Focus on Arts and Ecology

There is an urgent need to ensure the energy transition benefits all, write two professors of communication. 

By Jia Hepeng, Pan Yeheng, April 25, 2024

During its provincial Two Sessions meetings early this year, the major coal-producing province of Shanxi announced targets for a just transition. It said social issues must be properly managed during the shift to a green and low-carbon society to avoid job losses or harming the interests of vulnerable populations.

We think Shanxi’s stance is of huge importance for China’s response to climate change and its low-carbon transition. Specific numbers aren’t yet available, but some have and will lose out during the energy transition. Take Chinese coal workers for example. A joint study by Peking University and the UN Development Programme revealed 1.4 million jobs were lost in the sector between 2016 and 2021. It predicted that the next ten years will see another 1.3 million coal jobs lost, rising to 2.35 million over the next 30 years.

And this is in a single sector. As the energy transition continues, and production of China’s “three new” commodities – solar cells, lithium batteries and electric vehicles – grows, more people will be affected by the industrial restructuring required. To meet China’s targets of peaking its carbon emissions and then reaching net zero, we believe that study into how to make sure this transition is just must happen first. This will enable the formulation of appropriate policy measures; researching new low-carbon tech will not be enough on its own.

Overlooked views

“Just transition” means shifting from a carbon-intensive to a greener economy in a fair and inclusive manner. In the context of low-carbon development, it means ensuring people’s interests are not harmed, insofar as that is possible. When harm is unavoidable – for example when a carbon-intensive factory must close – compensation should be paid to those who lose out.

A just transition would benefit a huge number of people, but the term is rarely used in China’s carbon discourse and there is no large-scale accounting of what is needed. To date, most uses of the term in the official media are in the context of calling for western countries to take the interests of developing nations into account. It is rare to see research looking at low-carbon, new-energy and climate-change issues through the lens of a just transition.

Given this, how, over the past two decades, has China been able to make so much progress on its low-carbon development without social disaffection?

First, decarbonisation has so far taken a “big cake” approach, ensuring there is plenty of benefit to go around: workers at a closing factory might protest, but they do so over compensation measures rather than the closure itself; and they are, generally, looked after via measures such as retraining for the service sector. As a result, there has been little public opposition to decarbonisation.

During periods of economic growth, those who lose their jobs can often find alternative employment in other expanding sectors. In the late 1990s, then-premier Zhu Rongji launched reforms of state-owned enterprises, leading to tens of millions of workers being laid off. Yet rapid economic growth allowed China to weather that crisis. In comparison, measures to hit peak carbon and, earlier, save power and reduce emissions, have had an impact. But this has been concentrated in only one sector, energy, and so has been more easily accepted.

Also, while it might not use the term “just transition”, China implements the core of the idea – compensation for those losing out – under the banner of “common prosperity” or regional revitalisation policies. For example, in 2016 the central government spent RMB 100 billion (USD 13.8 billion) on measures to help 1.8 million workers leaving the coal and steel industries. Those efforts, though, were described as part of an “economic transition” rather than put within a low-carbon or climate framework.

So, for Shanxi to take the lead and set just-transition targets as part of an annual agenda-setting event indicates the issue is one China must face. The lack of just transition discussions has not, so far, hampered progress towards peak carbon. But achieving China’s goal of carbon neutrality by 2060 will be tougher. The topic cannot be avoided.

Overlooked costs

We believe that China’s aim to peak its carbon emissions by 2030 is achievable with more use of clean energy and other big cake measures. But carbon neutrality will impact every part of society. As a whole, the energy transition will affect far more than those who work in the energy sector.

As we will see, those who live near sites manufacturing new-energy products are suffering from associated environmental damage. Moreover, in the north-west, a lot of renewable generating capacity has been installed, but as economies here are less well-developed, the local people are at risk from over-reliance on a single sector. Meanwhile, government officials are evaluated on their success in getting new projects started. They rush to attract investors and rarely consider things from the point of view of local people, such as compensation for their losses.

During our visit to the Huiteng Xile Grasslands in Ulanqab, Inner Mongolia, we saw how many former herders had switched to working in tourism, as the grasslands have been given over to wind turbines. This has meant less reliable incomes. The herders complain they haven’t been given enough compensation for the disruption caused by the construction and operation of the wind farms.

Loss of incomes isn’t the only problem. Local people in under-developed regions are also suffering from the pollution caused by the manufacturing and recycling of new-energy products. Some of the earlier wind turbines and solar panels installed in China have already reached the end of their useful life. But high recycling costs mean cheaper, informal recycling operations have sprung up in poorer areas, with health consequences for the local people. A 2023 China Central Television news report on villagers in Xinxiang, Henan, found solar panels were being burned at scale as part of the recycling process – polluting both air and water.

Meanwhile, research has found that any negative effects of the low-carbon transition on the welfare of households will be felt more in rural than urban areas.

This is partly because urban incomes in China are 2.5 times higher. Stricter manufacturing and materials requirements make green products more expensive than the mainstream alternatives. Those with higher incomes can afford to stick to their green principles and pay the extra, while those in less-developed regions struggle to pay the extra costs.

The future move to carbon neutrality will mean that most consumers will have to buy more expensive, low-carbon products. These higher living costs will only make lives harder for lower-income groups already suffering more from pollution.

This is why it is so urgent to discuss a just transition.

Policy priorities

In fact, Shanxi was already working on its just transition targets before the official announcement, launching China’s first just transition loan.

In August last year, the municipal government of Datong city, Shanxi, joined with the Postal Saving Bank of China to lend Jinneng Holding Coal Group RMB 100 million (USD 13.8 million). Jinneng is a coal and coal power firm in the process of making a low-carbon transition, including by manufacturing solar panels. Some of the funds will be used for retraining employees and improving their skills and employability to “bring about a just transition for labour.” 

That is an example of a local government exploring routes to a just transition that meet local needs. We believe that a just transition must be nationwide, and so more research is needed. Currently, this process is at an early stage. Last year, the World Resources Institute and Peking University launched a study into international just transition experiences and lessons, with the findings to be published soon.

Our own research has found public support for China’s environmental and low-carbon policies is mainly down to a tendency to accept national policies. But achieving carbon neutrality will mean huge changes to social and economic interests, and the public must be able to see personal benefit from the process. That means giving a higher priority to a just transition.

Jia Hepeng

May 2, 2024 

As climate-induced disasters escalate in South Asia, a lack of transparency in data sharing is obstructing vital cooperation efforts. Omair Ahmad, our managing editor for South Asia, argues that recent events like Cyclone Biparjoy and the flooding in Bhutan and Assam highlight the urgent need for collaborative action. However, data secrecy perpetuates tensions and prevents effective responses. The Himalayan region faces increasing cyclones and floods, exacerbating challenges for agricultural communities reliant on erratic monsoons. Moreover, rising temperatures and sea levels threaten essential crops and livelihoods. Despite shared vulnerabilities, cooperation is hindered by the absence of effective transboundary institutions like SAARC, which are also marred by geopolitical tensions. Additionally, an opaque water bureaucracy restricts access to crucial hydrological data, impeding scientific cooperation and grassroots efforts to mitigate environmental threats. To address these challenges, South Asian governments must prioritise transparency and empower transboundary institutions. By making hydrological data accessible, communities can drive collaborative efforts to adapt to climate change effectively.

(Sources: The Third Pole)

In the face of climate uncertainty, South Asia must unite to tackle its water challenges, notwithstanding complex regional dynamics.

By Ambika Vishwanath, Sanya Saroha, April 9, 2024

Water in South Asia has always had a complicated history, right from early civilisations to the present day, where rivers are divided by political boundaries. Despite a shared tumultuous past, and often because of it, South Asia remains one of the least integrated regions in the world, despite its abundant resources and shared risks. In pursuing economic security, river basins have primarily been used for agriculture and energy, but are seldom seen as cohesive units that also require safeguarding.

The looming threat of climate change exacerbates existing tensions between riparian countries, presenting new challenges to achieving sustainable water management. With changing precipitation patterns, melting glaciers and increasing frequency of extreme weather events, including rising heat, the availability of the region’s water resources is becoming increasingly unpredictable and vulnerable. This unpredictability threatens food, energy and health security, as well as development goals, further straining relations between countries reliant on shared rivers.

While there are existing agreements between South Asian countries on water management, they are outdated and do not address the threats posed by climate change to shared water resources. Furthermore, most are bilateral, proving largely ineffective given that several South Asian countries share rivers, which compound climate challenges. Climate change means India’s river basins could face severe deficits by 2030, impacting some of the most populous regions in northern and central India unless urgent and concerted action is taken. Approximately one-fifth of India is struggling with drought-like conditions, while a staggering 70% of its water sources are contaminated. Nepal ranks as the world’s 4th most climate-vulnerable country, grappling with recurrent disasters such as floods, glacial lake outburst floods and landslides annually. In Pakistan, weather extremes are rising as the country received over 190% of its normal rainfall in 2022, causing devastating floods.

Countries like India and Pakistan are undergoing population growth, poverty and rapidly changing physiography, leading to increased demands for water and food supplies. Regional climate cooperation in South Asia is paramount if any country is to deftly adapt to a changing climate and avoid conflicts arising from highly contentious shared resources. While opportunities to update existing treaties and engage in dialogue exist, political will and domestic pressures continue to remain obstacles.

The problems of bilateralism

Water security in South Asia has undergone a notable transformation, characterised by growing distrust among neighbours and a high prevalence of domestic political instability. The current bilateral frameworks on climate cooperation are not immune to these geopolitical and domestic shifts, emphasising the need for cooperative regional dialogues.

Existing regional treaties are primarily bilateral in nature, focused on sharing mechanisms or dictating energy usage and storage. However, these treaties are often contentious, marked by unequal principles and fail to address the long-term health of rivers. For example, the Indus Water Treaty (IWT), initially intended as a conflict prevention mechanism between India and Pakistan, remains controversial. India issued a notice to Pakistan to modify the 64-year-old treaty in 2023, presenting an opportunity to adopt a more needs-based approach that considers environmental impacts and future risks, but there has been little movement on this front. Furthermore, the exclusion of China and Afghanistan from the IWT neglects the other two riparian countries that also share the Indus basin.

With growing demand on both sides, New Delhi and Islamabad have made periodic incendiary statements on water usage, with the rivers becoming tools in larger political grievances. Incidents such as the targeting of engineers involved in flood protection efforts by Pakistani militants in Kashmir in 2012, in response to India’s alleged violations of the IWT, and India’s proposed diversion of the Indus River following the 2019 Pulwama attack, underscore the volatile nature of water-related disputes.

South Asia urgently requires an integrated approach to water management that accounts for climate-related changes and uncertain future weather events. The current system of political posturing only serves to impede progress, while alterations in water cycles and rising populations persist. An amended IWT could address this growing demand and mitigate climate change’s impact on water cycles.

Many of these treaties fail to adapt to changing realities and are often subject to divergent national interests. In the context of India and Nepal, dissatisfaction on sharing water resources persists despite the signing of six treaties and several memorandums of understanding. Nepal has accused India of constructing high roads, barrages and other infrastructure that disrupt water flow and cause floods, while Indian states have also accused Nepal of development activities leading to floods in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh and of not implementing adequate flood protection projects in its region.

Nepal and India have some of the best open channels of communication in the region when it comes to water. However, certain agreements such as the Kosi Agreement (1954), the Gandak Agreement (1959), and the Mahakali Treaty (1996) have been criticised by Nepal, who contends these are not equitable and were imposed by India, leading to a fluctuation of trust between the two countries. Meaningful implementation of these agreements could strengthen communication channels for water sharing between the two.

Internal political disagreements often hinder agreements between nations as well. The long-pending Teesta water agreement between India and Bangladesh demonstrates how domestic politics create barriers to international treaties. A once-robust river, infrastructure development, including barrages and hydroelectric plants and changes in water availability and rising temperatures, have reduced the river’s flow. The ruling party of West Bengal has blamed the central government, other states of India and Bangladesh for releasing water from barrages at inappropriate times, indicating its significance as an electoral issue. This politicisation has resulted in West Bengal obstructing the signing of what could have once been an effective water-sharing agreement between the two countries.

The way forward: strengthening transboundary diplomacy

At present, none of the existing water-sharing treaties and agreements incorporate climate considerations, except for the 2023 Bhutan-India flood forecasting scheme. While all eight South Asian countries are signatories to the Paris Agreements and have established nationally determined contributions (national plans to reduce emissions), these commitments primarily focus on emissions reduction and clean energy.

There remains a gap in understanding the intricate relationship between water and climate, as transboundary river basin treaties lack a strong climate lens. Recognising water as a vital resource for ecological integrity, climate resilience, human wellbeing and socioeconomic development is essential, moving beyond its use as an object of geopolitical contestation or national economic growth.

Despite long-standing advocacy by experts lobbying for a better regional approach with research that focuses on environmental and human security, learning from international experiences and robust regional mechanisms, challenges persist due to domestic and geopolitical tensions and the lack of political will. Even when will might have existed, larger security considerations often play a stronger role. While there have been some successful community-level initiatives, such as early warning systems between villages across the India-Nepal border, or the Brahmaputra dialogues between India, China, Bangladesh and Bhutan, joint efforts between India and China on glacial melt, scaling up and fostering greater cross-border trust has proved difficult.

Promisingly, initiatives focused on climate change that do not wade into the subject of water sharing, such as those of the International Center for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD), a Kathmandu-based intergovernmental organisation, have seen some success. They emphasise people-to-people diplomacy and provide a platform to openly discuss climate issues with a data-driven approach.

Dialogue on climate may serve as a pathway for South Asia to engage in discussions on integrated water management, an often emotive and complicated issue. Collaborative strategies are needed to address these pressing challenges and transition from bilateral to regional water management for a more cohesive, cooperative and equitable region. We need greater imagination in the region to see what is possible and not only what is immediate.

This article has been co-published by South Asian Voices (Stimson Center) and The Third Pole

Officials weigh the impact of the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline on national energy security amidst mounting US pressure to abandon the plan. 

By Zofeen Ebrahim, April 19, 2024

The rooftop of Vaqar Zakaria’s home in Islamabad is strewn with photovoltaic panels that he says have lowered his electricity bill to virtually nothing. This is countered by the stark contrast in his rising gas costs. “From a steady PKR 800 [USD 2.87] a month, it has risen to PKR 4,000 [$14.38] in the last six months,” he says, during a call with The Third Pole.

Zakaria, head of environmental consulting firm Hagler Bailley Pakistan, is fortunate to have a gas supply at home. His situation highlights a nationwide energy paradox where advancements in one sector are negated by crises in another. Gas in Pakistan is widely used for domestic heating and cooking, but across the country, the commodity is becoming increasingly scarce. As citizens consider alternatives, disparity widens with affluent households turning to expensive propane cylinders or electric stoves, while the poor burn wood.

“If only Pakistan had imported Iranian gas back in the late 1990s when there were no sanctions,” Zakaria said, recalling a time when prices were far cheaper “at just USD 2 per million British thermal units (MMBtu)”.

A participant in some of the early discussions, Zakaria remembers strategising over the proposed 2,775km pipeline that promised to link Pakistan’s energy supply directly to Iran’s abundant gas reserves. The long-term project, which came to be known as the ‘peace pipeline’, has faced significant delays due to geopolitical pressures, sanctions on Iran and financial hurdles within Pakistan.

Iran’s proven natural gas reserves, estimated at 1,203 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) as of December 2021, are second only to Russia.

In February this year, Pakistan’s caretaker government decided to dust off the 2009 agreement, approving the construction of the first phase or 80km stretch (of the total 780km pipeline) from the Iranian border to Gwadar, in Balochistan.

According to Hassan Nourain, the consul general of Iran in Karachi: “The network is designed to pass through Balochistan and Sindh provinces before entering Punjab. The pipeline from Iran will have an estimated capacity to funnel 750 million to around 1 billion cubic feet of natural gas per day [ft3/d].”

Meanwhile, Tehran has issued Islamabad a deadline: finish the pipeline segment by March 2024 or incur financial repercussions amounting to nearly USD $18bn — a sum that could prompt international arbitration.

“We are very reluctant to take this drastic step,” the Iranian consul general told The Third Pole, “but the gas company of Iran is a national company and belongs to the people of Iran. It invested USD $1bn years ago. Now, the Iranian parliament is pressuring the government to decide the fate of this project.”

Iran had already fulfilled its part of the agreement by completing 1,100km of pipeline from the South Pars gas fields to the Pakistan border. “By 2012, Iran had completed its construction and was ready to transport gas to Pakistan,” said the Iranian diplomat. In 2014, Iran also extended the deadline by an additional decade, on Pakistan’s request, he added.

But Pakistan is also feeling the pressure from the US. Last month, Donald Lu, the US assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asia cautioned Pakistan against importing gas from Iran, as it would expose it to US sanctions.

In response, Pakistan’s Foreign Office spokesperson Mumtaz Zahrah Baloch made a case for national sovereignty; since the pipeline is being built within Pakistani territory, “we do not believe that at this point there is room for any discussion or waiver from a third party”, she said.

Nonetheless, the acting US mission spokesperson in Pakistan, Thomas Montgomery told The Third Pole “We advise anyone considering business deals with Iran to be aware of the potential risk of sanctions.” The US has been pushing Pakistan to seek green alternatives; through its development agency it has helped add almost 4,000 MW of clean energy to Pakistan’s grid since 2010.

Senator Mushahid Hussain Sayed, a senior member of the ruling Pakistan Muslim League, speaking in a personal capacity, highlighted the tension between national sovereignty and the US: “We invite its meddling by abdicating our own autonomy for decisions on our core interests.”

Despite the warnings from its longstanding ally, Pakistan’s defence minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif told The Third Pole that the energy infrastructure project would proceed, signalling Pakistan’s intention to assert its autonomy: “We will go ahead with construction of the pipeline,” he said.

Waiver favour

While Pakistan grapples with Iran’s deadline, the land in Gwadar earmarked for construction has yet to be acquired, according to government insiders.

Micheal Kugelman, director of the Wilson Center’s South Asia Institute in Washington, summarises the predicament: “Pakistan is seemingly caught between the devil and the deep blue sea – build the pipeline and risk being sanctioned, or don’t build it and get slapped with a massive fine.”

Ahmad Irfan Aslam, the former law minister in the caretaker government that greenlighted construction of the 80km section of the pipeline, points out Pakistan’s reliance on the US for “everything from economic bailouts to its security”. He warned any waiver request would necessitate complex negotiations.  

“We cannot bear American sanctions. We will present our stance to the US,” Musadik Malik, Pakistan’s petroleum minister told journalists last month. “Iran has been told multiple times that we need their gas. We want to complete this project but without any sanctions.”

Montgomery confirmed Pakistan has yet to present a formal waiver request. With Pakistan in a tight spot, Aslam suggested exploring a deadline extension and seeking a waiver, which “would require support from both Saudi Arabia and the UAE.” But as tensions mount in the Middle East over the Israel-Gaza conflict, with new US sanctions against Iran announced on April 18, Kugelman said it was unlikely that the US would grant Pakistan a sanctions waiver to proceed with the project.

Economic feasibility  

Pakistan has just 19.5 Tcf of proven gas reserves, sufficient for just 12 more years, based on current annual consumption levels.

“The only advantage to have Iranian gas is if there is a guarantee of firm supply at favourable rates,” said Haneea Isaad, an energy finance specialist at the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA). With existing Qatari gas contracts at USD 13/MMBtu and spot market prices “even lower at USD 8/MMBtu,” according to Isaad, the Iran-Pakistan pipeline would need to offer better rates to be economically viable.

“We are looking towards raising funds from international banks” said defence minister Asif. Emphasising compliance with international standards, he said: “We will not violate any international regimes.”

However, Zakaria warned securing investment may prove challenging: “Neither the development finance institutions nor the western and the Middle Eastern banks will lend for the project in view of US sanctions placed on Iran, which will also make it difficult for Pakistan to pay for the gas received from Iran,” he said.

Pakistan’s best bet may be to build the pipeline with financing from China or some other external source, said Kugelman. Among possible funders is Russia. Sayed told The Third Pole that, “Russia has offered to fund the initial USD $160m for the 80km of Pakistan-Iran Pipeline.” While Iran, said its consul general, “would be happy to provide technical and engineering support in building the pipeline”.

Pakistan faces a complex energy transition, marked by growing demand and discussions centred on the immediate challenges of costs, legal action and geopolitical dynamics.

As Pakistan prepares to host Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi on an official three-day visit from April 22, Isaad warned against viewing Iranian gas as a panacea for Pakistan’s energy needs, emphasising it is “another imported commodity and subject to geopolitical considerations and linked to global oil prices”.

Pakistan should instead focus on renewable sources like wind and solar, she said, suggesting a strategic shift that aligns with global energy trends. But “if it is needed for industrial use, like for the fertiliser sector, then we might have to wait for other alternatives such as green hydrogen and ammonia to become economically feasible.”

Sweltering days found to increase mortality in three cities across India. 

By Joydeep Gupta, May 1, 2024

Crippling heatwaves are sweeping across South and Southeast Asia. In the southern state of Kerala in India, two people have died reportedly due to high humidity coupled with heatwave conditions as temperatures hit 42 degrees Celsius. In the last few weeks, Indian politicians campaigned during near 40C temperatures. As India goes to the ballot between now and 1 June, some politicians have blamed heatwaves for a low turnout.

The India Meteorological Department (IMD) typically issues heatwave warnings if the maximum temperature of a weather station reaches at least 40C in the plains and at least 30C in hilly regions, with a departure of 4.5-6.4C from the normal maximum temperature.

But a new study shows that even on days where there is no official heatwave warning, the threat from heat remains. “Heat stress is usually 1−4C higher on heatwave days than on non-heatwave days,” the study titled ‘Excess Mortality Risk Due to Heat Stress in Different Climatic Zones of India’ found. “However, the [heat] stress on non-heatwave days remains considerable and cannot be neglected,” says the research conducted by multiple authors affiliated with research institutes and colleges across the India, as well as one from Germany.

The authors showed the association of a newly formulated India heat index (IHI) with daily all-cause mortality in the three cities which were chosen for their differences. Delhi is semi-arid, Varanasi is humid and subtropical and Chennai tropical wet and dry. The researchers used 42 years (1979−2020) of meteorological data  to examine vulnerability to heat stress in India and developed climate-zone specific and percentile-based human comfort class thresholds. Values exceeding the 90th percentile were classified as ‘sweltering’, while those below the 25th percentile were ‘comfortable’.

Heat and death

The study found that during ‘sweltering’ days, all-cause mortality risk was enhanced by 8.1% in Varanasi, 5.9% in Delhi and 8.0% in Chennai, relative to ‘comfortable’ days. Across four age groups, the impact was more severe in Varanasi, with a 3.2-7.5% increase in mortality risk for a unit rise in the IHI, compared to Delhi (2.6−4.2% higher risk) and Chennai (0.9−5.7% higher risk). The authors also observed a 3−6 day lag between heat stress and mortality in these cities.

The study shows the statistical “exposure-response relationship between the IHI and mortality in the three cities”. But medical doctors, including experts from the World Health Organisation, insist that heat cannot cause illness or death, and that it can only aggravate existing conditions such as high blood pressure or diarrhoea. They say these are the conditions that cause illness or death, and that is why a doctor writing a death certificate will not write heat stress as a cause of death.

Asked to comment on this, study co-author and chair of the Centre for Atmospheric Sciences at IIT Delhi Sagnik Dey told Dialogue Earth, “Heat is a risk factor, causing diseases which cause death. Therefore, in the death certificate, it’s not mentioned. Similar is the rationale for ’smoking’ or ‘air pollution’. Smoking cannot kill people – smoking can cause cancer or heart diseases or stroke, which kill people. So, you will never find ’smoking’ as the cause of death.

“In epidemiology studies, we link the risks to deaths or disease [morbidity] – the interpretation is the deaths from all possible causes attributable to that risk factor. This is standard practice.”

Policy implication

The authors say the heterogeneity they found in heat stress impact across diverse climate zones in India should lead to the development of an early warning system that keeps these regional variations in mind.

IMD heatwave warnings differ across climatic zones in the country. The researchers say the index they used will improve these warnings. Asked what the improvement will be, the components of the index used in the study and the relationship between this index and the wet bulb globe temperature (WBGT) used in some countries to add parameters important to human health, Dey said, “IMD does not use any specific index. They provide heatwave warning. The indices are to quantify the stress when someone is exposed to heat and should consider relative humidity, wind and direct radiation along with temperature.”

“All existing indicators were developed based on data from developed countries. We did earlier studies to find that none of the indices match with each other in terms of comfort classes. We tweaked WBGT to represent Indian climate conditions better, but as of now, it is done based on statistics. Epidemiological studies are required to fine tune the thresholds. There is a discussion going on how to integrate IHI into the learning system.”

Asked to explain why heat stress should be different in different areas, Dey told Dialogue Earth, “India has six climate zones, and there is no reason to believe that the comfort thresholds should be the same. We know that heat stress is not just temperature, but many other factors are relevant. So, logically, the risk should also vary. In our analysis, we showed evidence that this is indeed the case. Other studies also concur with the fact that the risk is very different in dry heat [what we found in our arid or semi-arid regions] vs humid heat [we found in subtropical humid or other climate zones].

“What we should do in the future is conduct epidemiological studies across the diverse climate zone and validate the statistical-based thresholds and fine tune it.”

K J Ramesh, the former head of IMD, said that because there is heterogeneity in heat stress across India, the IMD and National Disaster Management Authority have city-level heat action plans. “Those are being followed and are saving lives. We’re learning by doing. I wish this had been mentioned in the paper.”

He added, “Heterogeneity can be at various levels and can have major impacts. In one of the years between 2015 and 2017, it was found that infant deaths in certain hospitals in Telangana had gone up significantly in midsummer. Upon checking, it was found that all these hospitals had their maternity wards on the top floor. Now they have been asked to shift those wards. These micro-level differences are important.”

He also disagreed with the study drawing a relationship between PM2.5 pollution and heat stress. “PM2.5 and other pollutants rise in the atmosphere and get dispersed in the summer.”

Asked what construction workers and others who had to be outdoors should do to reduce heat stress, Ramesh said, “They should not work between 1 and 4 pm. They can start earlier, at 6 am.”

Reports of whales trapped in fishing gear are on the rise worldwide, as are the risky attempts of ‘disentanglers’ to free them. 

By Daniel Cressey, April 24, 2024

In 2004, a humpback whale was spotted entangled in fishing gear in Banderas Bay, a small bight on the Pacific Coast of Mexico in which the resort town of Puerto Vallarta nestles.

This area is home for Astrid Frisch-Jordán, the operations manager for Ecotours de Mexico and a professional whale watcher. Concerned townspeople were soon calling her about the trapped animal.

“The first day, we were like: ‘Oh, that’s very bad, but we cannot attend, we are not experts’,” she recalls.

As the hours ticked by, the community’s urge to act grew. “By the second day, we said: ‘Well, we have to do whatever we can’. And then [on] the third day, we went out [to] sea with just garden tools and our knowledge about whales.”

So began seven dangerous hours of her and several other like-minded locals attempting to cut the animal free with equipment designed for trimming plants. Meanwhile, other whales were trying to intimidate them into leaving.

“It was quite dangerous. But the whale was fully released and we were all okay,” says Frisch-Jordán, who is also the head researcher for an NGO called Ecology and Conservation of Whales (Ecobac). “It changed my life completely.”

The event led to the formation of the Mexican Whale Disentanglement Network (Raben), which this year celebrates 20 years of operation and the successful disentanglement of 66 whales from gillnets, lobster pots and other fishing gear.

From its early days in Banderas Bay, Raben has grown to encompass 15 teams and 180 members. Its growth has coincided with a surge in reports of tangled whales, from less than 10 a year, to 37 by 2021; Frisch-Jordán co-authored a paper published in February that details this rise. According to experts consulted by Dialogue Earth, the surge parallels a global increase. This has likely been driven by an outreach effort encouraging people to report, an increase in entanglements as fishers expand their activities, and the recovery of North Pacific whale populations after the end of industrial hunting.

Freeing the bound

Being tangled in a net or other fishing gear is a horrible experience for marine mammals. Held below the surface, smaller animals can drown, and while larger creatures may be able to swim away, injury is common. Ropes can cut into flesh and slow whales down or force their bodies into awkward positions that inhibit feeding.

Whales are hugely powerful and can drag fishing gear that would be impossible for humans to even lift – one whale attended by a Raben team off Mexico’s coast was tangled in a cod pot from Dutch Harbor in Alaska weighing over 200kg, Frisch-Jordán’s paper notes. The whale may have dragged the load for more than 4,000 nautical miles.

Freeing whales from entanglements is not easy. Typically, teams approach in small boats and try to attach their own line to whatever fishing gear is entangling the animal. If this is successful, buoys are attached to the line, which slow the whale down and keep it at the surface, allowing crucial time to try and cut away the entangled gear with special knives.

The risk for would-be rescuers is becoming entangled in the very fishing gear they are trying to cut loose. Members of disentanglement teams have been dragged under the water and died in such cases; some rescuers have also died from the impact of marine animals hitting them.

“Training people to do this is an enormous responsibility,” says Scott Landry, who directs the Marine Animal Entanglement Response programme at the Center for Coastal Studies in the US. “We live in fear that people are going to be injured doing this work.

“These are large animals. These are fast-moving, messy operations, and we’re dealing with an animal that has no idea we are trying to help them,” adds Landry, who is also a member of the International Whaling Commission (IWC)’s Expert Advisory Panel on Entanglement Response. “I would say they are very unpredictable – and you’re getting them at the worst moment of their lives.”

The techniques used by Landry, Frisch-Jordán and others around the world have their roots in whaling, mankind’s rather less friendly interaction with the world’s largest mammals. Whalers would harpoon them and attach barrels to keep the animals from disappearing below the waves: this history has simultaneously led to today’s dangerously low populations of some species, and provided disentanglers with the tools to help. 

The right whale problem

In the 18th and 19th centuries, North Atlantic right whales were savagely hunted. The whales’ name comes from the notion that these animals – which can exceed 15 metres in length and 60 tonnes in weight – were the “right” ones to hunt, as they were slow-moving and would float once dead.

The pre-whaling population, estimated at 21,000, was harpooned down to a few hundred by the end of the 1800s.

After growing steadily from less than 300 in the early 1990s to number nearly 500 at the start of the 2010s, the North Atlantic right whale population has now contracted to approximately 350. The chief cause is people: the whales are most commonly struck by ships plying the eastern seaboard of the US, or tangled in Atlantic fishing gear.

Researchers who have studied scars on these animals believe over 80% of North Atlantic right whales have been entangled at least once.

“Any threat to a right whale that will increase its mortality risk, or increase ill health from sub-lethal entanglement, will directly affect the chances of the species going extinct,” says Michael Moore, who directs the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution’s Marine Mammal Center in the US.

Moore cites estimates that around 70 reproducing females are left.

Becoming trapped in fishing gear can so sicken whales that they are no longer able to reproduce. Some entangled right whales become so emaciated that they sink rather than float when dead; this is normally only seen in exhausted females after carrying young and giving birth. “Essentially they are dead whales swimming,” says Moore.

Taking techniques around the world

North Atlantic right whales are not the only marine mammals on the brink.

David Mattila, who coordinates the IWC’s expert panel and the Global Whale Entanglement Response Network, is also concerned about the impacts of entanglement on Arabian Sea humpback whales, Chilean right whales and Sea of Okhotsk bowhead whales. Entanglement might also harm the western grey whale, but the animal is so rare Mattila cannot be sure it still exists.

“These are populations of large whales that are very critically endangered, and they are exposed to entanglement,” Mattila tells Dialogue Earth. He adds that these are populations for which the death of even one whale due to entanglement could potentially be a major conservation issue.

Mattila was involved in the development of professional disentanglement efforts when they began in the 1980s. This year, he celebrates the 40th anniversary of his first rescue – a female humpback trapped in a gill net near Provincetown, north-western US.

“Now we know, basically, it happens anywhere in the world you have whales and man-made rope or net in the water,” says Mattila.

Growing concerns and rising reports of entanglements triggered the IWC to convene a special meeting on the topic in 2010, which recommended capacity-building for rescues around the world, alongside prevention. Mattila estimates that, to date, around 1,300 people from 36 countries have been trained by this IWC initiative.

Rope: A problem for fishers, and for humanity

For every whale reported to a rescue network, many more are entangled and die unseen. The real solution, say those involved, should be preventing whales from encountering rope in the first place.

Modern fishing gear ropes are made of various forms of plastic, and manufacturing changes in the 1990s significantly increased their strength. Using weaker rope – either by cutting some strands or manufacturing weaker rope in the first place – has been suggested as a way of saving whales, as has closing areas where whales might come into contact with boats, such as shipping lanes and fishing areas.

Some fishers are also experimenting with marine-mammal-friendly, rope-free systems. For example, typical lobster fishing entails a lobster pot on the sea floor, permanently connected by a rope to a marker buoy at the surface. Rope-free systems use sunk gear with no permanent rope: instead, a lobster catch triggers the pot to release a float, which rises to the surface and signals the gear is ready for retrieval.

However, these solutions all stand to increase the price paid by consumers. To date, society has not been willing to stomach that price, says Moore.

Current industrial fishing methods are predominantly designed to prioritise the catch. Until this paradigm shifts, teams like Frisch-Jordán’s will continue receiving calls about whales entangled in the vast array of equipment that fishers have created to extract food from the seas.

Sometimes, if it is too dark, too dangerous, or a whale is too injured, disentanglement teams cannot help. “The hardest part is when we cannot rescue the whale – and that, of course, happens a lot,” says Frisch-Jordán.

“But when you have a strong whale in perfect shape, and you just set it free, that for me is magical.”