapse tomorrow,” says Wansted. “Now the government is simply requiring plants to continue operating because there might be a problem in the future. This has never happened before.”

He says many of the plants ordered to remain online were too old to maintain cheaply, or already had replacement plans. Forcing consumers to pay twice – for active plants that were due to retire and new replacements sitting idle – does not make long-term sense, he adds.  

A 63‑year‑old coal power plant in Michigan, for example, has received emergency orders twice, costing USD 113 million to continue operating. In December, the US court of appeals received an appellate brief to overturn that order.

Besides, Trump has disparaged renewables, fancifully calling wind the “most expensive energy ever conceived”, and falsely claiming that China exports wind turbines but barely uses them at home.

By contrast, California has embraced collaboration with China on clean technology. “California has long been a climate leader and aims to show differences when the federal government falls behind,” Li says.

Despite California-China collaboration “de-escalating” under Trump’s administration, the partnership has spanned three governors and developed a “muscle memory”, Li adds.

In 2019, former governor Jerry Brown established the California-China Climate Institute. In 2023, California’s current governor Gavin Newsom signed a memorandum of understanding on low-carbon collaboration with China’s National Development and Reform Commission. This included collaboration on carbon capture, utilisation and storage technologies, and regional cooperation with Guangdong and Hainan provinces.

Li believes that in renewing its partnership with California, China aimed to prevent a complete “decoupling” with the US. It even added subnational cooperation into the 2023 Sunnylands Statement.

Yang says both governments expect “bottom-up” initiatives. The ports of Shanghai and Los Angeles have launched a “green shipping corridor”, which involves expanding capacity to refill ships with sustainable fuel, among other measures. Meanwhile, the Chinese firm BYD operates in California, where its electric school buses started receiving state subsidies in 2024.

Coal’s future and lessons from the US

While coal’s story has ended in California, its decline is still ongoing in the rest of the US.

Data from Global Energy Monitor shows coal-fired capacity has dropped from a peak of 340 gigawatts (GW) in 2011 to 190 GW in 2025.

Former president Joe Biden set out a plan to eliminate emissions from the country’s power sector by 2035. Shearer says: “While that commitment currently faces challenges under the Trump administration, more than 60% of remaining US coal-fired capacity is still planned to retire over the coming decades.”

About 7 GW was retired in 2024 and that figure is likely to have been even larger in 2025.

“The main obstacle facing the US today is policy uncertainty,” says Shearer. “Over the longer term, however, the shift away from coal is clear, due to the advanced age of many US coal plants and the pressure from market forces and competing technologies.”

Many US coal plants were not permanently retired but converted to fuels like gas.

Wamsted says this was often done to lower costs rather than reduce emissions. “We do not favour doing that, because it still keeps fossil fuels in the system,” he adds. Gas emits less CO2 than coal when burned but it also comes with methane leakage risks. Methane has a much stronger short-term greenhouse effect than CO2, making its climate impact nearly as bad as coal over 20 years.

Wamsted believes replacing coal and gas with renewables and storage is the most direct approach – and this is precisely California’s method.

Since 2019, the state has added about 40 GW of renewable power and battery storage, with battery storage now 2.5 times its 2022 level, according to The Guardian.

“It is hard to have 1 v 1 lessons,” Li says, “but China can learn from California’s long-term planning – scaling up storage and renewable energy to accelerate the phase-out of coal. China’s energy transition boils down to coal reduction and phase-out. Large-scale energy storage is essential to enable mass and effective coal retirement.”

China still needs coal in the short term. Yang notes that Beijing municipality’s coal use has fallen from 30 million tonnes in 2000 to under 600,000 tonnes today. “I believe Beijing’s de-coalification is essentially complete. The remaining coal is mainly for heating in rural areas, which is dispersed and requires switching to electric, gas or developing renewable heating to reach carbon zero.”

China’s National Energy Administration pledged to secure coal supply for residential heating and electricity at a press conference late last year. The government approved at least 42 GW of coal projects in 2025, but coal consumption did not rise.

Yang explains: “These coal projects mainly address short-term, fluctuating demand growth and replace old coal plants. Thus, new approvals do not proportionally increase total carbon emissions.”

Wamsted says that in China, new coal replaces old coal, while in the US, ageing coal is kept as expensive power “insurance”.

Both nations’ concerns over grid reliability have kept coal in place, says Shearer, “but coal is neither the only nor the most effective way to ensure reliability”. Grid resilience can be built through battery storage, pumped hydro, as well as more flexible market rules.

According to Wamsted, Texas’s “energy-only market” proves renewables can scale in a free electricity market where buyers and sellers trade freely by need and price. As a result, the state’s renewable share in electricity generation has risen from 15% a decade ago to nearly 38% today.

Song Wanyuan