Focus on Arts and Ecology

After a decade of successful pollution control, challenges remain on groundwater contamination, new pollutants and rural water quality.

By Shi Yi, August 28, 2025

In late March, residents of southern Hunan were passing on an emergency notice from environmental authorities about thallium pollution in the Leishui River.

The river feeds into several local water supply plants, and villages draw from it for use at home and on farms.

An emergency response had been triggered four hours after abnormal levels of the metal were identified, the notice stated.

Thallium, a toxic element which causes both acute and chronic poisoning, is an uncommon pollutant and China’s standards for surface water quality do not require testing for it.

Quick action meant the quality of water at supply plants was not affected, and there have been no reports of harm to health.

“In the past, thallium contamination had been discovered after the fact,” Ma Jun of the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs (IPE), a non-profit, told Dialogue Earth. “But in this case it was picked up earlier, by automated monitoring, in time for an emergency response.”

China’s water-monitoring network got a boost in 2015 with the State Council’s Water Pollution Action Plan. Its aim was to improve the quality of surface water, groundwater and coastal waters, as Dialogue Earth reported at the time.

In the decade since, China has made significant progress on tackling surface water pollution. Between 2014 and 2024, the percentage of such water suitable for drinking, fishing and direct human contact (that is, Class I to Class III) rose from 63% to 90.4%, according to the Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE). While the share of the most polluted waters (not reaching Class V) fell from 9.2% to 0.6%.

However, serious challenges remain – with the rural water environment, with groundwater, and with new pollutants. Experts told Dialogue Earth that as water quality improves, the government’s focus is shifting from controlling pollution to restoring ecosystems.

A new normal

Prior to the release of the 2015 action plan, frequent water and air pollution incidents were causing public concern and a loss of trust.

China has had a Water Pollution Law since 1984, and the 1990s saw government-led clean-ups targeting specific rivers. The action plan, though, brought together the government, the market and the public. This joint approach to water governance was seen as a new normal replacing the “iron fist” approach.

The clean-up of foul urban waterways is seen as a typical example.

Ma Jun recalls rivers that would flow into a city and emerge dark and foul-smelling. The action plan set a goal of eliminating that problem by 2030.

In 2016, the MEE and other bodies launched an online reporting platform and started sharing data with the “Blue Map” of pollution created by the IPE, encouraging members of the public to provide leads.

According to data on the Blue Map, 13,000 reports were received in the following four years, with over 80% receiving an official government response. By June 2024, China had identified over 3,000 “foul waterways” through a combination of public reports, real-time monitoring and remote sensing. Of these, 98.4% received an intervention of some degree.

An IPE report published this year shows the number of central and local government water-monitoring points publishing data has increased more than sixfold since 2015 – from less than 1,000 to 6,400. Of these, 3,646 are managed centrally, by the MEE, with results updated every four hours. The number of groundwater and coastal monitoring points has also increased, further expanding the network.

According to Debra Tan of China Water Risk, a Hong Kong environmental organisation: “It was leaning into tech for real-time monitoring and the government’s daring to invite public participation and transparent disclosure of pollution that won the people’s trust, leveraging China’s vast population as watchdogs.”

‘Deep water’ and new pollutants

Although there has been progress on perceptible issues such as foul rivers, problems like groundwater pollution still stand in the way of the action plan’s goals.

The plan wanted worsening groundwater pollution to have been brought under initial control by 2020, with very poor quality water brought down to around 15%. But over 20% of groundwater was deemed to be Class V – too polluted to drink – between 2021 and 2024, according to annual environmental bulletins. IPE analysis shows this is due to overextraction and industrial seepage.

Transparency on groundwater contamination also lags. China now has over 20,000 groundwater monitoring points, but only states if tap water sources are up to standard or not.

With perceptible pollution issues improving, governance is turning to those which are invisible. In 2022, China announced a campaign to tackle new pollutants: persistent organic pollutants, endocrine-disrupting chemicals and antibiotics. An editorial in the People’s Daily described these as “tough bones to chew”, after the easier tasks of cleaning up air pollution and foul waterways.

For example, studies have found antibiotics are common in China’s surface water and even groundwater, with agriculture being the biggest source. In the Yangtze River basin, 1,600 tonnes of antibiotics reached the water and other environments every year between 2013 and 2021.

In 2022, the State Council issued a systematic plan for dealing with those new pollutants, with monitoring in key locations, industries to establish the extent of the problem, and a treatment strategy focusing on risk prevention.

The technology for identifying and removing new pollutants, as well as associated standards, are new, with multiple challenges ahead, commented He Linghui, deputy director of Shenzhen Zero Waste. The focus should therefore be on stopping their release at source, so they never reach the environment.

In 2023, China issued a first list of new pollutants to be focused on, but many hazardous chemicals were missing. He Linghui said the list should be expanded over time, with emissions standards and overall caps to reduce usage.

From cities to villages

Over the last decade, China has invested more in cities than rural areas, and seen better outcomes as a result. In 2024, 98% of all urban wastewater was treated, compared to only 45% of rural domestic wastewater. Experts say the focus should shift to rural areas, and agricultural pollution.

According to an article by Luo Wushan, a senior inspector with the MEE’s South China Inspectorate, poor water quality in rivers and lakes is now mainly caused by phosphorous levels – and 99% of that comes from agriculture. The remaining 1% is from industry and urban wastewater, and cannot easily be further reduced.

To improve the situation in rural areas, China published a plan in 2021 aiming to have 40% of village wastewater pass through treatment plants by the end of 2025. Surface pollution from agriculture is a trickier problem, and the related plans lack quantified targets, saying only that things should be coming under control by the end of 2025. There are a number of reasons for this.

Agricultural pollution is more dispersed than that from industry and cities, as the MEE has explained. This makes it harder to identify, monitor and track sources of pollution. Also, work on this issue started later and there is a combination of historical “debts” and new pressures. Current approaches are both costly and ineffective.

Experts say copying the approaches used in cities and industry will be ineffective for the dispersed and changeable patterns of pollution in rural areas. Recently, in some river catchments, China has been exploring a shift from a focus on preventing pollution alone to management of ecosystems – and this could be the solution for those rural areas.

Luo Wushan explained: the main pollutants in rural areas are nitrogen and phosphorous, which are used in crop fertilisers. He thinks in situ recycling should be explored: using the restoration and creation of river and lake ecologies to increase the water’s ability to clean itself, so solving a problem that will not yield to engineering methods.

Towards ecological management

In 2022, Zhang Bo, then head of the MEE’s Department of Water Ecology and Environment, said that on testing figures alone, China’s water environment was on a par with mid-tier developed nations. But that in many catchments the ecology was still out of balance, with rivers and lakes often drying up: “There are still some big failings.”

Against that background China has said it will work on three aspects of the problem – the water environment, water resources and water ecologies – in order to protect and restore water systems.

In May this year, the MEE and other bodies published an action plan for protecting rivers and lakes over the coming three years, saying that more than a simple assault on pollution is required.

That’s the approach being taken on the Yangtze. In 2021, a 10-year fishing moratorium was imposed on the river, with about 230,000 fishers being found alternative employment. Protection and restoration of key wetlands and grasslands got underway, and functional zones were drawn up along the river’s course, with remaining natural riverbanks protected and restored.

In 2023, China trialled a system for assessing the Yangtze’s environmental health, covering the number and population size of aquatic species, retention of natural river banks, river and lake interconnectivity, environmental flows and a human activity index.

In comparison, Ma Jun says, the EU and US have been emphasising the protection and restoration of water ecosystems, and monitoring and assessing their health, since the 1980s. The goal of the EU’s Water Framework Directive is to restore water bodies. “It treats the river as a river of life and aims to help it support ecosystems. Our basic aim is the same.”

Shi Yi

China’s electricity supplies are generally stable today, but extreme weather and renewables integration are growing challenges.

By Niu Yuhan,August 19, 2025

A generation ago in China, power outages were a part of daily life for many as the power grid struggled to catch up with the country’s economic development. In rapidly developing cities and rural areas, the lights could go out suddenly, and sometimes stay out for hours.

That such outages are rare in big cities nowadays is thanks to decades of investment in the grid and technologies. However, extreme weather exacerbated by climate change poses difficulties. The intermittency of renewable energy sources will also need navigating as coal use is replaced by wind and solar. A core challenge for the electricity system is to ensure renewables keep growing, without disrupting the grid’s reliability.

A power-hungry nation

China’s electricity system has become much more reliable. In 2024, the average consumer lost electricity access for just under 7 hours per year, less than half the 16.5 hours of 1998, according to the Power Reliability Management Centre (PRMC).

Since 1978, the country’s growing economy has been demanding more and more power. But back then, only central government was allowed to invest in power generation. A shortage of government funds limited the power supply and caused regular outages, hampering economic growth.

In response, the government relaxed rules on investment in the sector in 1985. Local governments, private companies and overseas enterprises could now invest in electricity generation. Government contracts guaranteed the purchase of a number of hours of generation per year at a fixed price, ensuring a return on those investments. The changes worked, with more investment, and more electricity produced. During the 1980s and 1990s, generation capacity grew by an average of 10% per year.

According to the PRMC’s analysis, electricity shortages were the main reliability issue up until 1997, and over 60% of power outages were caused by insufficient generation. From then, growth in demand slowed while generation capacity continued to increase, by over 10 gigawatts a year. Shortages had become much less of a problem. In 2001, power shortages only accounted for 1% of grid reliability issues.

At the turn of the century, it looked as if China no longer had to worry about a lack of electricity.

Electricity ‘droughts’ remain

China’s installed generating capacity has shot up in the past decade, from 1,370 gigawatts in 2014 to 3,350 gigawatts in 2024. Still, supply-and-demand imbalances have not been completely ironed out.

Disconnects between where and when power is generated and needed are increasingly apparent, and shortages still occur locally or at times of peak demand. These are structural issues, rather than overall supply issues.

The causes of shortages differ by year and location, but all reflect a structural problem not yet solved: generally, China has too much coal power capacity, but it still does not have enough to meet peaks in demand. In other words, there is plenty of power capacity across a year but not always across shorter timescales.

In the past, increasing coal-fired power capacity was generally considered the first choice to meet China’s energy needs. But according to a Greenpeace report, spending hundreds of millions of yuan on coal power plants to meet peak loads is terrible value for money. It would be better to reform the electricity supply system.

Camille Paillard, an energy analyst with the International Energy Agency (IEA), tells Dialogue Earth: “Historically, grid stability has been supported by extensive investment in modern and digital technologies for the transmission network, as well as high reserve margins and abundant hydropower. However, as in many countries, the pace of grid investment in China is not keeping up with the rapid growth of renewables and electrification.”

Electrification means switching from using fossil-fuelled powered machines to those powered by electricity. Examples include making steel using electric arc furnaces rather than coal-fired blast furnaces, driving electric vehicles instead of internal combustion vehicles, or replacing gas boilers with heat pumps in homes.

Yang Muyi, senior electricity policy analyst at the energy think-tank Ember, hypothesises that electrification levels in China are approaching those of developed nations, and that means more load on the grid. “Solutions include increasing investment in the distribution network, encouraging off-peak charging, and ‘demand-response management’,” he says.

Demand-response management entails encouraging consumers to shift electricity use to times when it is more plentiful or general demand is lower, through flexible pricing and financial incentives.

Yang stresses the importance of integrating demand into overall system planning. For example, electric cars could help regulate the grid using a Vehicle-to-Grid model. This would turn them into mobile batteries – charging up when demand on the grid is low, feeding power back in when it is high. That needs smart dispatch systems and market incentives, Yang adds.

Electricity planning is changing in China, from the traditional separation of generation and the grid, towards integrated solutions for generation, grid, demand and storage.

Complexities of bringing renewables to the grid

Ten days prior to a severe power outage in Spain and Portugal in April 2025, Spain had run entirely on renewables for a full day for the first time. The intermittency of renewable energy was quickly blamed for the power cut. The official report rebuts that oversimplification but some media outlets continue to make the accusation.

This is not the first time renewables have been blamed like this. Dialogue Earth spoke to Anders Hove, a senior research fellow at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies’ China Energy Research Programme: “In my experience, any major power disruption (whether that’s a sudden outage or a shortage) is caused by a complex set of factors. But often people look for a single simple reason, and that habit is exploited by those with vested interests, particularly when it comes to renewable energy.”

Part of the reason the misunderstanding is so persistent is that renewables are indeed affected by the time of day, the season and the weather. Electricity systems need to be able to respond accordingly. “But those fluctuations don’t mean that the grid can’t be stable,” Hove clarifies.

Investment in renewable energy has jumped in the five years since China set its targets to peak carbon emissions before 2030 and reach carbon neutrality by 2060. In 2024, combined wind and solar energy capacity in China overtook that of coal, while national targets for wind and solar output were hit six years ahead of schedule.

Connecting renewables to the grid has only a limited impact on electricity systems in the early stages, according to an International Energy Agency report. But as rollout continues up to 2030, China will get into the “deep water” of renewables intermittency and grid stability. If the necessary measures are not taken, reliability will be at risk.

Paillard of the IEA says: “We have found that low-carbon resources like hydropower, battery storage, and demand response could meet nearly 60% of China’s short-term flexibility needs by 2030.” She explains that these needs are set to triple by 2030 compared to 2022. “Ensuring reliability will require deploying new, flexible resources while also making better use of existing ones. Coal will continue to play a role in providing both short-term and seasonal flexibility, but it needs to be part of a much broader portfolio of solutions.”

These low-carbon resources are already technically mature and have been widely deployed, “but remain locked out of markets by rules designed for a fossil-fuel-dominated system,” Paillard says.

Hove says that, in the past, market mechanisms did not allow the price of electricity to rise in line with the price of coal, making life difficult for coal power plants. A capacity-payment system was introduced to compensate, ensuring reliability. But that system is primarily for coal power plants. Other flexible sources of power, such as gas or energy-storage facilities, do not receive the same support.

Meanwhile, a lot of long-term energy storage methods, such as green hydrogen and green ammonia (hydrogen and ammonia produced using renewable energy only), are still in the demonstration stage, according to Yang Muyi. “More time, research and policy support are needed before commercialisation,” he says.

Why China needs to be alert to extreme weather

China has never had a widespread power outage like Spain and Portugal did in April, but that does not mean its electricity system is entirely secure. The country has seen regional problems and localised power cuts in recent years.

According to an National Energy Administration report, the biggest risk facing China’s grid is the climate. In 2024, over 40% of all problems and power cuts were linked to the weather and natural disasters. For example, between 11 and 13 April 2025, high winds and heavy rain brought power cuts to 1.35 million electricity users across 22 provinces.

Extreme weather does not just test the design, management and resilience of the grid. It can also affect renewable energy generation. According to a 2024 paper published in the journal Nature Water, extreme drought, low wind speeds and weak sunlight could cause China’s utilisation hours of hydro, solar and wind power generation to drop by 12% by 2060.

It is a vicious cycle: coal power causes climate change and extreme weather; extreme weather reduces generation from low-carbon, renewable alternatives.

“With rising electrification and more frequent extreme weather events,” says Paillard, “building a robust and digitalised grid both at the transmission and distribution levels, alongside flexible generation and demand response, will be essential to maintaining system security in China.”

As China amends legislation that aims to strengthen fisheries management, some stakeholders are raising concerns over livelihoods. 

By Feng Yingxin, August 14, 2025

China’s Fisheries Law, which determines how those working in the sector can make a living, is being revised. The latest draft was published by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress last month while a public consultation process was also completed.

The revisions are intended to bolster protections for fishery resources and so promote high-quality development in the sector. Compared to the first draft published late last year, the second adjusts rules on conservation measures and permitted fishing gear. For example, it requires local governments to disclose more information on the nature, extent and duration of seasonal fishing bans.

In responding to the new draft, civil society and the media have continued to focus on the implications for fishers themselves – they say the draft’s emphasis on conservation and combatting overfishing will further restrict their work.

With the number of fishing vessels being reduced in recent years, many have had no option but to seek alternative employment. Ensuring they can find jobs is key to effective fisheries management.

One of the aims of the law is to “protect the legitimate rights of fishery workers.” This has led to debate over the best way to balance conservation with livelihoods.

Dialogue Earth discussed with fishers themselves what the revision means for their rights and futures, and also consulted experts.

Fishers’ rights: A limited response

The new draft adds protections for fishers’ rights that were not in the earlier proposal published in late 2024. It requires governments at county level and above to provide support as fishers transition into new employment, boost skills training and ensure their social rights.

Apart from that, though, the draft has little to say about the fishers. Wang Canfa, a professor at the China University of Politics and Law, explains that the point of the Fisheries Law revision is to “improve fisheries management”.

“The revision intends to strengthen oversight, management and law enforcement for the whole fisheries ecosystem. The fishers are not the focus.”          

Changing the rules

The new draft clarifies some rules on fishing practices. It provides detailed regulations on how local governments should manage fishing bans, including the need to disclose their extent and the nature and duration of the restrictions. This information must be specific, well publicised and decided upon scientifically, based on the state of fishery resources.

The revision also makes changes to rules on fishing gear. The earlier draft proposed a “whitelist” of types of gear permitted for use, with the manufacture, sale and use of any unlisted gear to be prohibited.

That whitelist is not in the new draft, which instead continues the existing approach: a blacklist of gear that must not be made, sold or used. It also supports the use of gear on a separate, as-yet-unpublished list of “recommended fishing gear”.

The revision also maintains the ban on fishing by unregistered vessels that lack an official name, number, certification or homeport registration, and on the provision of any services to those vessels.

Changing jobs: Challenges and support

As the rules on fishing change, fishers must adjust accordingly or simply stop working. The new draft has little to say on compensation mechanisms during that process. It only states that when aquaculture licences are withdrawn, the authorities must pay fair and reasonable compensation for losses incurred.

Despite the lack of coverage in legislation, local governments have long been handing out compensation to affected fishers.

In the 1980s, with China’s fishery resources in decline, the government restricted the number of fishing vessels, the number of people working in the industry, and the amount of fishing allowed. Local governments offered to buy back boat registrations, encouraging fishers to quit.

A closed season affecting China’s entire coastline has also been imposed each summer since 1995. Currently this lasts from 14-16 weeks, affecting over 100,000 vessels and many hundreds of thousands of workers.

To help those who lose income during the closed season, the government has been paying out “fishery stewardship subsidies” since 2008. These are also intended to compensate fishers for their subjection to “responsible fishing measures”, such as marine animal protection rules and port entry and exit reporting regulations.

Liu Cuibo, 60, lives in eastern China’s Tianjin municipality and has been a fisher all his life. The four-month closed season causes his income to plummet. “With all the rules tightening up, I need the subsidies to survive,” he tells Dialogue Earth.

Wang Canfa says those compensation mechanisms have not appeared in the revised law because its purpose is to present overarching legal principles. Therefore, only compensation for changes or removal of aquaculture licences is included.

It is difficult for the law to cover local and seasonal compensations, so these are usually handled through government policy, he adds.

Recreational fishing no easy solution

Compensation can ease things in the short term, but it is no substitute for a stable and sustainable source of income.

Liu Cuibo explains that fishing vessels also get subsidies for accident insurance and equipment for navigation, firefighting and lifesaving. Even so, declining fishery resources mean life is hard and he is thinking about a change of job. “The reality we face is that fishing makes us poorer,” he says.

Taking tourists out to experience fishing is seen as one of the main alternative jobs. The revision of the Fisheries Law does not include much on this recreational fishing, besides saying provincial-level governments should set rules for managing it.

Liu Cuibo thinks recreational fishing is being left aside: “There’s very little content on who’s allowed to do it; it’s all left for the provinces to decide.”

Currently, implementation and management of closed seasons varies by location. Some exempt tourist boats, and some ban net fishing demonstrations, to reduce illegal fishing.

Liu explains that in Tianjin recreational fishing is not allowed during the closed season. The only suitable remaining month is September, but strong autumn winds mean sometimes they do not even earn enough to keep the boats running. To boost incomes, some recreational fishing vessels now offer services to scatter the ashes of departed family members.

An expert who preferred to remain anonymous explains that in Hainan, city and county governments can now decide which vessels can apply for recreational fishing licences, and what standards they need to meet. However, not many fishers have applied. The expert says this is because they have not yet found a profitable model: “In Hainan at least, there’s not a lot of recreational fishing. The sector hasn’t developed.”

Tong Yuhe, an associate professor at Hainan Tropical Ocean University, says there are too few options for fishers leaving the trade. Therefore, he says, policy restrictions on recreational fishing should be relaxed to allow more fishers to get involved.

Tong adds that support for changes of career should continue until fishers are fully settled in new jobs, rather than being restricted to short training courses.

But Wang Songlin, president and founder of the Qingdao Marine Conservation Society, says he worries the expansion of recreational fishing would put pressure on fisheries resources: “Recreational fishing can be as destructive as commercial fishing.” His organisation suggests requiring fishing permits and catch reporting for recreational activities that yield substantial harvests.

Illegal fishing hard to tackle

Some former fishers do not successfully transition to making a living on land, and wish to pick up their nets again. Current policy, though, does not provide a legal route to do so. Some decide to risk fishing illegally – or even use speedboats to steal gear from other fishers.

Those who are fishing without the proper licences and documentation do not receive fishing subsidies. This makes them more likely to ignore closed seasons or use banned fishing gear, worsening the overexploitation of fishery resources.

That all makes things even more difficult for the legitimate fishers. One reader left a comment on a Dialogue Earth article complaining that rampant illegal fishing was having a serious impact on their legitimate business.

Liu Cuibo says that strict management of the waters in his area means very few unregistered wooden vessels fish illegally, but there is a problem with widespread illegal use of speedboats.

He explains: “During the fishing season, they steal fishing gear and the catch inside and disrupt legitimate fishing. Their boats are quick, and they target fixed fishing gear, shifting to wherever the catches are good.”

Liu thinks the type of boats used should be forced to carry trackers so they can be identified and monitored, which is how unregistered fishing vessels are dealt with currently.

Those returning fishers have already benefited from compensation and policy support when they quit the industry, which makes them unpopular. Wang thinks more support is needed: “Current fishery resources can’t support a large number of fishers. Allowing those who have left to return and compete for those resources with fishers who have stuck with the job is unfair.”

Joint management

Experts say fishers and law-enforcement officials working together to manage illegal behaviour may be a good way of balancing conservation with the needs of the fishers.

Wang Songlin says the fisheries authorities could empower fishing communities to set up cooperatives to manage their own fishing and monitor illegal activity. “That would be more effective than just relying on the coastguard.”

A precondition for that public participation, though, is ownership of marine resources. Wang explains that almost all fishery resources are currently regarded as publicly owned. If the law could clarify which fishers have the rights to which fishing ground of migratory species, the fishers would be more motivated to fish sustainably. Some coastal fishing communities are experimenting with joint management, with good results.

Wang says the Qingdao Marine Conservation Society has yet to make any recommendations for joint management based on the current version of the law, but it hopes to start trials soon.

“If the fishers are going to take responsibility, they have to be given something to be responsible for,” says the anonymous expert. “When they feel a sense of ownership over their local waters, a shared interest, they will be motivated to protect them.”

Feng Yingxin

Activist Naiyan Kiplagat on these women’s responses to climate change and land grabs across Africa. 

By Temwani Mgunda, August 20, 2025

Indigenous women in Africa are protecting the environmental rights of their communities in the face of steep legal barriers and patriarchal norms. At the same time, they are reviving ecological grazing techniques, encouraging the planting of drought-resistant crops, and leading efforts to diversify livelihoods.

These women face myriad challenges, from losing ancestral land rights to surviving disasters exacerbated by climate change, finds a new report by the International Indigenous Women’s Forum (FIMI).

Their situations echo those of Indigenous women across many other parts of the world, such as the Aymara and Quecha of Peru and Bolivia, and the Bunong, Stieng, Thmorn and Kroal in Cambodia.

Indigenous women play a central role in the community management of territories. But the FIMI report found their limited rights to inheritance and land ownership restricts their economic autonomy and their ability to influence the management of natural resources. They are nonetheless perservering with applying solutions.

Ahead of the UN’s COP30 climate negotiations in November, Dialogue Earth spoke with Naiyan Kiplagat, co-founder of the FIMI member organisation Paran Women Group, and a member of the Samburu People of southwestern Kenya. We spoke about the issues facing Indigenous women in Africa and FIMI’s role in protecting Indigenous communities’ environmental rights, at home and at the UN.

Dialogue Earth: The FIMI report highlights the loss of Indigenous territories driven by governments, companies and other forces. What is the extent of this problem in Africa?

Naiyan Kiplagat: The problem of Indigenous land dispossession in Africa is widespread, persistent and often driven by state and corporate interests under the guise of development or environmental protection. In Kenya, both the Maasai and Ogiek Indigenous communities have faced significant loss of ancestral lands due to tourism infrastructure, agribusiness and exclusionary conservation policies.

A striking example is the ongoing eviction of the Ogiek people from the Mau Forest by the Kenya Forest Service (KFS) and Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS). This is happening despite a landmark ruling by the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights in May 2017. The ruling recognised the Ogiek’s claim to the Mau Forest and ordered the Kenyan government to grant them collective title to their ancestral territory. The court affirmed the Ogiek are Indigenous and the forest is central to their survival, culture and spirituality.

Yet, government agencies have continued to forcibly remove Ogiek families from the forest, claiming the evictions are necessary to prevent encroachment and deforestation. There are growing concerns that these removals are linked to emerging carbon credit schemes, where forests are monetised for climate mitigation without the free, prior and informed consent of Indigenous custodians. This commodification of nature not only violates the rights of Indigenous Peoples, but also ignores their critical role in biodiversity conservation.

The Ogiek, as traditional forest stewards, maintain that their presence ensures sustainable forest management. Evicting them not only erases their identity but also undermines authentic climate solutions. Unfortunately, this is not an isolated case as across Africa, Indigenous territories are increasingly under threat from mega-projects and market-based climate actions that exclude community voices, especially those of women. These trends reflect deep environmental and climate injustice, whereby Indigenous women and their communities are marginalised from land governance and stripped of their rights in the name of conservation or development.

What is FIMI doing to protect land and environmental rights of Indigenous women and their communities in Africa?

FIMI has been at the forefront of this effort across Africa. Recognising that land is central to the survival, identity and cultural continuity of Indigenous Peoples, FIMI provides both financial and technical support to strengthen women’s leadership in land governance and environmental justice.

One of the key tools for this support is the AYNI Indigenous Women’s Fund. This has provided targeted funding to Indigenous women’s organisations to implement projects focused on securing land and territorial rights, raising awareness of environmental rights, and documenting traditional land use and ecological knowledge. The last of these is important to help strengthen legal claims to ancestral territories.

Despite this work, there are still many more challenges. Governments and corporate actors often pursue land-based projects like conservation areas, infrastructure or carbon-offset schemes without consulting Indigenous women. Legal frameworks in many African countries still fail to recognise communal land rights or exclude women from land ownership. Meanwhile, security risks and political marginalisation continue to silence many Indigenous women land defenders.

How are the Indigenous women of Africa and their communities affected by climate change?

For Indigenous Peoples, life, identity, spirituality, and survival are inextricably tied to their ancestral territories. These lands are not just physical spaceres; they are living landscapes that hold generations of wisdom, governance systems, medicinal plants, sacred sites, and ritual grounds for cultural practices. These lands serve as places of spiritual reflection, initiation, and healing. Cultural and spiritual rituals such as traditional circumcision ceremonies, prayer gatherings, and rites of passage are carried out in specific forested areas that are considered sacred. The loss or degradation of these territories due to climate change disrupts not only the environment, but also the cultural continuity and spiritual well-being of the people.

Climate change has particularly intensified the daily struggles of Indigenous women across Africa, especially those in pastoralist and forest-dependent communities. As primary providers of water, food and firewood, women are now forced to travel longer distances due to drying rivers, deforested lands and unpredictable weather patterns. This increases their physical burden and exposes them to greater risks, including gender-based violence. Crop failures and livestock losses have deepened food insecurity, placing the responsibility of feeding families squarely on women’s shoulders.

Traditional knowledge systems such as medicinal plant use and seed preservation are also being disrupted as ecosystems degrade, limiting women’s ability to care for their families and communities. With climate-induced migration on the rise, many Indigenous women are displaced from their ancestral lands, leading to the loss of cultural practices, spiritual connections, and social safety nets. These combined pressures are eroding women’s well-being, status and resilience, making them among the most vulnerable to the climate crisis.

Since the Indigenous peoples are mostly pastoralists or hunter-gatherers, climate change has constantly contributed to their migrations across borders in search of pastures for livestock and food. Seasonal or permanent movement of people in search of water, pasture or safety often leads to the disruption of traditional life, community cohesion and intergenerational knowledge transfer.

Among the pastoralist Maasai, families are migrating across county and national borders to find resources, leading to rising inter-community conflict and cultural disintegration. This is a growing crisis across Africa since in the Sahel, nomadic Indigenous groups are being pushed further from their grazing routes. In many places, young people are losing connection to sacred rituals and land-based identity, eroding centuries of knowledge and culture.

How are African Indigenous women and their communities mitigating or adapting to the climate crisis?

Indigenous women across Africa are applying traditional knowledge passed through generations and combining it with innovative approaches to adapt to and mitigate the impacts of climate change. Their strategies are rooted in lived experience, a deep understanding of the natural environment, and a commitment to sustaining their communities and ecosystems.

One of the key innovations which Indigenous women – especially from Para Women Group – have mastered and continue to influence others to practice is the use of energy-saving cooking stoves and the production of briquettes from organic waste, both of which are made by Indigenous women. These technologies reduce the reliance on firewood, helping to slow deforestation, cut down harmful emissions, and improve indoor air quality while also creating alternative sources of income for women through small-scale production and sales.

In the face of unpredictable rainfall and prolonged droughts, Indigenous women are also encouraging the planting of drought-resistant crops in household kitchen gardens. These crops – such as sorghum, millet, cassava and traditional leafy greens – ensure food security even under harsh climate conditions, while reducing dependency on expensive and unsustainable commercial seeds.

Among pastoralist communities, Indigenous women are actively involved in reviving rotational grazing systems. The traditional practice of moving livestock between grazing areas allows grasslands to regenerate, prevents land degradation and supports sustainable pasture management in the face of drought.

Recognising the risks of over-dependence on livestock, especially in climate-vulnerable drylands, women are also leading efforts to diversify livelihoods. Through initiatives such as beadwork, beekeeping cooperatives, herbal medicine trade, eco-tourism and tree nurseries, they are finding alternative income sources that are resilient to climate shocks while preserving culture and biodiversity.

These Indigenous-led innovations are not only helping communities cope with the changing climate but also offering sustainable, low-cost and culturally appropriate solutions that national climate policies can learn from. By valuing and investing in these practices, Africa can strengthen both climate resilience and community well-being.