Focus on Arts and Ecology

The H5N1 virus is spreading rapidly among seabirds and sea mammals, causing deaths from pole to pole. 

By Fermín Koop, May 8, 2024

A deadly strain of avian influenza is spreading across the global ocean.

Scientists estimate that it has caused the death of tens of millions of poultry and wild birds around the world. Officially called A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b, it has also been detected in at least 48 mammal species and is strongly implicated in mass die-offs of sea lions and seals.

Bird flu was previously considered primarily a threat to poultry and secondarily a potential human pathogen. But it has now become a terrifying, albeit still largely unquantified, threat to marine life too.

Where is it?

The current troubling form of the virus was first detected in Europe in autumn 2020. At the end of 2021, it was discovered in North America and has since been recorded in wild birds in every US state.

The virus then went south and by December 2022 had reached the southern tip of South America. It has now been detected in Antarctica, as well as Africa and Asia. Only the Pacific Islands, Australia and New Zealand remain free of it.

How is it affecting ocean wildlife?

Populations of wild birds have been hit hard across the globe. At least 100,000 from 24 species had died in Peru’s protected areas after contacting the virus between November 2022 and mid-March 2023, a study found.

Various mammals have been infected by previous strains of H5N1, mainly dogs and cats and some animals classed as ‘semiaquatic’ such as mink. But the current strain has spread to significantly more species and been reported in 13 marine mammals, according to a March study.

Mass deaths have occurred. In Argentina, over 17,000 southern elephant seal pups were found dead on the Valdés Peninsula in a die-off attributed to the virus. There have been at least 24,000 sea lion deaths linked to it recorded in Peru, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil.

Víctor Gamarra-Toledo is an author of the March study, and a researcher at the Natural History Museum of Peru’s San Agustín de Arequipa National University. He says the large number of deaths is undermining ecosystem services provided by the animals affected. So many birds have perished in Peru it is lowering the production of seabird excrement that farmers use as fertiliser, he told Dialogue Earth.

How bad could it get?

The virus is already exacerbating the predicament of several species of conservation concern. As well as sea lions and elephant seals, this includes marine otters and dolphins.

“It’s a real blow to some species and they will take a long time to recover. The bird flu also reached the Galapagos”, says Claire Smith, UK policy lead on avian influenza at the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds. Of the 56 native Galapagos bird species, 45 are endemic, meaning found only there.

Impacts on wild marine birds have varied widely. In the UK, there has been a 70% reduction of northern gannets at their key breeding ground of Bass Rock. But, on the other side of the world in Antarctica, Adélie penguins tested positive without showing any ill effects.

The true impact of the outbreak is hard to quantify.

“Any number of deaths is an underestimate. Birds and mammals can die in areas where there’s no surveillance and we don’t find out. We also don’t have much numbers from what’s happening in Africa. Millions of birds have died and the impact on populations is significant,” says Christian Walzer, executive director of health at the Wildlife Conservation Society.

How did this problem start?

Bird flu is nothing new in the poultry industry. These viruses are categorised as either low or highly pathogenic depending on their lethality to poultry. Highly pathogenic H5N1 was first detected in farmed geese in Guangdong, China, in 1996, and quickly spread through populations of captive, commercial birds.

What sets the most recent strain apart is the rapidity with which it spreads and the severity of the disease it causes among wild birds and mammals, experts told Dialogue Earth.

“It used to be present mostly in winter, with peaks of infection, and then a big drop. Now the infection is present all year round, generating many risks and more chances of transmission,” says Marcela Uhart, director of the Latin America program at the Karen C. Drayer Wildlife Health Center, University of California, Davis.

How is it spreading?

In birds, avian influenza primarily spreads through contact with the saliva, nasal secretions, or droppings of infected birds. Once it becomes prevalent among wild populations, it can spread globally as birds migrate, including to marine areas far from farms.

Scientists are not yet sure how it passes between birds and mammals. Many infected species are scavengers, suggesting that eating infected corpses could be involved. Healthy animals may also get the virus from contact with faeces from infected members of their own kind. Species that seem to be resistant to severe illness could still be spreading the virus.

In a study published in February, scientists report collecting brain samples from sea lions, one fur seal and a tern found dead on the shores of Argentina. They all tested positive for H5N1 and genome sequencing revealed that the virus was almost identical in each, with mutations that assisted spread in marine mammals.

Are humans at risk?

Humans can be infected with H5N1, but it is relatively rare and the risk to the public has been widely regarded as low. Most infections have been among those, such as poultry workers, who have had close contact with infected birds. A total of 20 countries have reported 882 cases of bird flu in humans since 2003, half of which were fatal, according to the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

Experts advise avoiding close contact with sick or injured birds and mammals.

“If the virus can be transmitted between marine mammals, as it’s now believed, that’s a big problem for us [humans],” says Pablo Plaza, an Argentine veterinarian working at the Centro Científico Tecnológico Patagonia Norte. “The virus is here to stay, and while things seem to be calmer now, it can keep on surprising us.”

What can be done?

Detecting bird flu early is the primary line of defence, according to the World Organization for Animal Health (WOAH). Early detection and timely reporting of infected birds lets countries know which flu subtypes are in circulation. They can then limit the movements of poultry and monitor wildlife.

While there is a vaccine being used on poultry, WOAH says it must be part of a wider disease-control strategy. Culling is one of the recommendations, along with quarantining.

“It’s something we have control over, live poultry travels very long distances,” says Diana Bell, a UK conservation biologist based at the University of East Anglia. Bell suggests making farms self sufficient in rearing eggs and chicks, instead of exporting them internationally. She also advocates stopping the trend towards megafarms that contain over a million birds.

Researchers are trialling a vaccine for endangered condors in the US, but implementing this on a large scale in other wild birds would be difficult. “We can’t vaccinate wildlife; it would never end. It’s preferable for the virus to hit a population and for it to develop natural immunity,” says the Wildlife Conservation Society’s Walzer.

What happens next?

The spread of the virus is overlapping with environmental changes due to climate change, and the latter could increase the problem of the former. In Chile, for example, the El Niño weather phenomenon had a strong impact last year on fish that birds rely on for food, placing more stress on animals and likely making them more susceptible to the virus.

Vivian Fu, Asian Flyways Initative lead at WWF-Hong Kong, says the ongoing bird flu disaster highlights the importance of a One Health approach. This involves looking at the close connection between the health of people, other animals and our shared environment.

For now, ocean researchers face a nervous wait to see where the virus appears next, how badly it harms the animals it infects, and how that reshapes our understanding of the threats to marine life.

“Over 40% of the Peruvian pelicans died because of the virus,” Uhart says. “A country might have a conservation strategy with marine protected areas and think that is sufficient to mitigate impacts to a species, but the virus brings a new layer of complexity.

“We might think a bird or a marine mammal is doing well based on their conservation status and the number of individuals out there. But then something like this happens and it changes everything.”

Five experts share their take as the US hikes its tariff on Chinese EVs, solar panels and more.

By Dialogue Earth Staff, May 24, 2024

On 14 May, the US government announced huge increases in tariff rates on a range of Chinese exports, most of which are forms of “green” or low-carbon technologies. The measures, which will come into effect from 1 August, include a 100% tariff on the value of electric vehicles, 25% on lithium-ion batteries and 50% on solar cells. This means importers of Chinese goods from the affected categories, which also include medical products, steel and aluminium, and ship cranes, will have to pay the specified percentages to the US government as tax.

The tariffs will make these products uncompetitive, effectively blocking their access to the US market.

Besides representing a new area of tension between the US and China, the tariff hikes have implications for global energy transitions, climate diplomacy, Latin American manufacturing and trade relations, and the very nature of technological progress in the 21st century.

Dialogue Earth spoke to experts from Europe, China and Latin America on their assessment of these issues and more.

Belinda Schäpe

Independent expert and advisor on Chinese climate policy and EU-China relations

The recent US tariffs on green technologies mark the next stage in a trade war with China that could slow down an already delayed energy transition in the US. A race to the top in production would be welcome, but current US policies might not have the anticipated effect. Green technologies in the US will likely become more expensive due to the new tariffs, despite the large subsidies of the Inflation Reduction Act, hampering global efforts to tackle climate change. The EU should not compromise on its climate targets; instead, it should find its own way of handling China’s dominance in green technologies.

The EU needs to carefully balance its objectives of achieving resilient supply chains and climate resilience. Hastily cutting China out of green technology supply chains could jeopardise the EU’s climate objectives. This requires a pragmatic look at the threat from Chinese green technologies: while dependence on China for some goods may create economic and strategic risks, it may not for others. To ensure a smooth energy transition, some reliance on China may be unavoidable in the short- and medium-term, given its dominance in international supply chains. Diversifying these supply chains will require global partnerships, particularly with countries in the Global South, backed by financial firepower and innovation, rather than new tariffs. 

With tensions between the US and China escalating, EU-China relations play a pivotal role in maintaining continuity in climate efforts and diplomatic dialogue. A looming tit-for-tat between China and the US on green technologies risks undermining global climate cooperation. Under a second Trump administration, the US might abandon its climate commitments – and with that, one of its few active working groups with China. If US-China climate engagement falls apart, the onus will fall on the EU to work more closely with China towards advancing global climate efforts and to hold China accountable for its climate commitments. The EU should stand ready to maintain its climate leadership position, while carefully navigating trade tensions.

Yao Zhe

Global policy advisor for Greenpeace East Asia

With elections approaching, President Biden’s decision to escalate the trade disputes on Chinese green products is a risky bet. Going tough on China may win over some voters as an immediate political gain, but he could lose China’s trust for climate cooperation. China is expected to take countermeasures in response to the new tariffs, but US-China climate dialogues are set to continue. However, if green trade disputes continue to intensify, it could prevent any substantial coordinated climate effort from the two countries.

US-China climate engagement is now headed by new leads. John Podesta, now America’s top climate diplomat, is also in charge of the implementation of the Inflation Reduction Act. His dual hats will inevitably draw trade and climate talks closer together, and that will be a tough test for the resilience of bilateral climate engagement. 

Climate was the special bond stabilising relations between the two countries during difficult times. But recent moves in the US, including pressuring China with “overcapacity” claims and hiking tariffs on Chinese EVs and solar cells, are sending conflicting signals. 

Competition may well be the baseline of US-China relations for a long time to come. But that doesn’t mean they have to compete on every front. On climate, there are still good reasons to cooperate, even in green industries.

Chinese companies are exploring opportunities to set up joint ventures and manufacturing centres in overseas markets, including the US. This will help create local jobs and economic growth. If Chinese and American businesses have the desire to work together, politics should not get in the way. 

David Tyfield

Professor of sustainable transitions and political economy, Lancaster University

The new US tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles (EVs) show that there are increasingly powerful voices in the US, who get that there is much more at stake with the EV than a minor upgrade of a long-established technology.

We are only at the beginning of the socio-technical evolution of the EV. They are increasingly “supercomputers on wheels”, in an age where everything is digitalised. As a result, EVs are not only central to the transformation of mobility and geopolitical competition in associated key industries of the 21st century, they are also the key technology that will shape forms of urban life, visions of the (“good”) future, and thus, global order and power.

Given the fundamental mismatch between the global worldviews of the current and rising superpowers, it is little surprise that we are witnessing a dynamic of escalating rivalry and progressive “strategic decoupling” regarding the EV, what it will become and how it, in turn, will shape the future world.  

The determined presence of the US in a genuine “global EV race” is welcome – not necessarily for the quantitative pace of EV roll-out, nor because American innovation is somehow “better”, but because it at least secures a platform for meaningful competition regarding the qualitative moulding of future EVs. It also ensures that the trajectories of this crucial technology are not ceded by default to the demands of the Chinese Communist Party.

The protectionism involved, though, is a strategy beset by the risk of being self-defeating. Yet this is now unavoidable. What is clearly not on the table any longer is the “best case”, win-win and lowest-risk strategy: that of US-China collaboration.

So, how this latest move affects the global sustainable mobility transition depends on complicated detail as it develops over the medium-term. As the US and China offer increasingly distinct and directly competing visions of the EV, the rest of the world (whose markets both will need) could play one against the other, yielding a positive global outcome. But the opposite outcome may also arise, as a worsening geopolitical split spills over, slowing EV adoption through cycles of distrust that negatively affect this technology.  

In short, the tariffs have announced a new era in which intensified global competition could accelerate or slow EV adoption, but will definitely make it more turbulent. 

Jorge Heine

Research professor at the Pardee School of Global Studies and interim director of the Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future at Boston University

This should be a wake-up call for all countries in the region, as it may be the opening salvo of a major escalation in the US-China trade war. Candidate Trump has announced that, as president, he would impose a 10% tariff on all goods imported into the United States and a 60% tariff on all Chinese goods.

Since the 90s, a number of Latin American countries including Chile, Colombia, Peru and Uruguay have bet on free trade and on having access both to the US and Chinese markets (whose economies comprise 40% of the world’s GDP) to increase their exports and grow. This bet has stood them in good stead.

The message coming out of Washington now is that the era of globalisation and open markets is over. Protectionism now rules the roost. For a region endowed with so many of the key commodities for the transition to a green economy, including copper and lithium, the targeting not just of electric cars, but also of batteries and other green renewable energy products like solar panels, is especially worrisome for Latin America.

Leveraging and adding value to these key commodities for the transition to a green economy is, for many Latin American countries, the best option to boost growth, after yet another “lost decade”. Latin American countries are keen to work with both the United States and China to make this happen by triangulating the relationship – much as the region did at the height of the commodities boom.

The message coming out of Washington, however, is that this is a no-go. The US is now strictly prioritising its own internal market, with climate change and the region’s green transition considered mere collateral damage.

Enrique Dussel

Coordinator of the Centre for China-Mexico Studies at Mexico’s National Autonomous University

In the past few years, we have been experiencing a conflict between the US and China. Many are speaking of “near-shoring”, “onshoring” and “offshoring”. I would add “security-shoring” to the conversation, which places US national security above trade and has a direct impact on third countries.

Recently, the expectation in the US is that third countries must use the same regulations against China. It is the “invest, align, compete” strategy that the US has taken against China. The “align” aspect affects third countries, because the US is looking for third partners to join against China; the expectation is that Mexico aligns itself with security-shoring strategy in all areas.

Dialogue Earth Staff

Dialogue Earth is an independent non-profit dedicated to producing exceptional environmental journalism and informed conversations on urgent climate and environmental topics. We have a network of specialist country editors located across South and Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America, plus a production, administrative and editorial hub in the UK.

(Sources: Dialogue Earth)

Leading candidates have both pledged to boost renewables, with debates also focusing on state energy firms and the fossil fuel legacy of outgoing president AMLO. 

By Emilio Godoy, May 28, 2024

As Mexico heads towards its presidential elections this Sunday, 2 June, the future of its energy transition is at stake. Leading candidate Claudia Sheinbaum and her closest competitor, Xóchitl Gálvez, have both acknowledged the oil-dependent country’s need for an energy transition, but are proposing different paths towards that goal.

Energy has been a hot topic during the six-year term of outgoing president Andrés Manuel López Obrador, widely known as AMLO, and also featured regularly in the candidates’ debates and speeches on the campaign trail. As election day nears, Dialogue Earth looks at their proposals on energy, and the key issues shaping the future of the sector in Mexico.

Claudia Sheinbaum: the energy contradiction

Claudia Sheinbaum, the former mayor of Mexico City, running as the candidate for AMLO’s left-wing Morena party, has maintained a substantial lead in the polls ever since confirming her candidacy last September. The most recent surveys of voters’ preferences and awareness of candidates indicate that she holds a considerable advantage over her opponents.

Sheinbaum is broadly offering continuity with the energy policies promoted by her predecessor, who has prioritised fossil fuels and the strengthening of the state-owned Federal Electricity Commission (CFE) and Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex) in the name of energy sovereignty.

However, Sheinbaum – an environmental scientist and former contributor to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change – has made stronger signals than AMLO for the need to promote Mexico’s gradual shift from fossil fuels towards cleaner energy sources such as wind and solar power. These include mentions of distributed generation, the smaller-scale energy production through renewable projects and clean technology in households and communities.

Improvements in energy efficiency are another key aspect of her proposed programme, including the promotion of investments in the country’s electrical transmission and distribution networks. During her time as Mexico City mayor (2018–2023), Sheinbaum won praise for her record on green initiatives, including overseeing the increasing electrification of the city’s buses, supporting the installation of solar panels in central markets, and attempting to curb plastic use.

“Our goal is to advance the energy transition at a faster pace,” Sheinbaum told a 6 May meeting of regional councillors from the Spanish private bank BBVA.

She has pledged USD 13.6 billion of investment in renewable energy to 2030, aiming to add more than 13 gigawatts of generation capacity to the grid. But this may still be insufficient to meet the country’s growing energy demands, with some business figures estimating that as much as USD 3 billion a year is needed to support the sector, and calling for increased foreign investment. A national electricity reform in 2013, by comparison, helped to add around 8 GW of new capacity by 2019, and the country has since announced intentions to more than double renewable generation capacity, in order to meet emissions reduction targets.

Sheinbaum’s 308-page manifesto cites “energy transition” 18 times.

But days after her appearance before the bank officials, some of the contradictions and political compromises of the poll-leader’s energy proposals were made clear. On 15 May, during a tour of the state of Nayarit, she mentioned a long-term plan for Pemex, which foresees “the exploitation of hydrocarbons and refining, processing, petrochemicals, and a vision where Pemex also enters into renewable energies and cogeneration.”

During her pre-political career as an academic, while she was a researcher in the institute of engineering at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), Sheinbaum put forward a much more critical view of fossil fuels. In a 2008 essay on energy alternatives for Mexico, the now-candidate questioned the increase in oil exploitation as a sign of “irrational use of the resource” and expressed concerns over its “greater environmental impacts”.

Now, in the game of politics, Sheinbaum has been widely seen by analysts as moulding her discourse to follow the line of her mentor, AMLO, in privileging the role of Pemex and CFE and, by extension, favouring the consumption of fossil fuels. She has, however, signalled more openness than her predecessor to the participation of private companies in Mexico’s energy sector, including in meetings with international business groups.

Xochitl Gálvez: a return for the private sector

Sheinbaum’s closest opponent is Xóchitl Gálvez, a former senator, computer engineer and businesswoman, running as the nominee for the broad Strength and Heart for Mexico coalition. The focus of her energy proposals has been the reopening of the sector to private investment, returning to the conditions of the 2013 energy reform, which AMLO abandoned.

In this sense, she has proposed launching auctions for renewable energy projects, as well as the tendering of oil exploration blocks. In parallel, she has called for the closure of six loss-making Pemex refineries, and for the state company to participate in the generation of hydrogen and other energies with private firms.

The candidate’s coalition brings together the conservative National Action party, the centre-left Democratic Revolution, and the Institutional Revolutionary Party that dominated 20th-century Mexican politics. Some of her key energy proposals include a goal of achieving carbon neutrality by 2050, the promotion of electric public transport and the installation of home solar panels. She has also suggested the deployment of fossil gas in the south-east of the country, with the region facing challenges in meeting residential and industrial demand, as well as transmission.

Her proposal document contains 14 mentions of the energy transition.

“The world is not going to wait to see whether or not Mexico wants to enter the energy transition. We’d better get on this train,” Gálvez said during a tour of the state of Yucatán in March.

“There is no better sovereignty than not relying on fossil fuels, relying on wind, solar energy, but it is also clear to me that we have to make a just transition,” she said. “We cannot say overnight that fossil fuels will no longer be used, that is false, because oil is something very valuable,” she added.

AMLO focus on energy sovereignty

Looking at the energy policies pursued by the AMLO government since 2018 is key to understanding the current candidates’ proposals. His government has made energy sovereignty one of its flagship initiatives, aiming for the country to meet its needs through domestic production. Support for fossil fuels has been privileged under this approach, with the country’s energy transition stalling during his tenure.

Mexico will miss the target set in 2014 for clean sources to have a 35% share of generation by 2024; its target for 2035 is 40%.

Although government support has helped to stabilise Mexico’s oil extraction, it has not been the salvation that Pemex may have imagined: the USD 90 billion transferred during the AMLO government in various types of support, such as tax reductions and subsidies, have not resulted in better financial results for the struggling company.

Meanwhile, Mexico continues to rely on the United States for electricity generation and gas imports, burned in combined cycle power plants.

The Mexican government is also encumbered by the construction of the Olmeca refinery, better known as Dos Bocas, in the south-eastern state of Tabasco, some 760 kilometres from Mexico City. Construction began in 2019 and it was scheduled to begin operating in 2022, though the estimated cost has now jumped from an initial USD 8 billion to at least USD 17 billion.

Dos Bocas has been pitched by the AMLO government as the basis for fuel sovereignty, as it will theoretically refine some 340,000 barrels of crude per year, producing 170,000 barrels of gasoline and 120,000 barrels of diesel. Gálvez has described the troubled refinery as a “monument to corruption” and said she would pledge support and investments to finish the project.

Mexico among Latin America’s worst polluters

Another result of the AMLO government’s policies has been an increase in Pemex’s emissions. These grew from 48 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent in 2019 to 60 million tonnes in 2023, according to Pemex reports sent to the Securities and Exchange Commission, the US stock market regulator, as a requirement for the company to sell bonds there.

The energy sector is the third largest source of methane emissions in the country, releasing 1.34 million tonnes into the atmosphere in 2023, to which Pemex is the largest contributor. However, several studies have highlighted that the true scale of this pollution could be higher, due to shortcomings in measuring processes.

As part of the Global Methane Pledge launched at the COP26 climate conference in 2021, Mexico has committed to reducing its emissions by 2030. Current policies put it on a path towards achieving only minor cuts in methane emissions, with the International Energy Agency projecting 1.2 million tonnes a year by 2030, and describing the country’s progress as “moderate”.

Mexico ranks as the second largest polluter in Latin America, after Brazil, and is among the 12 largest emitters of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the world. Pemex is among the 15 most polluting companies in the world.

These energy figures underline the urgency of the decisions facing the election candidates both at the national level, and in relation to the state-owned companies.

Ramón Torres, a UNAM researcher in energy and development studies, proposes that, for its own future, Pemex and CFE should support the development of offshore wind energy, battery storage, hydrogen generation, and the promotion of distributed generation and mass electrification.

“For years, we exploited the cow, now let’s dedicate the cow to something else if it no longer works,” Torres says. “We have to enter the new energy world.” CFE and Pemex, he adds, should “turn to the new technological frontier. They should be the tools for the energy offer of the future.”

For environmental lawyer Anaid Velasco of Mexico Resiliente, a coalition of sustainability organisations, it will be necessary for the next president to set out clear rules for the country’s energy transition, without setting obstacles.

“The transition needs willpower,” she says. “The goals have been there, they are ambitious, but it doesn’t happen. In a presidential system, things happen if the incumbent wants them to happen. If there is a legal system that allows participation from various sectors, incentives can be put in place to make it happen. Transition happens at various scales, from panels in houses to the industrial level.”

Mexico’s presidential election takes place on 2 June. Claudia Sheinbaum continues to lead the race, polling at around 60% of voting intention, far ahead of Xóchitl Gálvez and centre-left candidate Jorge Álvarez Máynez, who are polling at roughly a third and a tenth of votes, respectively. The Morena candidate is widely expected to emerge as the winner.

Emilio Godoy