Focus on Arts and Ecology

 This week’s big environmental stories - 21-27 January

Central government has made major revisions to its policy for controlling provinces’ energy use. Consumption caps have been loosened and renewable energy will no longer count towards consumption totals.
 
The aim is to make the policy more flexible, so energy needs can be met and poorer provinces can catch up economically.

The revisions have major implications for renewable energy development, coal-to-chemical facilities and equality between provinces, according to the action plan for energy conservation and emissions reduction (2021-2025) released by the State Council on Monday.
 
The “dual controls” policy – of controlling energy consumption and energy intensity (meaning energy used per unit of GDP) – has been a key driver of China’s decarbonisation since its implementation in 2006. 
 
Observers believe the revisions will have a mixed impact on China’s emissions trajectory.
 
The discounting of renewable energy from consumption totals removes a key barrier to developing renewables fast enough to reach carbon neutrality by 2060. Provinces can now consume green electricity knowing this won’t affect their precious energy allowance.
 
Other exemptions may provide incentives that are less promising for the climate. Use of coal and oil as feedstocks for chemical processes, such as in coal-to-chemical facilities, will no longer figure in provinces’ energy consumption or intensity calculations. Such processes mostly just change the form of the energy rather than consume it, the argument goes. But research shows coal conversion still generates substantial emissions and is very water intensive. The exemption is considered a boost to the coal-to-chemical industry, whose coal use was previously kept on a tight leash by energy quotas. 
 
Overall, the revisions make energy consumption caps less binding, while doubling down on energy intensity. Under the new rule, a province overachieving its GDP growth target will be allowed to go beyond its energy consumption cap “accordingly”, as long as it hits its energy intensity target. This will be a relief for poorer provinces, which felt rigid energy consumption caps limited their ability to catch up on economic growth. 
 
China has committed to reducing the energy intensity of its economy by 13.5% between 2021 and 2025.

(Sources: China Dialogue)

The system classifying sustainable economic activities has divided the bloc’s member states but could be headed for a compromise solution. 

By James Norris, January 24, 2022

Taxonomy is a dry, technical word for a classification system but, when used by the EU as part of its efforts to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050, it is a term that has triggered passionate debate. The EU Taxonomy, in short, defines and classifies which economic activities can be labelled as “green”, to qualify for EU funding. After it was first proposed in March 2019, the debate about what to include in the taxonomy quickly became one about EU member states’ national interests.

The main sticking point has been over fossil-fuel gas and nuclear energy. Pragmatists concerned about energy security have argued for their inclusion, while environmental campaigners have objected that this would contradict the EU’s net-zero emissions strategy. As the year-end deadline for a decision approached last month, fears that the European Commission would allow their inclusion had been such that environmental activists gathered in Brussels to stage a mock funeral for it. Their fears proved well founded, as on New Year’s Eve the commission published draft proposals allowing the inclusion of gas and nuclear, under certain conditions. 

So, what’s it all about? The EU Taxonomy, according to a European Commission document, is “a tool to help investors, companies, issuers and project promoters navigate the transition to a low-carbon, resilient and resource-efficient economy.” The aim is to “protect private investors from greenwashing, help companies to become more climate-friendly, mitigate market fragmentation and help shift investments to where they are most needed”. As such, it is central to the EU’s broader aim of reaching net-zero emissions by 2050.

Environmental objectives

The EU Taxonomy strategy sets six environmental objectives: mitigating climate change (mainly through decarbonisation); adapting to climate change (managing the physical risk); protecting water and marine resources; transitioning to a circular economy; preventing and controlling pollution; and protecting and restoring biodiversity and ecosystems. Each of these objectives covers a range of economic activities. The climate change mitigation section alone covers 90, each of which has “technical screening criteria” to determine whether any revenue or capital expenditure incurred from the activity can be considered green.

The system is designed to be flexible, to encourage companies to adopt its rules. Apart from the activities that are more obviously green, such as the manufacture of solar panels and wind turbines, the EU Taxonomy also sets criteria for “transitioning” activities; in other words, for those companies working towards meeting the green definition. For example, the manufacture of cement has always been a highly carbon-intensive industry, but if the CO2 emitted in the process can be reduced to below a certain threshold set by the EU Taxonomy, then it can be considered green. This would be important to a cement manufacturer because, with these green credentials, it can then access attractively priced Green Deal funds to finance its business.

Thus, simply by defining which activities are green and setting the standards to be met, the EU Taxonomy effectively decides which sectors and companies get green funding, incentivising them to remain on the path to net zero. The EU itself, as well as other governments and agencies, will also be using the taxonomy criteria in the financial markets for their risk assessments and for their green bond programme. Asset managers handling pension and other investment funds will likewise be looking to follow the taxonomy when they decide which companies to invest in. Directly applicable to them, too, is the Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation, which requires them to report on how much of their revenue comes from investments in green companies.

A further element of flexibility in the system comes with the taxonomy’s review process, as the criteria are set to be reviewed every three years, after which they can be adjusted as necessary. For environmentalists, however, the EU Taxonomy has seen far too much flexibility already – so much, they say, as to potentially undermine its whole purpose. As the WWF declared in a statement released to coincide with the mock funeral staged in Brussels last month: “Billions of euros are at risk of being diverted into fossil fuels, nuclear energy and factory farming, worsening the climate and nature crises. This is because the EU Taxonomy is probably about to be greenwashed.”

A politicised debate

The EU Taxonomy, as well as being an environmental measure, has become an intensely political question for EU member state governments, now under pressure from their electorates over soaring energy prices, increased living costs and fears of energy blackouts. In early 2021, the French government gave their backing to new nuclear projects. But as they wanted nuclear to be included in the taxonomy, France had to do a deal with Germany, which instead wanted the inclusion of gas, having moved to decommission all its nuclear reactors following the Fukushima disaster.

As Energy Monitor said: “it now appears that a nuclear-for-gas compromise may be the only way to get the taxonomy through a vote in the EU Council.” If that were to happen, the WWF said, “it will deal a fatal blow to the taxonomy. The consequences for the EU Green Deal, the EU’s sustainable finance leadership, and the climate and nature crises would be dire.”

Climate change thinktank E3G says such a move would contradict the EU’s regulatory process and principles, entail reputational damage and a loss of trust, effectively handing its current regulatory leadership role on climate issues to China.

EU Taxonomy lags behind

Developments in the EU Taxonomy debate are being closely watched by regulators and investors around the world. China’s own taxonomy is known as the Green Bond Endorsed Project Catalogue. It excludes gas, liquid natural gas and coal, and so sets the highest green energy finance standards. This taxonomy is mainly used by financial institutions and corporations for the issuance of green bonds in the Chinese onshore markets, with different disclosure requirements for different types of green bonds.

China and the EU have conducted an in-depth comparison of their respective systems, which has resulted in the Common Ground Taxonomy. This could in time form the basis of a possible global standard for sustainable finance, usable by other countries wanting to develop their own green taxonomies.

Russia’s taxonomy also restricts investment in new gas projects, closely reflecting the EU’s original proposals. South Korea, meanwhile – sensing that the EU Taxonomy is in trouble – seems to be back-tracking on its own standards. According to E3G, the Korean environment ministry has explained that the continued debate over this issue in Europe has influenced their decision not to exclude unabated gas power from its ‘green’ list, although nuclear power is still excluded.

Japan is struggling to live up to the pledges it made at COP26 in Glasgow last November, such is its concern about energy supplies. According to Bloomberg, Japan’s prime minister, Fumio Kishida, approved a strategic energy plan on 22 October, before the COP, which says: “no compromise is acceptable to ensure energy security, and it is the obligation of a nation to continue securing necessary resources.” The US and UK have already said they will draft their own taxonomies in due course.

Back in Europe, the reality is that the taxonomy debate has been skewed by serious misconceptions and a lack of understanding, being focused on national interests rather than long-term goals or vision, says Tsvetelina Kuzmanova, a policy adviser on sustainable finance at E3G’s Brussels office.

As she told China Dialogue: “The taxonomy cannot tell you what to invest in. It cannot ban investments in polluting activities. It does not even apply to member states’ own spending or budget – it is meant for private finance disclosure requirements as a transparency tool. If anyone is willing to invest in unsustainable activities, that is their decision. But [the taxonomy] should not justify greenwashing and thus undermine the legitimacy and trust in the overall framework.”

Policy analysts at Principles for Responsible Investment, a United Nations-backed international network of investors, draw a distinction between the EU Taxonomy’s treatment of gas and nuclear and the role they might play in the energy transition. As the aim of the taxonomy is to define which economic activities can be considered green, rather than to exclude non-green activities from playing a role in that transition, the analysts say it should be possible for legislators to develop a separate framework that gives gas and nuclear a role in the transition that does not compromise the taxonomy’s integrity.

The European Commission has already indicated it may be moving to make its rules less binary in their effect. Currently working its way through the legislative process is an initiative to support the financing of certain activities not covered by the EU Taxonomy that can help to reduce the amount of carbon dioxide produced by the economy in the next decade. And in October, EU Commissioner Mairead McGuinness spoke to the Financial Times about the possibility of an “amber” category for activities that did not qualify for the green label but that could still have a part to play in the energy transition.

The debate is a lot more nuanced than would first appear. One thing is certain: the EU Taxonomy doesn’t forbid anything; it is merely a tool to promote green economic activities. That technical point has, not for the first time, been lost in the heat of political battle.

James Norris

James Norris is a journalist with over 20 years' experience in the financial services industry. He has written for the FT Group, Financial News, Euromoney and Incisive Media.

(Sources: China Dialogue)

What does a sustainable civilisation look like and how do we get there? A burgeoning movement of artists and activists is seeking answers. 

By Joe Coroneo-Seaman, January 21, 2022

It is 2050. In most places in the world, the air is moist and fresh, even in cities. It feels a lot like walking through a forest, and very likely this is exactly what you are doing. The air is cleaner than it has been since before the Industrial Revolution. We have trees to thank for that. They are everywhere.”

In the current moment, these words from Christiana Figueres and Tom Rivett-Carnac’s 2020 book The Future We Choose might seem like pure fantasy. The world they describe seems so far from the present, where over 90% of the Earth’s population breathes air deemed unsafe by the World Health Organization, scientists warn that humans are causing “irreversible” changes to the climate and nature is declining globally at an unprecedented rate.

But a burgeoning artistic and political movement known as “solarpunk” is trying to bring this lush, verdant world closer to reality.

Solarpunk imagines an optimistic future where humans have overcome the major environmental and social crises of our time and in the process created a safe, just world powered by clean energy and organised around collaborative social ideals.

It rejects the pessimism of cyberpunk, which paints the future as a corporate-controlled and environmentally degraded dystopia. As stated in a manifesto written collectively by the online solarpunk community, “as our world roils with calamity, we need solutions, not only warnings”.

The concept of solarpunk originally emerged in the late 2000s, when a handful of artists on the social media platform Tumblr began sharing drawings of futuristic green cities. Over time, the aesthetic and ethos evolved into a more robust vision for the world, and in the process has been embraced by other art forms. There are now published collections of solarpunk literature, subgenres of music, movements within architecture and even tabletop role-playing games.

At the core of this vision is the idea that humans can coexist in harmony with the rest of nature. A solarpunk world is one where vast swathes of land have been returned to wilderness, rooftop gardens dot the skylines of high-tech cities and vertical farms provide food to their residents.

Responsible use of technology is also a prominent theme. Solar, wind and wave power have entirely replaced fossil fuels as sources of energy, while widespread 3D printing has made it much easier to produce things locally, creating resilient, self-sufficient communities.

Increasingly, artists and writers in the solarpunk movement also describe a world that is just and safe for marginalised groups – especially those facing the brunt of the climate and ecological crisis today. “BIPOC [black, indigenous and people of colour] and queer people are safe in solarpunk futures,” says Brianna Castagnozzi, co-editor-in-chief of Solarpunk Magazine.

 This week’s big environmental stories (14-20 January)

In mid-January, a team of two trawlers with a crew of 16 from Zhejiang province caught nearly two and a half tonnes of large yellow croaker (Larimichthys crocea) in a single haul in the East China Sea. They sold the catch for more than 9.5 million yuan (about US$1.5 million), nearly 4,000 yuan ($630) per kilogram. The stunning price is down to demand in a pre-Chinese New Year market and the extreme rarity of wild populations of the species. Large yellow croaker is a delicacy in China. Farmed fish are common and are currently sold at about 50 yuan per kilo.
 
Experts warn the boats seem to have got the bonanza from a croaker wintering ground, and the individuals they have netted are likely to be parent fish about to lay eggs. Although such big catches are a sign of population recovery, intensive fishing outside of summer closures could end it. The two trawlers are far from the only ones trying their luck in nearby waters with electronic fish finders.
 
China set up a summer closure system for coastal fishing in the 1990s, and it’s been increasingly strict. But that doesn’t prevent “compensating overfishing” outside the closed season. 
 
Experts are calling for the protection of wintering grounds and banning of trawling in coastal waters. But the most commonly shared sense of urgency is directed at establishing a fishing quota system based on annual stock surveys. One expert says even if the system was established tomorrow, the quota for large yellow croaker “should be zero in the coming years,” because it’s too early to say if its population has recovered. It still takes time, repopulation efforts and strong regulation, combined with marine ranching as a replacement for fishing.
 
China has been trialing fishing quotas since 2017 in Shandong and Zhejiang provinces. But as one expert who worked on the trials told China Dialogue in 2020, multiple factors set its formal establishment back. One problem is lack of data on fish populations due to inconsistent surveying. Another is too many vessels, making it hard to allocate total allowable catch among them.

(Sources: China Dialogue)

This week’s big environmental stories (14-20 January 2022) 

Year-end economic data has revealed a Chinese economy rapidly expanding with renewable energy and new energy vehicles, while a number of carbon-intensive industries may finally be starting to retreat.
 
The data, released by the National Bureau of Statistics on 17 January, offers a look at the major economic trends in the first full year since China set its carbon neutrality targets in September 2020. 
 
On power generation, there was an enormous 29.8% increase of wind-generated power compared to 2020, a year which itself had seen an increase of 10.5% on 2019. The leap comes off the back of massive wind farm installations in 2020. Solar-generated power also grew by a sizeable 14.1% in 2021. Nuclear power, meanwhile, is seeing a small renaissance in China in the net zero era. With a number of new reactors coming online in 2021, nuclear power generation increased 11.3% compared to 2020.
 
The picture for coal, which still forms the backbone of China’s power sector, was more complex. Coal-generated power saw growth of 8.4%, much faster than in 2020. Domestic coal mining production and coal imports also saw significant growth of 4.7% and 6.6% respectively. The growth across the coal sector is a direct result of the government’s response to China’s power crisis in the last quarter of the year. In the power sector, China’s largest emitter of CO2, progress appears to be moving one step back for every two forward.
 
A commentary written by the National Bureau of Statistics’ energy bureau chief, Hu Hanzhou, concluded that “energy supply has been guaranteed… [and] the development of a green and low carbon energy sector has seen solid progress.”
 
In the heavy industry sectors, major coal consumers steel and cement both saw rare declines in production in 2021. Crude steel and pig iron production declined by 3% and 4.3%, respectively, compared to 2020, a year that saw record output. The decline in steel production is the first since 2015 and offers hope China can get the bloated and massively polluting sector under control – essential for achieving its carbon emission targets. The decline in output was driven by a major slowdown in China’s property market and government caps on total output.
 
Another green sector which saw impressive growth was the production of new energy vehicles, which include electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids and fuel cell vehicles. China produced a total of 36.8 million such vehicles, a jump of 145.6% on 2020. In contrast, output of internal combustion engine vehicles increased by around 6%.

(Sources: China Dialogue)

Some ocean management organisations are bringing climate change into decision-making, with Antarctica’s CCAMLR a pioneer. 

By Jiliang Chen, Ding Yutian January 19, 2022

Climate protection and ocean conservation are getting increasing attention, and the links between the two are being taken more seriously during international processes. At the Glasgow Climate Conference, leaders announced their ocean actions, including establishing marine reserves, as climate actions. Some countries have put the “blue economy” and coastal adaptation to climate change into their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to keeping warming within Paris Agreement levels.

The Glasgow Climate Pact marks the first time ocean issues have been formally included in UN climate processes. In its own words, the pact “invites the relevant work programmes and constituted bodies under the UNFCCC [UN Framework Convention on Climate Change] to consider how to integrate and strengthen ocean-based action in their existing mandates and workplans and to report on these activities within the existing reporting processes.”

This is hardly the first time the link between the climate and the ocean has been recognised. Some ocean management bodies are already considering climate change when setting policy, with the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) a pioneer.

The climate change threat to marine life in Antarctica

CCAMLR, one part of the Antarctic Treaty system, is an international organisation founded in 1982 to steward Antarctica’s marine , mainly by managing fisheries. Specifically, it applies “to the Antarctic marine living resources of the area south of 60° South latitude…. and of the area between that latitude and the Antarctic Convergence.”

CCAMLR’s work is carried out in accordance with the 1980 Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources. In Article 2 of that document, a section on conservation principles includes the “prevention of changes or minimisation of the risk of changes in the marine ecosystem which are not potentially reversible over two or three decades.” That means not just preventing clear cause-and-effect threats, but also potential future threats. And there is no doubt that climate change is one of the major threats faced by Antarctic ecosystems.

Climate change could cause changes in the size of individual creatures, overall biomass (through changes in population size, spawning rates and disease); and distribution (as species shift to waters with more suitable temperatures, or are forced to move due to shifting competitors or predators).

These impacts aren’t yet significant in the Antarctic’s two main fisheries – krill and toothfish. But research shows they will worsen as climate change intensifies.

In 2013, scientists from the Australian Antarctic Division, working in the laboratory to study krill breeding during ocean acidification, found that when carbon dioxide in the water reaches 1750μatm, more than four times normal levels, krill breeding plummets. The researchers predict that, under a business-as-usual scenario, by 2100 krill hatch rates will have dropped 20%. That will affect population sizes.

The Antarctic toothfish, one of two toothfish species found in these waters, is under even greater threat. Research carried out in 2008 by the University of British Columbia predicted moderately warmer oceans would cause the range of the Antarctic toothfish to shrink as the ice shelf retreats. In an extreme warming scenario, that range would drastically reduce, with a risk of extinction in a matter of decades.

Including the climate in Southern Ocean conservation policy

Against this background, CCAMLR started discussing climate change relatively early and has kept up to date with research, gradually including climate considerations in its policy-making framework. As all CCAMLR policies are first discussed and given scientific backing by its Scientific Committee before being passed to the commission itself, that process has gone through three stages.

The first stage involved agenda setting. In 2000, CCAMLR noted that the International Science Council had carried out a study into the vulnerability to climate change of Antarctica’s mainland and freshwater ecosystems, which could be relevant to its own Ecosystem Monitoring Programme. Cooperation between the Council and the Programme benefited both. In 2005, climate change entered the agenda of the CCAMLR Scientific Committee intersessional working group meetings. Two years later, it became an official agenda item of the Committee. In 2015, climate change became an independent agenda item for the CCAMLR meeting, which is where decisions are made and policy is set.

That led to the second stage: some CCAMLR measures started to feature climate change goals, for example during the establishment of protected areas and the management of krill stocks.

Establishing nature reserves can improve the ability of ecosystems to adapt to and recover from climate change. Also, less disturbed ecosystems can be used as reference for scientific research. In 2011, this was one of the stated aims in proposals for protected areas in the Ross Sea and East Antarctica. The Ross Sea “marine park” was created in 2016 and is the largest protected area in the world. Building resilience to climate change, and use in scientific research, are both stated objectives in the proposals for marine protected areas in the Weddell Sea and Western Antarctic Peninsula. These proposals were put forward in 2018 and 2017 respectively but CCAMLR member states have so far failed to agree on establishing them.

Political and financial commitment is needed to support the contributions of women and girls at all levels. 

By Nina Jeffs, January 18, 2022

At the COP26 climate summit, the leaders of Estonia, Tanzania and Bangladesh were the first to sign the Glasgow Women’s Leadership statement, calling for countries to support the leadership of women and girls on climate action at all levels of society and politics. Yet these three women comprised nearly a third of all female leaders at the conference, out of 140 heads of delegation.

On Gender Day at the COP, countries including the UK, Canada and the US pledged to further integrate gender into their climate finance arrangements. While the pledges reflect a growing awareness of “gender-responsive” finance, which promotes gender equality, the amount of money so far mobilised falls well short of what is needed around the world. Attention to gender in climate finance negotiations remains negligible. Making the Glasgow Women’s Leadership statement a reality will require scaled-up funding for women’s capacity-building and community-level climate action.

The negative impacts of climate change disproportionately affect women and girls, especially in the global south. This is not due to inherent vulnerability but the result of gender inequalities in the political, social and economic realms that intersect with other axes of social disadvantage, such as race, sexuality, gender identity and disability status. For example, during and after climate-related events, women and girls are more exposed to gender-based violence, and girls are less likely than boys to continue their education. The Malala Fund estimates that in 2021, climate-related events will prevent at least four million girls in developing countries from finishing their education. When it comes to employment, women in developing countries are more likely to work in the informal sector, making their livelihoods more vulnerable to economic and environmental shocks.

Despite these challenges, women and girls have a crucial role in achieving the climate targets set at COP26. As valuable members of society, they deserve to participate equally in public life. Still, it is notable that their participation generates more effective and equitable climate outcomes, from sustainable land management to last-mile solar panel deployment. Research demonstrates that due to socially prescribed gender roles, women assess risk differently to men and typically prioritise the welfare of their families and communities in resource-management decisions. Such differences in decision-making extend to national politics: a 2019 study found that national parliaments with more women pass more stringent climate policies. Measures that improve women’s access to healthcare, education and political representation strengthen their adaptive capacity, enabling their societies to adapt more quickly and easily to the effects of climate change.

Unfortunately, women continue to face barriers to equal participation in environmental decision-making, and women-led community organisations commonly struggle to access climate finance. Support for women’s initiatives and access to resources can drive effective climate action that meets the needs of communities.

Women’s participation in environmental decision-making

While women, especially indigenous women and women in the global south, are leading frontline climate action and activism, they are underrepresented in environmental decision-making at all levels. Gender-differentiated tasks, including women’s responsibility for most unpaid household labour, and unequal power relations within families and communities, can limit women’s opportunities to participate in local environmental governance. The common prerequisite of land tenure for community natural resource decision-making also limits women’s input. UN Women estimates that 64% of women globally do not have equal land rights to men in practice.

At national and international levels, women continue to face glass ceilings that prevent them from reaching environmental leadership positions. Gender parity in national-level environmental decision-making is rare, and employees of environmental ministries are on average one-third women. Although the gender balance of government delegations to climate negotiations has improved, UNFCCC research found that men spoke 74% of the time in plenary meetings between May and June last year.

Gender-responsive policy measures can help to overcome these systemic barriers. Land tenure reform can support women’s land ownership, inheritance and use rights, for example, by mandating that land registration by couples includes both names. Policies like gender quotas can support women’s career progression in environmental institutions. Investment in social services, especially childcare, can lighten the load of unpaid household labour on women, as can flexible working policies and paid parental leave. Creating and enforcing laws and policies against sex and gender discrimination, including gender-based violence, can ensure that climate change spaces are inclusive and safe for all. These measures all contribute to addressing the complex issue of culture change.

Ensuring access to quality education for girls is also a key pathway for gender parity in climate leadership. Girls’ education can be a force for gender equality in families and communities and is closely associated with a country’s female political representation. Climate education for girls, including technical environmental training, can increase their resilience and build their capacity to critically engage with climate information and lead climate solutions. In developed and developing countries alike, girls’ participation in STEM (science, technology, engineering and maths) education on an equal platform with boys can enable them to access traditionally male-dominated “green” jobs and contribute to an equitable just transition.

Of course, women and girls are already leading their own solutions to the interlinked challenges of climate change and gender inequality. To scale these up, they need access to climate finance.

Women’s access to climate finance

The integration of gender considerations into climate finance is limited. Due to insufficient monitoring, reporting and verification of gender in climate finance, data on the topic are patchy, but Oxfam research shows that only 1.5% of overseas climate-related development assistance identified gender equality as a primary objective and two-thirds of projects and programmes do not consider gender equality in their design, budgeting or implementation. Of this aid, only 0.2% reaches women-led and women’s organisations. Liane Schalatek, associate director of Heinrich Böll Stiftung Washington, DC and co-author of a recent report on the topic, calls this a “shocking indictment”, reflecting a disregard by climate funds and implementing agencies that “women-led, women’s and feminist organisations not only are very aware of the needs and climate impacts… in their communities, but have also women-led contextualised and localised solutions.”

While staff from climate finance institutions express support for funding gender equality organisations, institutional barriers exist, especially for the global south. The small scale of many women’s community organisations can hinder accreditation with, and direct access to, large-scale funders. Due to concerns about budget timelines and transaction costs, institutional funders commonly only offer large funding packages with stringent timelines.

Gender parity and expertise in financial institutions are important for the design of gender-responsive climate finance solutions, as is meaningful consultation with women and girls in beneficiary communities. The gender integration targets present in climate finance institutions like the Green Climate Fund can be taken further by making gender considerations mandatory for funding. Improving data collection and transparency on gender integration in climate finance projects, including on how projects benefit people of different genders, can foster collaboration and knowledge-sharing among funders and beneficiaries.

Small innovations in climate finance mechanisms can transform access to finance for women’s organisations. Direct access channels remove government as middlemen and reduce institutional hoop-jumping for community organisations. Providing smaller funds, more flexible timelines, and capacity-building and institutional support for women-led and women’s organisations applying for climate finance can also support equitable access. More loans than grants are typically available, and gender-responsive finance is weighted towards adaptation rather than mitigation programmes. Improving the balance in these areas can support long-term capacity-building for women’s climate leadership.

At COP26, civil society groups celebrated women’s climate leadership at the Gender Just Climate Solutions Awards – from the Imece initiative training women in Turkey to build solar batteries for refugees, to Todos Juntos supporting indigenous women in Guatemala to establish mealworm farms. These initiatives prove that combined solutions to climate change and gender inequality exist – women leaders, new and emerging, just need more support.

Nina Jeffs

Nina Jeffs is a Schwarzman Academy Fellow at Chatham House, where she provides analysis on climate change policies that promote social and gender equality. Tweets @Nina_Jeffs

(Sources: China Dialogue)