Focus on Arts and Ecology

Characterised by lawlessness and guerrilla violence, Amazonian mineral mining in Venezuela has attracted the US as it bids to cut off China. 

By Catriona Rainsford, March 20, 2026

At a discrete location near Venezuela’s mining region, several men handle blueish-black gravel in weathered hands.

The minerals they are transporting come from mines seized in 2023 by National Liberation Army guerrillas from Colombia. “Months later, they even brought in helicopters,” one miner tells researchers from the investigative outlet Amazon Underworld. “Everything was chaos. They were taking the material away.”

Attention following the US capture of Venezuela’s president, Nicolás Maduro, on 3 January initially focused on the country’s flagging oil sector. But another potential bonanza lies in the south, where vast mineral reserves lie beneath remote jungle. Control of this area is violently contested between feuding armed groups.

In early March, Maduro’s replacement, Delcy Rodríguez, met with mining executives – including several from the US – and promised to move at “Trump speed” to unlock these riches.

Doing so would require bringing order to an anarchic sector in which industrial mining is almost non-existent and production by state mining company Minerven is largely made up of minerals traded from artisanal mines.

Despite this opaque supply chain, a deal was announced shortly after the meeting that would see Minerven sell one tonne of gold to the commodity trader Trafigura, which has also done major deals in Venezuelan oil since the US intervention.

Flows of gold from southern Venezuela had long been crucial in propping up Maduro’s cash-strapped regime. But in recent years, new commodities have begun to gain ground: critical minerals.

“The gold in this area is already diminishing and there’s little left,” an Indigenous miner told Amazon Underworld, an investigative outlet that visited the region in mid-2025. “Now people are working mostly on these things: black sands, tin, coltan.”

Many of these resources ultimately end up in China, which controls 91% of global rare earth processing. Recent actions by the US under Donald Trump suggests his administration wants this to change. “The US wants to prevent China from accessing these resources, but they also want access themselves,” Bram Ebus, director of Amazon Underworld, tells Dialogue Earth.

Black sands

On the ground in Venezuela, black sands appear to be little more than coarse dirt. They sell for around USD 7.50 per kg. But they contain important traces of rare earth elements, crucial for renewable technologies, as well as advanced electronics and military hardware. They are mined in areas also rich in cassiterite, the source of tin used in the solder for electronic appliances, and coltan, which ends up in semiconductors and mobile phones.

US interest in these resources has so far been understated compared to its vocal promotion of Venezuelan oil. But the spectre of the White House has been present since the early days of the US intervention.

“You have steel, you have minerals – all the critical minerals. They have a great mining history that’s gone rusty,” the US commerce secretary, Howard Lutnick, told journalists the day after Maduro’s capture. “President Trump is going to fix it and bring it back.”

He provided no details about how this would happen in practice.

Industrialising Venezuela’s minerals sector would be a still more daunting task than restoring its dilapidated oil infrastructure.

The reserves cover a vast swathe of territory in the remote southern states of Bolívar and Amazonas. In 2016, Maduro designated 112,000 sq km of this area the “Orinoco mining arc”, and later announced plans to trade minerals with China and other members of the BRICS bloc.

There is still no formal geological mapping of these mineral reserves, however, and commercial mining infrastructure remains all but non-existent. Instead, excavation is carried out by local miners using rudimentary techniques such as dredging rivers from makeshift barges and digging shallow holes. The miners include thousands of Indigenous people, whose marginalised economic position forces them into an economy that poses a severe threat to their ancestral lands and ways of life.

Executions, forced labour and child workers

Aside from a lack of oversight and regulation, miners also work in conditions of chronic insecurity. Many operations take place under the control of armed groups, including Colombia’s National Liberation Army (ELN).

Amazon Underworld’s research details how mining communities are subjected to systematic human rights abuses, including summary executions, forced labour, child recruitment and sexual violence. Freedom of movement is restricted. Punishments are imposed upon miners accused of theft or insubordination.

“They have a prison there, with barbed wire and everything,” one miner told researchers. “But you can’t do anything about it, because if you do, they’ll throw you in there, too.”

Similarly brutal conditions have long been documented in Venezuela’s illegal gold sector, alongside deforestation and mercury poisoning of rivers. But the rise of critical minerals is creating new dangers, for both the environment and human health.

“We don’t know what disaster is coming, because everyone is searching for these rare earth elements, digging holes everywhere, making it look like a ravaged field,” Venezuelan environmental journalist Fritz Sánchez tells Dialogue Earth.

Indigenous miners have reported adverse health impacts, adds Sánchez: “They have skin burns. They have persistent joint pain, swollen joints and a series of pathologies associated with the radioactivity of the minerals.” Due to the lack of clinics in these remote areas, such claims cannot be medically documented, he says.

According to Amazon Underworld’s investigations, Venezuelan state forces collaborate with Colombian guerrillas in this shadow economy. Mineral ores must be moved in bulk, with kickbacks paid to local military who permit or facilitate the transport. The Venezuelan government recently refused to comment on allegations of criminal activity in its mining sector.

Amazon Underworld discovered that some of the ores are sold to traders, who move them across the border into Colombia. There, they are processed and exported using fraudulent customs codes. Another portion is sold to collection hubs set up in 2023 by another state mining company, the Venezuelan Mining Corporation (CVM), then shipped. Export documents and testimonies collected by Amazon Underworld indicate that via both routes, most of the minerals ultimately reach China.

Due diligence guidelines issued by the China Chamber of Commerce for Metals, Minerals and Chemicals aim to mitigate human rights and environmental risks linked to mineral supply chains. However, these guidelines are voluntary. And the export documents demonstrate that these minerals from troubled regions like Venezuela can still reach Chinese industrial hubs with relative ease.

Production on the rise?

The lawlessness of the region presents an issue for any companies seeking to invest. That has not prevented the Venezuelan government from pushing for more mining. Two weeks after the US action, Rodríguez announced plans to increase gold production by 30% during 2026, alongside iron, bauxite and critical minerals.

The results can be seen on the ground. “Fuel is flooding to these mining areas, and none of this mining would happen if they didn’t have access to fuel,” Cristina Burelli, director of the NGO SOS Orinoco, tells Dialogue Earth. “When [Rodríguez] says ‘we’re going to increase mining,’ it’s a signal to just keep doing what they’re doing.”

Amazon Underworld’s Ebus says US mining companies are unlikely to rush to invest in a sector fraught with legal and security challenges.

Much of the mining takes place in protected areas, including the Yapacana national park in Amazonas; mining is entirely outlawed in the state. As per Venezuela’s constitution, mining in Bolívar state requires consultation with Indigenous communities – who would likely oppose large-scale extraction on their ancestral lands.

“I think what’s more plausible is that the US will buy from Venezuelan state companies and then refine in the US, and basically pretend they don’t know it’s coming from illegal mines,” Ebus says.

Until recently, US sanctions on Venezuelan gold and mining companies would have complicated such an arrangement. But on 6 March, the US treasury’s office of foreign assets control (Ofac) issued a general licence authorising certain transactions in Venezuelan gold, enabling the sale of Minerven’s gold to Trafigura. This is potentially a signal that the US is open to involvement in Venezuelan minerals.

This is not a surprise to David Soud, head of research and analysis at the consulting firm IR Consilium: “They did it with the oil, where Ofac issues a limited licence in an otherwise heavily sanctioned environment.”

Ebus says: “It’s remarkable that Washington sanctioned Minerven for illegal practices in 2019, watched it fail to change its behaviour, and is now introducing corporate investors to it. Not only corporations interested in direct mining, but also those sourcing Venezuelan gold will be financing the ongoing violence that has been documented over the last decade.”

The guerrilla challenge

The US designation of Colombia’s National Liberation Army (ELN) as a terrorist organisation complicates matters: any company sourcing minerals from ELN-controlled mines risks being accused of financing terrorism.

Trump has clashed with his Colombian counterpart, Gustavo Petro, whom the US accuses of benefitting terrorist groups like the ELN via his peace policies. In February, Trump told reporters the US and Colombia had vowed to fight together against the group. Colombia will hold a presidential election in May and Petro cannot run again, so it is unclear how this apparent commitment will develop.

Even if the ELN were defeated – far from a foregone conclusion – there is still the presence of other armed groups to contend with. Dissidents from the demobilised Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Farc) and Venezuelan gangs, both also present in the area, could seek to capitalise on any power vacuum. The ELN’s battles with rival groups and military forces in Colombia have seen thousands of civilians displaced by the crossfire.

The need for reform

Beyond military action, any genuine attempt to clean up Venezuela’s mining sector would require addressing the needs of vulnerable local communities. They are forced into mining by coercion or poverty.

“There’s no government programmes, no health, no education,” Burelli says. “If you’re really going to tackle illegal mining, you have to provide alternatives to these thousands of impoverished people.”

At present, there is little sign that such holistic solutions are a priority for either Trump or the Rodríguez government. This means scrutiny and reputational risks will remain high for any current or future buyers of Venezuelan minerals.

“Illegal mining in Venezuela is not only devastating Indigenous communities and fragile ecosystems but also eroding the stability of mineral supply chains, which are central to the energy transition,” Emily Iona Stewart, head of policy and advocacy at the NGO Global Witness, tells Dialogue Earth.

“What’s needed now is full supply chain transparency, enforcement of existing sanctions, due diligence laws, and meaningful investment in community-led alternatives to illegal mining.”

Catriona Rainsford

Discarded eggs and tiny juvenile animals could otherwise contribute vital income to struggling coastal communities. 

By Zubaida Mabuno Ismail, March 13, 2026

For thousands of coastal Ghanaians, artisanal fishing is a livelihood difficult to replace.

Centenary Cidi Ocloo, who has been fishing for 17 years, says the activity is much more than just a way to make ends meet. The sea and the three landing beaches in Ghana’s Keta district have become permanent fixtures in his life.

“I used to follow my father and his siblings to the shores as a child,” Ocloo tells Dialogue Earth. “There were times I would join them during hauling or simply swim while they worked.”

As Ocloo grew up he began coming every day to fish with other children and to help sort the catch.

“It was fun and still is,” he says. Nowadays, though, it can be a tough way to earn a living. Nets are increasingly brought in without fish, just holding garbage and sand. “There are days we haul an empty net,” says Ocloo.

He adds that any cuttlefish eggs trapped in his net are returned to the sea immediately. This follows some local education on protecting cuttlefish given by the chief fisher at his landing beach.

Ghana runs on seafood

The average Ghanaian eats 20-25 kg of fish a year, higher than the global average of 20 kg and many other West African nations.

To supply the catch, the country has a sizeable fishing industry, including scores of trawlers and industrial vessels. But it’s small-scale artisanal fishers that are the backbone of the sector. They put to sea in more than 12,700 canoes, operating out of nearly 200 fishing villages, using beach seine, lobster, gill and purse seine nets.

These artisanal fishers produce about 70% of the marine fish landed in Ghana, according to a 2023 paper. And around three-quarters of all the fish landed are consumed in country.

The fishing industry transcends nutrition and commerce in Ghana, serving as a cornerstone of social and cultural identity in coastal areas like Tema, Takoradi and Chorkor.

The sea governs the daily existence of people here, acting less like a simple resource and more like a generational legacy that fosters communal unity.

This precious resource has been under pressure for a long time. A 2015 research paper found that contrary to the rules, almost all artisanal and industrial vessels operate in the shallow parts of the coast. These practices have degraded breeding sites and depleted fishery resources, the paper says.

To make matters worse, Ghana’s fishers could be throwing away over a million US dollars’ worth of potential seafood annually by catching and discarding tiny, early-life-stage organisms before they can grow to sellable size.

That’s what a six-month study of the country’s beach seine net fisheries has found. It investigated catches on three landing beaches in Ghana, including Dzelukofe where Ocloo fishes.

Bycatch problems

Beach seines are a popular fishing gear along the coast. These nets are set in the water with a canoe and then hauled in from the shore.

The gear consists of two lines to be pulled in, two wings of net and a “cod end” in the middle. The wings have floats at the top and lead weights at the bottom, so the net hangs from the water’s surface down to the seabed.

The net is set in a curve by the canoe and hauled in by a team of upwards of 20 people. This leaves enclosed fish no option but to swim into the cod end as the net is usually hauled along the seabed, dragging along anything in its way.

Beach seines in Ghana can catch a lot of fish. They also catch quite a lot of garbage, plastics, sand, seaweed and anything else within the area the net is dragged through.

Everything besides the fish is left on the shores to dry out or rot. But often, nestled among this detritus, are eggs and tiny invertebrates, too small to be noticed by most people.

Margaret Fafa Akwetey has noticed.

The lecturer at Ghana’s University of Cape Coast led the six-month study into beach seining. She and her team found thousands of animals discarded from many different species. Three-quarters of the discards were juveniles or early life stages of species that are commercially important, such as cuttlefish, bivalves and crustaceans.

“Some 80 species [and] 20,545 individuals were recorded during the dry season,” Akwetey says. “While 75 species comprising 8,351 individuals were recorded during the wet season.”

Extrapolating from these figures, Akwetey estimates that some 8 million cuttlefish eggs may have been discarded through beach seining along Ghana’s 550 km coastline between August 2022 and February 2023.

“And when you want to translate this into organisms, considering natural mortality and every form of mortality, you are still looking at over 80,000 organisms that could have grown into a lot of cuttlefish,” she tells Dialogue Earth.

In her paper, she estimates the tonnes of lost potential adult cuttlefish could have generated USD 800,000 locally and USD 1.9 million in export.

Beach seining happens throughout the week on 315 landing beaches in Ghana, with most communities only pausing on Tuesdays. Apart from during closed seasons, “there’s fishing as long as the weather is good. Therefore, we are discarding many organisms,” says Akwetey.

Complicating the issue, many of the animals found in the study were attached to plastics. Clams had attached themselves to bottles, lids or polythene. Eggs were attached to plastic debris of all kinds as well as found in the sand.

“Fish, clams etcetera typically cling to rocks, macroalgae, reefs and other organisms … However, if we do not have a lot of [these] in the marine ecosystem, these organisms will attach to other things,” Akwetey says.

Ghana seeks to protect fish, and fishers

Ghana’s fish populations have long been under pressure from illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. The problem reached such levels that the EU issued a second yellow card warning to the country in 2021, saying it might restrict trade with Ghana if things do not improve.

Straightforward overfishing has also been a problem. Ghana first implemented a ban for trawlers in 2016 that was extended in 2019 to include artisanal fishers. Last year, industrial trawlers were banned for all of July and August, semi-industrial inshore vessels for July, while artisanal canoe fishers were exempted. In January of this year, the government announced it was again considering exempting artisanal fishers, who have long complained about its impact on their livelihoods.

Ocloo says there is always a “bumper harvest” after the closed season, but artisanal fishers like him struggle when they are part of the closure. Although he believes it should be maintained to protect fish stocks.

Seth Kedey, public relations officer of the Ghana National Canoe Fishermen Council, says there are more efforts afoot to protect fisheries and those who rely on them in the district of Keta where he works.

“Here in Keta, we place moratoriums on new canoes to reduce overfishing and protect juveniles and marine biodiversity,” he tells Dialogue Earth. “We are in a discussion with the government to declare a portion of the marine area as a marine protected area.”

Reducing bycatch could also help Ghana’s ocean life. But while fishers at Dzelukofe landing beach are aware of the impact, their peers elsewhere in Keta and in the Central region’s Cape Coast are less so.

Akwetey suggests awareness-raising campaigns could be a win for fishers and the environment.

Fishers know it is illegal to harvest sea turtles and return them if they are trapped in their nets, she points out. “Let’s employ the same strategy to persuade them to put the bycatch back into the ocean.”

Escalating conflicts show that renewables are not just a climate option, they are a security strategy, writes Panama’s former energy secretary. 

By Rosilena Lindo, March 13, 2026

The conflict that erupted on 28 February between the US, Israel and Iran is shaking global energy markets.

In just a few days, the escalation has led to attacks on ships and partial blockades in the Strait of Hormuz, through which around 20% of the world’s oil supplies pass. Key liquefied natural gas facilities in Qatar and refineries in Saudi Arabia have also been temporarily paralysed by attacks. Oil and gas prices have risen accordingly.

Although the epicentre of the crisis is in the Middle East, its effects will also be felt in Latin America and the Caribbean, a region in the midst of a rapid transition to clean energy.

The current energy volatility could have contradictory effects on that transition. On the one hand, logistical delays can make investments in clean energy more expensive. On the other, rising fossil fuel prices can strengthen the economic competitiveness of renewable energy.

Latin America and the Caribbean is starting from a relatively favourable position. Around 70% of the region’s electricity generation comes from renewable sources. Investment in clean energy in the region reached USD 70 billion in 2025, according to the International Energy Agency. However, the agency estimates it will be necessary to mobilise around USD 150 billion annually by 2030, in order to decarbonise the energy sector in line with the region’s targets.

The potential exists. According to the business data analyst BNamericas, the region has approximately 1,094 large-scale renewable energy projects (excluding hydropower) in the early stages of development, worth a combined investment of more than USD 500 billion. Of these, 176 are either under construction or in the advanced stages of preparation.

This outlook for the region coexists with the persistence of fossil fuels. At least 190 companies in an array of countries are still exploring or developing oil and gas fields in dozens of Latin American or Caribbean countries. In addition, more than 8,800 km of oil and gas pipelines are planned – mainly in South America – as well as 19 new liquefied natural gas export terminals. In contrast, the region seems to have almost completely ruled out the construction of new coal-fired power plants.

While the impact of the current conflict on fossil fuels is clear, the more than 1,000 renewable projects under development are not immune to these disruptions either. Although the Strait of Hormuz is not a major route for renewable technology components, global logistical disruptions have significant indirect effects.

The partial blockade of the strait has raised maritime insurance costs, increased freight rates on alternative routes, and caused congestion in ports and supply chains. Most solar panels, wind turbines, batteries and inverters arriving in Latin America are exported from China via the Pacific Ocean or the eastern Indian Ocean. But disruptions elsewhere can still cause logistical delays and higher transport costs, potentially slowing down the implementation of renewable projects.

However, the energy crisis resulting from the conflict may also accelerate the transition in some contexts. Rising fossil fuel prices improve the competitiveness of renewable energy. In regions highly dependent on energy imports, this could drive the adoption of solar and wind technologies.

Examples include the expansion of solar farms in the Caribbean islands and Chile.  Many industries which previously relied on gas are increasingly switching to clean power sources such as solar thermal systems.

Geopolitical tensions also highlight a structural advantage of renewable energy: its local nature. Notwithstanding short-term logistical issues a conflict may cause, renewable power generation does not depend on vulnerable trade routes or highly concentrated markets. This strengthens the energy resilience of territories and could attract more international financing for green initiatives in Latin America and the Caribbean.

The world is undergoing a period of accelerated innovation driven by multiple crises: the Covid-19 pandemic, rising geopolitical tensions and the growing climate impact of greenhouse gas emissions.

In this context, the transition to renewable energy-based economies is not only a climate option but also a security strategy. Governments must prioritise investments in renewable energy, storage, electricity grid modernisation and transport transformation. This will not only reduce emissions but protect their populations from external shocks.

The current crises serve as a reminder that diversifying energy sources is key to building sustainable, resilient energy systems that are less vulnerable to geopolitical tensions.

Latin America and the Caribbean have an historic opportunity before them: to take advantage of this situation and consolidate their position as a strategic centre for global energy sustainability. With abundant solar, wind and hydro, as well as critical mineral resources such as lithium, the region can become an energy transition laboratory that demonstrates how to strengthen resilience to geopolitical risks while generating green jobs, inclusive prosperity and true energy sovereignty.

Rosilena Lindo