Focus on Arts and Ecology

Brazil, Chile and Argentina have large deposits of elements that could help the transition to clean energy. Can they capitalise without big environmental sacrifices? 

By Jorge C Carrasco, March 2, 2026

In central-western Brazil, a small town of just 27,000 is being pulled into the minerals race between world powers.

Minaçu in Goiás state has significant reserves of rare earth elements. Some of these are essential for the energy transition, owing to their place in manufacturing clean tech like electric cars and wind turbines.

Global demand for rare earths grew by approximately 7% in 2024, according to the International Energy Agency, with powerful nations including the United States and China rushing to secure supplies.

Despite Brazil accounting for nearly a quarter of the world’s known reserves, Latin America is still playing catch-up in rare earth mining. China dominates extraction, mainly via its domestic operations. The country accounts for almost 70% of global rare earth mine production, according to a report published by the US Geological Survey in early 2025.

Minaçu is an example of Latin America’s push to compete. When Pela Ema opened in 2024, it became the first mine outside Asia to produce a number of rare earth elements used in magnets for electric vehicles and wind turbines.

In early November 2025, the work of the company who opened it, Serra Verde, was boosted by a USD 565 million loan from the US International Development Finance Corporation, which dispenses federal funds for overseas development projects. Annual production of rare earths at Serra Verde is forecast to be 6,500 tonnes by 2027.

Major deposits of rare earth elements have also been found in Chile and Argentina. These represent a significant opportunity for the region. But experts say Latin American countries should be wary of rushing to export rare earths when they could be developing full supply chains. Others warn of serious environmental damage being done to sensitive ecosystems.

Winning the rare earths race

According to the US Geological Survey, China accounts for approximately half of the world’s known rare earths reserves. In addition to dominating mining output, it also controls around 90% of rare earths processing.

By contrast, Latin America’s rare earths mining and refining industry remains underdeveloped, despite having healthy reserves of its own. Brazil produced only 140 tonnes of rare earths in 2023, and 20 tonnes the following year, the report added, negligible compared to the 270,000 tonnes China produced in 2024.

The latest geological studies confirm that several Latin American countries, especially Brazil, Chile, Peru and Argentina, have deposits of global importance.

In recent months, rare earths have been at the heart of tensions between China and the US. China imposed restrictions on exports in October, citing concerns over their use by foreign militaries. This fed into a tariff battle with the US, which is seeking to guarantee supplies of rare earths to support its own industries. An agreement was then reached at the end of that month. In early February, the US “set out to reshape the global market for critical minerals and rare earths”, by hosting more than 50 countries for a meeting designed to begin growing their collective market share.

The growing industry in Latin America, meanwhile, means it has become a more attractive region for both powers.

“Latin America has regained its centrality as a supplier of critical resources,” says Juliana González Jáuregui, an international relations researcher at the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (Flasco) in Argentina. “This centrality is based not only on its geological endowment, but also on the fact that the main global players are seeking to diversify risks in strategic sectors dominated by a few countries.”

Geopolitical competition for minerals and the need to ensure stable supply chains for strategic transition industries are central to this, she says.

The rare earths rush

Extracting rare earths is technically complex and costly, as well as hugely energy intensive. China’s production dominance is anchored by its ability to produce them cheaply and at scale. This has made it difficult for smaller operations in other countries to compete on the market. To counteract this, mining companies in other regions want a separate, higher pricing system.

This is where Brazil may have an edge. Part of Brazil’s reserves, such as those in Minaçu, are found in ionic clays. This type of deposit is simpler and cheaper to exploit than those found in harder rock, and mining it has less of an environmental impact.

New discoveries are also attracting the attention of foreign companies. These include the “district-scale” find announced last year that has inflated Brazilian Rare Earths’ Pelé project in Bahia state. The Australian mining company Viridis is developing a project called Colossus in the municipality of Poços de Caldas, Minas Gerais state, with estimated resources of 201 million tonnes.

In June last year, the Brazilian government began evaluating 56 business plans for critical mineral project, including rare earths projects, which had been submitted to try and secure support. It has set aside a fund of BRL 45.8 billion (USD 8.9 billion) to distribute among the projects chosen to receive support.

Chinese companies have taken note. China Nonferrous Metal Mining Group purchased the Brazilian company Taboca Mining in 2024, securing access to rare earths. In the first half of 2025, Brazilian rare earth exports to China tripled in comparison to 2024.

In Chile, Canada’s Aclara Resources is partnering with the Chilean mining conglomerate, CAP, to develop the Penco Module project at an estimated cost of USD 148 million. This project will focus on rare earths such as dysprosium and terbium, which are again used in magnets in electric vehicles. Its aim is to produce 800-1,700 tonnes of minerals per year through a leaching process that uses recycled water. The developers claim the project will not produce tailings (residue waste) and that reforestation using native species will take place.

At least 19 deposits have been discovered in Argentina. An environmental impact study by the company Litica Resources is the precursor to possible extraction in the country’s northern provinces.

These developments have been noticed by the European Union and the US, which have both adopted strategies to diversify the risks in their supply chains. The former has signed memoranda with Argentina and Chile, including chapters on critical raw materials, and ratified trade agreements with the Mercosur bloc. The latter created the Minerals Security Partnership in 2022, made up of 14 countries and the European Union.

An unequal partnership?

One of the crucial debates in Latin America is whether its reserves will simply be exported as raw materials or used to support local refining, processing and downstream control. Brazil, Argentina and Chile are all seeking to reposition themselves as industrial players. In November, the Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva said: “We are not going to be exporters of critical minerals. Anyone who wants them will have to industrialise in our country so that our country can earn that money.”

Constantine Karayannopoulos, a consultant in the minerals industry, tells Dialogue Earth that Brazil has “probably one of the best” rare earths deposits in the world. He cautions against repeating what he sees as the mistakes made in Australia and Canada: “Their economies grew largely on the basis of extraction [of raw materials], but they did not capture the added value that the Chinese, the Koreans and the Japanese – and to a lesser extent the Europeans – did.”

Ayaz Alam, director of the Geological Society of Chile (SGC), says that while there is interest in moving towards value-added production, “it is important to be realistic.”

“Projects have been delayed for years,” Alam explains. “Some companies planned to start operating in 2026 or 2027, but there are unresolved environmental issues, technologies that are not yet consolidated, and pending conflicts with local communities.”

González believes that for Latin Americans to balance investment opportunities with the risks of technological and political dependence, they should work with major players like China to avoid maintaining “asymmetrical relationships”. 

“The balance is not ‘with or without China’ but how to insert oneself into the global system without further deepening historical vulnerabilities,” she says.

What it means for the environment

One concern about this booming industry is the environmental impact. Rare earth elements are commonly mined using open-pit methods. The ore is crushed and ground, and rare-earth-bearing minerals may be concentrated using physical processes. These concentrates are then chemically treated with acids or alkalis to dissolve the rare earth elements. Then a solvent extraction process separates the different rare earths.

These processes traditionally require large volumes of water, and carry the risk of harmful substances leaking into surrounding ecosystems.

Rare earth mines can release radioactive elements such as thorium and uranium. The acidic waste generated during processing can pose a risk to animal and ecosystem health. Leaching – the process of using chemical pools or pits to dissolve rare earths, thus extracting them from surrounding material – can contaminate groundwater or surface water if there is leakage.

Francisco Valdir Silveira, director of geology and mineral resources at the Geological Survey of Brazil (SGB), tells Dialogue Earth that existing technologies can minimise these impacts: “If environmental and sustainability protocols are followed, the impacts will be much less and can be recovered in a short period of time. There are ways to prevent them.”

Some mining companies, such as Ukraine’s Kazatomprom and Cameco Resources in the US, have argued in favour of in situ leaching. They say directly injecting solutions into clay deposits reduces soil and solid waste removal by making excavation unnecessary. Trials of this technology are currently underway in Brazil.

However, studies suggest in situ leaching is not impact free. Research has shown that injecting chemical solutions can lead to soil acidification, the mobilisation of heavy metals and contamination of groundwater. Scientists have also highlighted the difficulty of fully restoring soil structure and microbial communities after operations end.

The electrokinetic technique, developed by the Chinese Academy of Sciences, is another proposal that claims to reduce the use of chemical agents – by up to 80%. This process uses electric currents to mobilise and recover rare earth elements, with less chemical waste. The technique still requires large volumes of water, however, and studies have identified several challenges to deploying it at a commercial scale.

Alam is sceptical that these methods can prevent environmental damage, particularly in salt flats like those found in Chile or Argentina: “Salt flats are unique ecosystems that depend on underground water stability. Biodiversity is linked to this balance. Phenomena such as extreme rainfall or prolonged droughts are already affecting this system, and industrial intervention tends to amplify these variations.”

The rare earths boom is still in its early stages in Latin America, giving governments a narrow window to define how the industry develops. Strong environmental standards, transparent licensing, meaningful consultation with communities and investment in processing and manufacturing could determine whether the sector delivers lasting benefits.

A region long characterised as a victim of ocean exploitation is taking a leadership role in a huge emerging conservation effort. 

By Mustapha Manneh, February 20, 2026

When the high seas treaty entered into force on 17 January, it established an important milestone on the journey towards protecting approximately 43% of Earth’s surface. This international agreement represents a triumph for the politicians and campaigners who fought for it.

For those from West Africa, this moment is not only about protecting a vital part of the ocean. It is also a chance to redefine Africa’s role in global marine governance.

At the centre of this redefinition is a proposed marine protected area (MPA) covering a vast patch of the Atlantic Ocean’s high seas that traces the curve of the West African coastline. Here, two mighty currents converge to produce a sea rich in marine life. Small pelagic fish are abundant, as are large predatory species, including yellowfin tuna and barracuda, alongside dolphins and pilot whales.

The high seas treaty, also called the Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) treaty, enables this MPA proposal. The treaty has created the legal framework for protecting marine areas that lie beyond national jurisdiction – beyond the “exclusive economic zones” of coastal states.

“There are a lot of countries outside our region that are the ones benefiting from that particular ecosystem we are planning to designate,” says Sikeade Oluwakemi Egbuwalo, the high seas lead at Nigeria’s Federal Ministry of Environment. “We feel the injustice has been going on for a while, and a few powerful actors have dominated our sea.

“It’s time for us to sit at that table and start demanding. This treaty has given us the chance to correct that imbalance.”

A plan for protection

The Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) has proposed an idea that could shape the future of the region’s fisheries: one of the world’s first high seas MPAs.

The area would cover the convergence of two Large Marine Ecosystems, defined as coastal ocean areas of 200,000km2 or more: the Canary Current and the Guinea Current. This hugely rich ecosystem stretches from Cape Verde and Senegal in the north to Nigeria and São Tomé and Príncipe in the south.

In the absence of regulations or any protection, people are already fishing in the high seas that lie off the coasts of Mauritania, Senegal, The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea and Sierra Leone. These countries have major artisanal and/or industrial fisheries. Advocates for the MPA say the lack of regulations risks damaging a valuable ecosystem.

Egbuwalo says the creation of this high seas MPA is motivated by science, ecology, geopolitics and local economics. She believes it will create employment opportunities for coastal communities and boost their catches in the longer term: commercially important fish species will have a chance to thrive in the protected area, before these replenished populations spill over into unprotected areas to be caught. The area has been exploited by fleets from outside the region, and regional governments should now take control and protect it, she adds. 

A change of perspective

For decades, West Africa has been battling with illegal fishing, legal fishing by foreign-owned boats and climate-related threats to the ocean. This high seas MPA proposal indicates the region’s willingness to become a standard-setter on global environmental issues.

At the time of publication, 17 of the 85 countries that had ratified the high seas treaty were African, while another 17 countries from the continent had signed it. These numbers indicate the vital role that African nations are playing in this process.    

“Africa has needed no permission to lead this global effort,” wrote Liberia’s president Joseph Nyuma Boakai last year. “The African Group, a bloc of 54 nations, was a pre-eminent voice in the negotiations because we understand that the problem of ailing oceans does not belong to any one country, and no one country can solve it alone.”

If Ecowas’ MPA proposal is approved under the treaty’s still-emerging framework, the proposed protected area could restrict industrial fishing and deep-sea mining exploration.

This would be a major step toward the global goal of protecting 30% of the ocean by 2030 (30×30), the most ambitious area-based conservation goal in existence. It would also assert African sovereignty over waters traditionally heavily influenced by external powers.

The paradox of protection

This work on waters beyond national jurisdictions clashes with an uncomfortable truth: most West African countries are struggling to protect their own waters and coastal communities.

According to a report from the International Union for Conservation of Nature, at least 16,000 km2 of marine areas in West Africa are protected as of 2022. But where protection is in place, much of it is on paper only, with little enforcement or punishment for infringement. This has created an opportunity for illegal fishing, especially by foreign fleets, causing the decline of fish stocks, damage to ecosystems and suffering for local communities. These communities also continue to face other threats, such as coastal erosion and the expansion of offshore oil exploration.

For years, the only African country widely considered to be taking a leadership role in ocean diplomacy was South Africa. It has a major ocean science programme, research vessels and an advanced navy.

There are now signs of a renewed enthusiasm for marine protection in other countries. As well as being a part of the high seas proposal, Ghana announced its first national MPA in June 2025.

Nigeria, Senegal, Cabo Verde and Liberia are also focusing more on marine protection as well as leading the region on the high seas issue, according to ocean policy watchers. There are high hopes for initiatives to increase MPAs in national waters, boost transparency in fisheries and strengthen regional ocean governance.

President Boakai of Liberia has championed regional cooperation on the ocean since taking power in early 2024. In December that year, the country hosted the 15th Ministerial Conference of the Fisheries Committee for the West Central Gulf of Guinea. Liberia called for stronger collaboration among member states to address illegal fishing, marine pollution and climate change.

Ghana’s fisheries and aquaculture minister, Emelia Arthur, has been pushing for stronger governance mechanisms within Ecowas since her appointment in January 2025.

Their leadership is being supported by international NGO groupings pushing ocean protection, such as the Blue Nature Alliance, the Bloomberg Ocean Initiative and the High Seas Alliance. These types of collaborative efforts are providing scientific modelling, diplomatic strategy and legal analysis.

But many countries struggle to conduct basic ocean monitoring at home, and have only limited ability to project power and assert sovereignty at sea. High seas protection risks being too ambitious to become a reality if this remains the case.

Lamin Jassey, a marine activist in The Gambia, says many West African MPAs already suffer from underfunding, weak governance, limited monitoring and poor local consultation, including in The Gambia and Sierra Leone: “Well designed MPAs can only succeed in balancing conservation and community rights if governance is inclusive, financing is sustainable and monitoring is strong.”

The challenges ahead

Enforcing marine protection requires satellite and vessel tracking systems, locally informed expertise, and patrolling. These require funding. Hundreds of millions of dollars are needed in long term funding for Africa to implement both high seas and domestic conservation, and reach the internationally agreed 30×30 target.

Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood, an expert on African maritime governance at the University of St Andrews in Scotland, says the high seas treaty is a step forward for conservation. But she also believes the treaty is not enough to undo centuries of uneven access and capacity, which have hamstrung the ability of African nations to exploit and protect the ocean.

Provisions on benefit-sharing and capacity-building in the treaty are important, says Okafor-Yarwood. But their impact will depend on how they are operationalised and who sits at the table, she adds. African states and communities need to meaningfully influence rules on access to marine genetic resources, area-based management tools and environmental impact assessments.

“Many African institutions lack stable funding, ships, deep-sea equipment and data infrastructures, even as their regions are central to global shipping, fisheries, and emerging industries like seabed mining,” Okafor-Yarwood tells Dialogue Earth. “If the [High Seas] Treaty is serious about equity, it must translate into long-term investment in African-led science, training, infrastructure and data governance.”

She says African research scientists are often not fully supported, with funding largely project-based and frequently coming from outside the continent. She believes they need to become agenda-setters in high seas research, and not just local partners.

Properly protecting the high seas is a chance to change the story, but only if protection is implemented effectively, Okafor-Yarwood adds.

“Weak implementation would entrench inequities in access to marine genetic resources, undermine efforts to curb [illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing] and biodiversity loss, and marginalise African knowledge and institutions in global decision-making. In short, it would reproduce ocean injustice on a larger scale.”

The global ocean agenda may still be largely written in Geneva, Brussels or New York before being in implemented in Africa. But it is also increasingly being discussed in Monrovia, Accra and Dakar.

“The proposal will create employment: the locals will be employed to manage the MPA,” says Egbuwalo. She warns that governments pushing this MPA under the high seas treaty are “fighting for the survival of their people, their livelihoods”.

The proposal then is the start of something, not the end. In time, it may redefine Africa from a victim of marine exploitation to a continent shaping the future of the ocean.

Supply-chain push may bring new deals but do little to help producer countries develop their mining sectors. 

By Tom Baxter, March 3, 2026

On 4 February, the US government convened a critical minerals ministerial in Washington DC. The meeting, attended by representatives of 54 countries, had the stated aim of securing supply chains for minerals central to high-tech chips, renewable-energy equipment and other advanced industries.

The ministerial brought a burst of activity: the launch of the Forum on Resource Geostrategic Engagement (Forge), the signing of ten bilateral agreements, and proposals for a critical minerals trading bloc underpinned by minimum prices for mined minerals.

Days earlier, President Trump had also announced Project Vault, an initiative to stockpile critical minerals backed by a USD 10 billion loan from the US Export Import Bank, the largest in the bank’s history.

Toward the end of February, the issue surfaced again in US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s speech at the Munich Security Conference.

The intention behind these overlapping initiatives is clear: to break US reliance on China for critical minerals and rare earth elements.

About half of the 54 countries at the ministerial were producer economies in the Global South. What might this new critical minerals push mean for their ambitions to move up the value chain?

In other words, could it help them switch from exporting to processing their ore and selling the refined products at higher prices? Or even to start manufacturing the final products the minerals go into, such as batteries or solar panels? The experts Dialogue Earth consulted are sceptical.

Revamped policies

February’s measures build on a Biden-era initiative, the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP). But they also differ significantly, says Cynthia Sanborn, director of the Center for China and Asia-Pacific Studies (CECHAP) at the Universidad del Pacífico in Peru.

While the MSP focused on coordinating between partners, the new initiatives are more explicitly aimed at building supply chains that exclude or bypass China. They are also, Sanborn notes, “security-oriented and more interventionist.”

“The new mechanisms and initiatives are not just trying to facilitate markets but to reconfigure and, to some extent, control them. This aligns closely with the broader direction of the US new national security policy, wherein critical supply chains such as semiconductors, energy technologies and now minerals are treated as areas that require active state coordination rather than purely market-driven outcomes.”

The context for these initiatives is clear, if unmentioned in official statements. China dominates critical minerals supply chains. It has an average market share of 70% in 19 of the world’s 20 most important strategic minerals, according to the International Energy Association (IEA).

More specifically, China’s export controls on rare earth elements, introduced last year in response to US tariffs, sharply exposed US vulnerability in these supply chains. According to a recent South China Morning Post article, shortages of yttrium and scandium, the vast majority of which are imported from China, are beginning to put pressure on technology supply chains, including 5G chips and heat-resistant coatings for engines and turbines.

In theory, a pricing floor and trading bloc could encourage companies to invest in new mining and processing facilities. But experts told Dialogue Earth it is too early to tell how much these initiatives will reshape supply chains and mining projects around the world – not least because of China’s existing lead in both investment and technology. “Given China’s entrenched position – the result of a long-term industrial strategy launched decades ago – the United States has significant catching up to do,” Sanborn told Dialogue Earth.

New mining and processing facilities can also take decades to come online. Compounding this, it is unclear whether US policy will remain consistent – or whether governments and investors believe it will.

New opportunities or new complications for producer countries?

Across producer countries in the Global South, a major policy objective around critical minerals is to move up the value chain.

“A multilateral trading bloc doesn’t seem to move the needle on producer country ambitions or bottlenecks to value addition,” says Thomas Scurfield, Africa senior economic analyst at the National Resources Governance Institute (NRGI). In the African context, regional arrangements would be key to value addition, allowing countries to pool their respective strengths. Scurfield says the US emphasis on bilateral deals and a multilateral trading bloc could undermine or complicate those efforts.

This tension played out at the African Mining Indaba in Cape Town from 8 to 11 February, where South Africa’s mining minister Gwede Mantashe publicly criticised DR Congo for signing a bilateral minerals deal with the US, rather than coordinating with regional partners. ”We need to act as one collectively, and deal with the wealth that we have to the advantage of Africans,” President Cyril Ramaphosa told African Review in an interview on the sidelines of the AU summit.

Obert Bore, programmes manager at the Zimbabwe Environmental Law Organisation (ZELO), however, says that the shift could open certain doors. “We are likely to see a lot of deals between US and African governments, including governments the US was previously unwilling to engage with,” he told Dialogue Earth, pointing to sanctioned Zimbabwe as an example.

But he cautions that, compared to their Chinese counterparts, American miners likely lack the technological capacity to meet African countries’ value-addition requirements. Mineral refining capacity remains minimal in the US, and progress on new projects has been extremely slow. They could only do so by partnering with Chinese firms, who have far more experience, he says, but that is “not likely to happen.”

Similar dynamics are at play in Latin America. The US rush to secure minerals could offer new sources of finance, technology transfer, training and stable demand, Sanborn says. But the goal to move up value chains may continue to encounter deep structural constraints.

“The deeper question is whether access to US-led initiatives will depend on geopolitical alignment, potentially forcing countries to reconsider long-standing economic ties with China,” she says. Currently, China is by far the largest market for minerals mined in Latin America, including by American companies – a disruption to which could prove both politically and economically destabilising, Sanborn warns.

Environmental concerns

The urgency with which the US is pursuing these critical minerals policies raises social and environmental concerns. Mining is a sector frequently associated with risks such as community relocations, inadequate compensation for land and livelihoods, and environmental degradation.

“The sense of urgency related to security concerns can easily translate into faster permits, compressed review processes, and political pressure to move projects forward quickly”, says Sanborn. “In countries such as Peru, where institutions are already stretched and social tensions around mining remain high, this could weaken our environmental oversight and community consultation.” This, and the perception that geopolitics rather than livelihoods is the priority, risks intensifying tensions with local communities, she says.

Thomas Scurfield from NRGI adds that neglecting these concerns could also be counterproductive to the original goal of the policies: securing reliable supplies of critical minerals. “If you don’t develop trust or don’t embed transparency, it can come back to bite you,” he says. Tensions can become political pressure, which can in turn mean government-led pauses or renegotiations of contract terms or even project cancellations.

The Strategic Partnership Agreement signed between the US and DR Congo at the beginning of December, for example, is already facing legal challenges in Kinshasa’s Constitutional Court.

Scurfield also notes the opacity that surrounds the bilateral agreements signed in Washington DC on 4 February. None of the 10 signed agreements have been publicly released.

Conversely, Chinese mining companies, who have long been criticised for opacity and poor community engagement, have been improving their social and environmental standards overseas – at least on paper. “At home, environmental regulation, green finance rules, and corporate disclosure requirements have tightened significantly over the past decade,” says Sanborn.

Two examples include the community grievance mechanism issued by the Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals and Chemicals Importers and Exporters and a series of new guidelines issued by the China Mining Association. These marked the first attempt by a Chinese industry body to standardise ESG practices in the Chinese mining sector and bring them into greater alignment with international norms.

The frameworks are not legally binding, but they do “reflect growing awareness in China that overseas performance affects long-term commercial viability and geopolitical relations,” Sanborn adds.

How producer countries in the Global South engage with the increasing geopolitical competition for critical minerals may ultimately shape not just supply chains, but their own industrial futures.