Focus on Arts and Ecology

Purpose of the articles posted in the blog is to share knowledge and occurring events for ecology and biodiversity conservation and protection whereas biology will be human’s security. Remember, these are meant to be conversation starters, not mere broadcasts :) so I kindly request and would vastly prefer that you share your comments and thoughts on the blog-version of this Focus on Arts and Ecology (all its past + present + future).

Premium Blogger Themes - Starting From $10
#Post Title #Post Title #Post Title

Thứ Năm, 25 tháng 6, 2026

Democracy meets extreme heat: India’s elections in a warming climate

Campaigning for votes when temperatures soar is dangerous, but many say India is in denial about the problem. 

A political rally in Salem, Tamil Nadu, India drew thousands of supporters as a newly launched party began its campaign ahead of the state assembly elections (Image: Imago / Alamy)

On 13 February, 37-year-old Suraj stood for nearly four hours in open ground in Salem, Tamil Nadu, waiting to hear a campaign speech by an actor turned politician. The heat intensified in the early afternoon. Minutes into the speech, Suraj collapsed, clutching his chest. Less than an hour later, he was declared dead.

In the hours before his collapse, Suraj had been exposed to a Universal Thermal Climate Index (UTCI) above 38C, according to a study by Poovulagin Nanbargal (Friends of the Earth), an environmental organisation based in Tamil Nadu.

UTCI calculates a “feels like” temperature that takes into account not just ambient air temperature but also humidity, wind and sunlight. Values above 32C indicate strong heat stress, and above 38C indicate very strong or extreme stress, where even minimal activity can be dangerous. When core body temperature exceeds 39C, it can lead to dehydration, organ failure and death.

Suraj’s passing reflects a largely unacknowledged reality. India’s elections are increasingly unfolding in dangerously hot conditions; conditions which are not treated as a public health risk even while they are claiming lives.

Heatwaves are only likely to get worse with climate change, bringing more health impacts and risks to public health, water resources and vulnerable populations.

A big month for voting

This month, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Assam, West Bengal and Puducherry all host regional elections, between April 9 and 29.

In the days leading up to the elections, temperatures surged across Kerala with the mercury reaching 38C. The India Meteorological Department has issued heatwave warnings on several dates in April when voting was occurring, with yellow alerts in 12 out of Kerala’s 14 districts.

On the ground, such warnings have reshaped campaigns. Across states, parties adjusted schedules, doctors prepared for a surge in heat-related illness, and workers described mounting difficulty operating outdoors.

In Kozhikode district, campaigning has shifted to early mornings and evenings.

“People start getting rashes and fatigue if we’re outside after 11.30 am,” says Jayesh M, a worker with the Communist Party of India (Marxist).

Even with shifted rallies, heat-related illnesses still spike during these gatherings.

“We see giddiness, breathlessness and dehydration every time there is a large gathering,” says Kalpana Mahanta, a doctor in Guwahati, Assam.

This echoes the 2024 general election, which coincided with one of India’s most intense heatwaves. Tens of thousands of suspected heatstroke cases were reported, along with hundreds of deaths. Estimates range from 360 to over 700.

Candidates themselves struggled. “Despite hydrating constantly, I found it hard to cope,” recalls Singhai Ramachandran who contested in 2024 for opposition party AIADMK. He remembers candidates fainting, severe sunburns, and hospitalisations due to dehydration.

“We hold rallies in the evening now,” says A. Saravanan, a spokesperson for the ruling DMK party. “But crowds are smaller and consist mostly of dedicated party cadres. The general public avoids the heat.”

Aditi Kundu of SwitchON Foundation, which works on sustainability and climate issues, also says voters are increasingly reluctant to attend political events in the heat.

“For the last few elections, parties are giving coconut water at rallies to supporters. We have seen them even giving hats and umbrellas to prevent sunstroke. But this alone may not be enough to counter the impact of high… temperatures”.

Her research in West Bengal shows heat is no longer an occasional disruption but a persistent crisis with 61.7% of respondents saying they know someone who has died due to heatwaves.

Yet some political leaders are dismissive of suggestions this impacts elections. “People here are used to the heat,” says Trinamool Congress vice president Jayaprakash Majumdar from West Bengal. “Turnout depends on political conditions, not climate.”

At an election rally in Mangalore, Karnataka, in February 2014, attendees stand on chairs to get a better view of the stage (Image: Rainer Krack / Alamy)

Some experts argue this perception reflects a deeper issue: the impact of heat on health in India is often unseen and unrecorded, and therefore unacknowledged. Suraj’s death in February, before peak summer, fits this pattern: it was officially attributed to a heart attack, obscuring the likely role of heat.

“What you cannot count, you cannot act on,” says Apekshita Varshney, founder of HeatWatch. “When official numbers say only a few dozen people died from heat in a season, policymakers can justify inaction.”

The real number may be orders of magnitude higher, she says.

Some deaths are recorded as heat related, however.

The Xylom and Dialogue Earth analysed 20 suspected heat deaths recorded in the summers of 2024 and 2025 by NGO HeatWatch via media reports from Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Assam and West Bengal. The mortalities occurred in the months of February to July, when campaigning and voting usually take place in Indian elections.

Of them, 17 occurred when UTCI exceeded 38C. The remaining three occurred above 32C and involved highly vulnerable elderly individuals or intense physical exertion.

Even where these dangerous heat conditions existed, there was often no heatwave declared: alerts were issued in only five of the 13 locations where deaths occurred.

In 2024, most deaths occurred in April and May. In 2025, many occurred as late as July, particularly in Assam, where humidity drives prolonged heat stress. Across states, UTCI levels remained above dangerous thresholds for much of the February-July election cycle.

Lack of guidance

Hosting outdoor elections without heat warning systems and cooling measures is a major risk to health. But official monitoring and guidance is lacking.

An Election Commission official confirmed to The Xylom and Dialogue Earth that the body maintains no official data on heat-related illnesses or deaths among voters, polling staff and security personnel during elections.

Media reports in 2024 stated that the commission had set up a task force to evaluate how heat impacts elections, but the official said that, to the best of his knowledge, this work had not been conducted.

“We do not oversee campaigns and political rallies. We leave it to the state’s chief election officers to issue advisories that are required according to the local requirements,” they say.

Archana Patnaik is chief election commissioner of Tamil Nadu. She says there is a checklist that must be followed for campaigns in the heat.

“Public meeting venues should have shade, shelter, water and medical aid for the benefit and convenience of the public. Basically, if any advisory is issued on heatwaves then dos and don’ts [are] to be followed by all,” she says.

Some experts want more.

“The Election Commission by now should have given advisories to parties that they cannot hold rallies in the afternoon heat. They are yet to do this,” says G Sundarrajan, a member of the Tamil Nadu Governing Council on Climate Change.

Heat and health experts say there are relatively easy-to implement solutions: shifting rally times; pre-event heat risk assessments; mandatory cooling zones; medical staff; caps on crowd density; and thresholds above which outdoor political events are simply not permitted. But advisories alone are insufficient, many believe, and there needs to be strict monitoring of campaigns to ensure they comply.

India frequently struggles with preparedness for the impact of heat in large crowds. The deaths at the Marina Beach air show in Tamil Nadu in 2024, and at a government award ceremony in Maharashtra in 2023, demonstrate this.

“Advisories alone do not translate to action,” says Abhiyant Tiwari, climate resilience and health lead for NRDC India. “There needs to be a strict monitoring and implementation process in place,” he adds.

Moving beyond temperature

Globally, more advanced approaches already exist to monitor heat and assess impact on human health than are used in India, according to a 2021 book on the use of UTCI. Across Europe, UTCI is integrated into public health systems, helping authorities anticipate and respond to heat risks.

In Poland, a UTCI above 32C is linked to a more than 25% increase in mortality risk, guiding public advisories and preparedness, the book states. In Portugal, high-resolution UTCI forecasts are shared with civil protection agencies. This enables targeted interventions, studies show, such as activating emergency plans to protect vulnerable populations.

UTCI data also feeds into pan-European decision-support systems used by first responders to prepare for extreme weather events, the book adds. These systems help to shift responses from reactive to preventive by translating complex climate data into clear and actionable guidance.

In India, however, large outdoor election events continue without integrating such tools into planning or risk assessment.

As temperatures rise, consequences become more visible. In the current elections, in which around one in five voters could go to the polls, the signs are that heat means some people in India will suffer for their political rights.

Some may end up forgoing them entirely.

In Part 2, we examine what happens on polling day itself: how heat shapes voter turnout, who is excluded from the democratic process as a result, and what it will take to make elections safer in a warming world.

This article is a collaboration between The Xylom and Dialogue Earth.

💙 Support My Blog

Chủ Nhật, 21 tháng 6, 2026

Work begins to double Three Gorges Dam shipping capacity

 An important environmental story from China, synthesised from local and international media, June 19, 2026

On 8 June, construction began on a new water channel at the Three Gorges Dam in Hubei, to meet surging shipping demand since the dam opened in 2003.


A new double-line, five-stage shipping channel will be built to complement the existing double-line lock.


State media Xinhua refers to it as a “comprehensive project integrating water conservancy, navigation and ecological functions”.     


In 2011, cargo throughput at the Three Gorges lock exceeded 100 million tons for the first time, reaching its designed capacity 19 years ahead of schedule. By 2025, it had reached 173 million tons, according to CCTV (China Central TV). The new channel, which is slated for completion in 2033, will increase capacity to 336 million tons.  


Xinhua reports that the project will include fish passages, in an efffort to help restock rare and endemic Yangtze fish species, and a seeming answer to previous research finding that dam construction and reservoir impoundment have damaged spawning habitats.


Other green construction measures will include reducing the volume of excavated spoil, promoting its resource recovery and reuse, and optimising construction site layouts, according to China Environmental News.

Discussions and technical studies regarding capacity expansion have been going on for more than ten years. The feasibility study for this new corridor project was approved by the National Development and Reform Commission last year. 


The Three Gorges Dam was designed to provide flood control, hydropower generation and improved navigation along the Yangtze. “The world’s largest clean energy corridor”, consisting of six major hydropower stations along the river, has surpassed 4 billion gigawatt-hours in cumulative electricity generation, according to People’s Daily. 


Research finds the project has also had ecological consequences and social impacts, including altered river hydrology, sediment retention, biodiversity disruptions, and resident displacement and resettlement issues influencing 1.13 million people.


(Sources: Dialogue Earth)

Fuel hikes set stage for India-China collab on e-mobility

India’s new foreign investment policy, China’s slowing battery demand, and the African market create a new opportunity in India. 

A roadside vendor sells petrol in plastic bottles in Manipur. Rising fuel prices due to the US-Iran war, alongside battery manufacturing overcapacity in China and increased electric vehicle demand from Africa, are presenting the Indian e-mobility sector an opportunity (Image: Vishma Ahanthem / Alamy)

The rising fuel cost keeps eating into my income,” says 60-year-old Ramsurat, an app-based cab driver in New Delhi. Ramsurat first felt the pinch back in the 90s, when he was a young truck driver in his hometown of Uttar Pradesh. The 1990-91 Gulf War between Kuwait and Iraq pushed up fuel costs in India, which impacted truck driver incomes, forcing him and others like him to move to Delhi in search of work opportunities.

He recalls that truck drivers back then would paint the fuel tanks of their trucks with witticisms like, Thoda kam peena meri rani, bahut mehengi hai Iraqi paani (Drink less, my queen, the oil from Iraq is pricey).

Since then, there have been multiple global events – hurricanes and wars – that have resulted in fuel price fluctuations. This year, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz amid the US-Iran war has led to yet another massive global fuel crisis, exposing regional and global cooperation on e-mobility.

India has had to revise fuel prices four times since 15 May. The fuel shortage has also prompted Prime Minister Narendra Modi to announce austerity measures, requesting people save fuel by using public transport, carpooling and avoiding foreign travel.

Every global crisis creates a “double whammy effect”, says Nikit Abhyankar, co-author of a UC Berkeley report on India’s oil-guzzling transportation sector. “Price of crude oil rises, and it also weakens Indian rupee. A 10% rise in crude oil and a 5% depreciation of the rupee means the cost of crude oil gets expensive by more than 15%,” he tells Dialogue Earth. Since the US-Iran war, the rupee has declined nearly 5.5% against the US dollar.

The report observes that a transition to electric vehicles (EVs) could reduce crude oil imports to India by over 90%, saving USD 240 billion annually, by 2047. But India is still a low-adoption country, with EVs still out of reach for many.

EV sales in India rose to merely 2.08 million in 2024, from 50,000 in 2016, according to Niti Aayog, a government think-tank, casting serious doubts on India’s 30% EV target for the transportation ecosystem by 2030.  

On average, battery EVs and hybrids cost about INR 1-2 lakh (USD 1,000-2,000) more than internal combustion engine cars, primarily due to the high battery cost. “That’s almost half of my annual income,” says Pankaj Kumar, another cab driver. “I want to own a hybrid electric car, but I don’t see many charging stations within the city and on highways.”

India is yet to get on the battery manufacturing fast track. The country has achieved only 2.8% of its incentive-linked battery manufacturing targets, according to a January 2026 study put together by think-tank the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA). A series of lapses, coupled with a lack of policy-level coordination, has plagued battery manufacturing, the study shows.

Besides, India imported USD 1.8 billion of lithium-ion batteries in 2022, 85% of which came from China.

Notably, on 10 March, India relaxed foreign direct investment restrictions on land-bordering countries imposed during the Covid-19 pandemic. This paves the way for Chinese investment in selected industries, including battery manufacturing, and eases bottlenecks for collaboration.

China’s overcapacity in battery manufacturing and a slowdown in domestic demand, coupled with the African demand for Indian-made vehicles, might just create the right conditions for India to expand its e-mobility sector.

India’s incentives

Despite the financial benefits of reducing fossil fuel imports and curtailing toxic emissions that choke Indian cities, EV penetration hasn’t risen as expected.

To tackle this issue, the Indian government launched a USD 2.47 billion production-linked incentive (PLI) scheme in 2021, under the Atmanirbhar Bharat (Self-Reliant India) initiative. The idea was to incentivise domestic battery manufacturing to make EVs affordable and increase adoption.

But there were a few hiccups. The scheme’s beneficiaries faced significant supply chain and implementation bottlenecks, such as stringent domestic value-addition requirements and an aggressive two-year installation timeline, leading to delays in commissioning capacity, the IEEFA study notes.

Delhi-based cab driver Ramsurat alternates between petrol and compressed natural gas to manage costs while waiting for EVs to become more affordable (Image: Alok Gupta)

The incentive also botched the selection of beneficiaries. In 2022, one of those picked, Hyundai Global Motors, withdrew its bid after Hyundai Motor India stated that the other company was in no way related to it or the renowned South Korean firm, Hyundai Motor Company.

The rest of the beneficiaries, Ola Cell Technologies, Reliance New Energy, Rajesh Exports, and ACC Energy Storage, had no experience in the battery manufacturing sector. Experienced battery makers like Exide and Amara Raja participated but were not selected in the auction, signifying design gaps in the scheme, says Charith Konda, co-author of the IEEFA study. “Beneficiaries also needed Chinese engineers and technicians to set up plants, but there were significant delays in visa approvals.”

According to the India Energy Storage Alliance (IESA), an industry platform for energy storage and electric mobility with over 100 energy companies as members, the PLI scheme had been implemented more slowly than anticipated due to the complexities of battery cell manufacturing. The sector is capital-intensive, with long gestation periods and significant reliance on technology partnerships. “While technology transfer has taken time to materialise, gaps in skilled workforce availability, limited focus in the initial phase on upstream supply chain development, and volatility in the global geopolitical environment have also impacted timelines,” the IESA wrote in a consolidated written response to Dialogue Earth.

“The PLI scheme has nevertheless played an important role in catalysing investments and initiating domestic capacity creation,” they said.

The relaxation of foreign direct investment, the IESA noted, could now accelerate e-mobility in India by bringing in capital, advanced technologies, and integration with global supply chains. But “appropriate safeguards may be required to avoid over-dependence on a single geography and to ensure resilience, transparency and long-term supply chain security”, the IESA said.

China’s collaboration

While India is in a slow lane for battery manufacturing, China is making four times the number of batteries demanded by the country’s EV makers.

On 27 March, Chinese EV manufacturer BYD, one of the world’s largest EV players, recorded a drop in profit for the first time in four years due to slowing domestic demand and fierce domestic competition.

Concerned by the demand slowdown, major Chinese EV manufacturers started looking out a few years ago.

In 2023, BYD submitted a USD 1 billion investment proposal to set up an EV plant in Hyderabad, but India rejected the proposal, citing security concerns.

However, joint ventures of Chinese and Indian companies assemble some of the most prominent EVs in India. Indian steelmaker JSW and Chinese manufacturer SAIC Motor work together under the popular MG Motor brand. “In 2024, the joint venture produced about half of its electric cars sold in India domestically, while the other half were imported from China,” noted an International Energy Agency report.

High battery costs continue to keep EVs out of reach for many drivers in India, despite rising fuel prices (Image: Frank Bienewald / Alamy)

“Rather than relying on imports of EVs and battery components from China, India should leverage the improving bilateral ties to attract Chinese investment and technical expertise for domestic manufacturing of EVs and components,” says Konda.

But India-China relations are delicate at best. A trust deficit persists due to their long history of geopolitical tensions.

Suranjali Tandon, an associate professor at the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, observes a narrowing gap between inflows and outflows in foreign direct investment from China. This, she says, has contributed to India’s decision to relax its investment rules for land-bordering countries. But there continues to be “scepticism about the collaboration” between the two nations, she adds.

While India navigates this challenging but co-dependent relationship, it has the opportunity to grow its e-mobility market outside of India in African nations, perhaps in collaboration with China. Countries in the Global South face similar policy challenges, and India, with its robust economic and diplomatic ties to African nations, is well-positioned to help decarbonise the continent’s transportation sector, says Akanksha Golchha, a Centre for Strategic International Studies fellow and co-author of a report on India-Africa electric mobility partnership.  

African ambitions

Data shows India and Africa share a similar e-mobility landscape; about 85% of the registered vehicles in Burkina Faso and 70% in Uganda are two-wheelers.

Indian automobile companies are not only starting to dominate Africa’s two- and three-wheeler markets but are reportedly doing this at the expense of Chinese competition. Bajaj Auto dominates this segment in over a dozen African markets, with a 40% market share, according to the Economic Times.

Other companies, such as Mahindra & Mahindra, TVS and Tata Motors, have assembly lines in various African countries, utilising locally sourced components to produce automobiles, boosting trade and diplomatic relations between the governments of African countries and India.

“India and Africa share similar transportation systems and challenges, which makes Indian two-wheelers and three-wheelers a roaring success in many African countries, built for varying road terrains, high fuel efficiency and low maintenance,” says Golchha.

Transport on the continent guzzles oil, accounting for 69% of total final consumption of oil products. Researchers suggest that accelerating South-South cooperation to phase out internal combustion engine vehicles, which constitute 90% of Africa’s transportation fleet, could save millions of dollars in crude oil costs and liberate the local population from air pollution.

While India expands its footprint in the African market, laying down the groundwork for the pipeline dream that is electric mobility, EV adoption continues to be a challenge back home.

For now, Ramsurat will need to switch between petrol and compressed natural gas, the two fossil-fuel options provided by the government, until EVs become affordable.

“I fear by then I’ll retire,” he says.

Thứ Bảy, 20 tháng 6, 2026

Can China’s new steel capacity rules accelerate its green transition?

Policymakers are looking beyond industrial upgrades, and could create favourable conditions for newer, greener steelmaking routes. 

Old coke furnaces are dismantled in Anshan, Liaoning province. China’s steel capacity replacement policy requires older iron- and steelmaking capacity to be retired before new facilities can be built (Image: Yang Qing / Xinhua / Alamy)

China’s industry ministry has revealed new rules on replacing steel production capacity. The changes, which end a nearly two-year suspension of new approvals, represent the most significant overhaul of the policy since 2021.

National steel policy has, since 2014, sought to control overall capacity and encourage upgrades by requiring the retirement of older capacity before new facilities can be built.

The revised measures, announced on 18 May, mean even more capacity must be retired before new capacity is added. They also tighten eligibility requirements and place new restrictions on the use of dormant capacity.

The changes come at a pivotal moment for China’s steel industry. After a decade of restructuring and upgrading, the sector is facing slower demand growth, weak profitability and mounting pressure to reduce emissions. Steelmaking remains responsible for around 16% of national carbon emissions and is one of the toughest industries to decarbonise.

The latest reforms, therefore, raise a broader question: can a policy originally designed to manage capacity also help accelerate the steel sector’s low-carbon transition?

A decade of steel policy evolution

China’s capacity replacement has evolved over the past decade from a mechanism to manage industrial capacity into a broader policy tool supporting industrial upgrade, environmental improvement, and, increasingly, decarbonisation.

The mechanism emerged from two major policy priorities that took shape in 2013. That is, efforts to tackle severe industrial overcapacity and a growing national campaign to improve air quality.

When the first steel capacity replacement rules were introduced, in 2014, they required an amount of existing capacity – ideally older and more polluting assets – to be shuttered before new capacity could be built. In key air-pollution control regions, the ratio was 1.25 tonnes retired for every 1 tonne added. Everywhere else it was 1:1.

Over the following decade, the policy evolved alongside China’s environmental and climate ambitions. The 2017 revision, for the first time, introduced preferential treatment for replacements with electric arc furnace (EAF) steelmaking. These are less polluting and less carbon-intensive than the blast furnace-basic oxygen furnace (BF-BOF) route, which today still accounts for around 90% of Chinese steel production.

Following China’s 2020 pledge to peak its carbon emissions before 2030 and be carbon neutral before 2060, the 2021 revision incorporated more explicit climate objectives. It further tightened replacement requirements in an expanded group of air-pollution control regions. It also included even stronger support for EAF steelmaking and emerging low-carbon technologies, such as hydrogen-based steelmaking.

The latest 2026 revision goes further still. It generally requires 1.5 tonnes of existing capacity to be retired before a tonne of new capacity can proceed, up from 1.25. It excludes the counting of long-idled capacity as a replaceable asset; restricts the transfer and trading of capacity quotas across regions and companies; and provides more explicit support for EAF and hydrogen-based steelmaking. These changes reflect growing concerns about the quality and credibility of capacity reduction, as well as the need to create space for lower-carbon steelmaking.

The evolution of approved projects under the capacity replacement mechanism illustrates both the policy’s achievements and its limitations. Between 2017 and 2024, approved replacement plans included approximately 400 million tonnes of new blast furnace capacity, 318 million tonnes of new BOF capacity and 128 million tonnes of new EAF capacity. Although the share of EAF projects increased over time, BF-BOF projects continued to dominate approved capacity additions. This shows the continued dominance of coal-based production.

Approval volumes declined significantly after peaking in 2017-2019, reflecting weaker steel demand, tighter regulatory controls and the completion of a major cycle of capacity renewal. The suspension of new capacity replacement approvals in August 2024 further contributed to the exceptionally low approval volumes recorded that year.

At the same time, the composition of new projects gradually shifted. Following China’s carbon peaking and neutrality pledges, EAF projects accounted for a growing share of approved steelmaking capacity, while a small number of hydrogen-based and other non-blast-furnace technologies also began to emerge.

Yet the policy’s contribution to decarbonisation remained more limited than its role in modernising production assets. This distinction, between industrial upgrading and decarbonisation, lies at the heart of the debate over the capacity replacement policy.

Upgrades did not equal decarbonisation

Why didn’t the gradual greening of the capacity replacement policy translate into deep emissions reductions? The impact was constrained by the structure of China’s steel industry and the incentives facing policymakers and producers.

Most new capacity launched since the policy’s inception has continued to rely on the blast furnace-BOF route. Although newer facilities are generally more energy efficient and less polluting than what they replace, they still depend heavily on coal. Replacing an older blast furnace with a newer one can reduce emissions intensity, but it does little to reduce dependence on coal.

A steel plant in Qiqihar, Heilongjiang province. Most new capacity launched in China since the replacement policy’s inception in 2014 has continued to rely on the blast furnace route, though recent changes may provide better conditions for lower-carbon pathways (Image: Wang Jianwei / Xinhua / Alamy)

A second challenge lies in the relationship between capacity and output. Some replacement projects retired facilities that had been underused, or even idle for years. Newer plants were often more productive than the assets they replaced. Therefore nominal capacity reductions did not always translate into lower production or emissions.

The policy also reflected competing priorities among stakeholders. While the central government increasingly viewed capacity replacement as a tool for pollution control and decarbonisation, local governments often prioritised investment and employment. Meanwhile, steel companies focused on maintaining competitiveness. These incentives were aligned around industrial upgrading but were less consistent in permanently retiring capacity or accelerating the deployment of low-carbon technologies.

As a result, capacity replacement proved more effective at modernising facilities than did driving structural decarbonisation.

Why were the rules tightened in 2026?

The 2026 revision, issued after a nearly two-year suspension of new approvals, reflects both lessons from a decade of policy implementation and the changing realities facing China’s steel industry.

After a decade of restructuring and upgrading, the sector is entering a period of weakening demand, thin margins, and rising trade frictions linked to record-high steel exports. At the same time, pressure to reduce carbon emissions continues to grow as China advances its climate commitments.

In this new environment, policymakers are increasingly concerned not only with how capacity is upgraded, but also with whether existing capacity can exit the system in a credible and orderly way.

One priority for the policy’s revision was to improve the credibility of capacity reduction. As well as upping the standard capacity replacement ratio to 1:1.5, the new rules also exclude long-idled facilities from replacement calculations; it has become harder for companies to use inactive assets to secure approvals.

The revised framework also tightens restrictions on the buying and selling of retirement quotas between regions and companies. This is to prevent replacement quotas becoming detached from actual production activity, and to ensure capacity exits are genuine rather than merely administrative.

At the same time, the 2026 policy provides more explicit support for lower-carbon technologies, offering clearer guidance for hydrogen-based steelmaking technologies. This reflects recent industrial experience: over the past three years, large-scale hydrogen metallurgy projects have moved beyond the pilot stage and begun generating operational experience. These include Baowu’s demonstration project in Zhanjiang, Guangdong province, and HBIS’s Zhangxuan project in Hebei province.

It remains too early to assess how far the new rules will reshape investment decisions. While the revised policy sends a clearer signal of support for deploying lower-carbon technologies, new investment in ironmaking and steelmaking remains subdued amid weak market conditions.

Nearly a month after the revised rules came into effect, no entirely new capacity replacement plans have been announced. The only one so far was issued by Shandong’s provincial industry authority. It is related to a project that had already completed public consultation before approvals were suspended in 2024 and is now progressing through the final stages of the administrative process.

Likewise, new project activity remains limited. Apart from a new EAF project in Yunnan province, which began construction in March, few new ironmaking or steelmaking production projects have broken ground so far in 2026.

Can new rules accelerate steel decarbonisation?

The revised capacity replacement framework could help create more favourable conditions for steel decarbonisation.

The tightened capacity-reduction requirements and restricted eligibility of idle assets make it more difficult for high-carbon capacity to remain in the system indefinitely. Clearer support for EAF and hydrogen-based steelmaking also sends a stronger signal about the direction of future investment.

Yet capacity policy alone is unlikely to drive a rapid transition. The steel sector continues to face weak demand, low profitability and uncertainty over future investment returns. Low-carbon technologies remain more expensive than conventional options, while demand for green steel is still limited.

This helps explain why progress has been slower than policymakers had initially hoped. Despite years of policy support, EAF steel’s share of crude steel production has remained around 10% in recent years, well below the 15% target set for 2025. The challenge is no longer simply technological, but increasingly one of economic viability and scale.

China has already introduced hydrogen development strategies and policies to encourage its use in industries, including steelmaking. Although large-scale deployment remains in its early stages, the projects led by Baowu and HBIS are in operation, while a growing number of pilot and demonstration projects are exploring different hydrogen-based steelmaking pathways.

Ultimately, capacity replacement is likely to play a supporting rather than decisive role in the sector’s transition. The expansion of China’s national carbon market, the development of green steel standards and certification systems, and new efforts to green industrial supply chains may prove just as important in creating demand for green steel.

In 2025, China’s State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) issued guidelines encouraging central-state-owned enterprises to build green and low-carbon supply chains. Such green procurement can help reduce the commercial risks associated with low-carbon investments by providing more stable demand signals for suppliers, including steel producers, as Yang Li of the Institute for Global Decarbonization Progress, a Beijing-based think-tank, recently observed.

Viewed in this context, the 2026 reforms are best understood not as a standalone solution, but as part of a broader shift in China’s steel transition. Research estimates that around 350 million tonnes of blast furnace capacity may need to be retired by 2030 to support the sector’s decarbonisation pathway. Whether that transition can be achieved will depend not only on stricter capacity management but also on the development of technologies, markets and policy incentives that enable lower-carbon steelmaking to scale.

    Powered By Blogger