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The Little Ice Age was brutal. How did people survive?

From roughly the 16th to 19th centuries, much of the Earth was gripped by a persistent frigid cold. It left ripples through history—and some lessons for today’s climate crisis. 

ByKieran Mulvaney, 
February 20, 2024

During the Little Ice Age, the Northern Hemisphere experienced long stretches of temperatures so cold that crops failed and rivers froze—like the Scheldt River, depicted here outside of Antwerp, Belgium, in a 1593 oil painting by Lucas van Valckenborch. PHOTOGRAPH BY INCAMERASTOCK, ALAMY STOCK PHOTO


Thousands of people walking and playing across the frozen River Thames. Soldiers on horseback capturing ships stuck in the ice. Indigenous populations using snowshoes to outfox English interlopers. Accused witches put on trial as their communities struggled to explain crop failures and extreme cold.

These were some of the images that define the Little Ice Age—a period of several centuries last millennium in which parts of the Northern Hemisphere grappled with a persistent cold. But what caused the Little Ice Age, how long did it last, how did people adapt to its frigid grip—and what lessons can we learn as we enter our own period of climatic change?

What is the Little Ice Age—and what caused it?

The Little Ice Age was not a true ice age—average cooling was probably only in the order of 0.5 degrees Celsius, or 1 degree Fahrenheit—nor was it consistently cold. Dagomar Degroot, associate professor of environmental history at Georgetown University and author of The Frigid Golden Age has referred to the era as a series of “little little ice ages.”

Although some researchers argue it may have begun earlier, NASA defines the Little Ice Age as beginning around 1550 and consisting of three cold peaks—around 1650, 1770 and 1850—interspersed with relative warm intervals.

Scientists are still working out exactly what caused the Little Ice Age too. Theories range from decreased solar activity to increased volcanic eruptions, to the genocide of Indigenous populations in North America, which allowed forests to replace agricultural land, in the process removing about seven billion tons of carbon from the atmosphere. A 2022 study argued that the initial trigger was, counterintuitively, a surge of extremely warm water flowing north from the tropics in the late 1300s, which flushed Arctic ice into the North Atlantic.

Widespread impacts

Whatever the cause, the consequences of the Little Ice Age have rippled through history, although to what extent is controversial.

Certainly, cold weather enabled Charles X Gustav of Sweden to march his troops across a frozen strait to capture the Danish island of Funen in 1658, and made it possible for French troops to seize a Dutch fleet that had frozen into the ice in 1795—an event described as being the only time in history men on horseback captured a fleet of ships. Fear and anxiety at repeated crop failures prompted a surge of “witch trials” and anti-Semitism in Europe.

Less definitively, the Little Ice Age may have played a role in the collapse of the Ming Dynasty in China, partly as a result of food shortages leading to peasant uprisings. The drop in temperatures and a simultaneous growth in ice cover on land and sea may have contributed to the disappearance of Norse colonies from Greenland. It has even been postulated that the unique sound of Stradivarius violins results from the wood that Antonio Stradivari used being denser than usual because of the cold.

Beyond the grand historical ripples it may have set in motion, the Little Ice Age had particularly severe impacts on the peasantry and the urban poor. In his book The Little Ice Age, author Brian Fagan describes “Alpine villagers [living] on bread made from ground nutshells mixed with barley and oat flour.” A 1648 account recorded the “cryes and teares of the poore, who professe they are almost ready to famish.”

Parts of the 17th and early 18th centuries were especially brutal. Several European nations underwent major famines in the late 1600s; according to Ariel Hessayon of Goldsmiths, University of London, the winter of 1684 was so severe that King Charles II authorized a charitable collection, to which he himself contributed. That enabled England to withstand the winter better than some of its neighbors; even so, Hessayon writes, “people died throughout the land, as did beasts, birds and fish. Burials were suspended because the ground was too hard to dig up. Trees split apart and plants perished.”

Adapting to the cold

Remarkably, some were able to adapt to the hardships. In London, the cold conditions caused the River Thames to freeze over on multiple occasions, to the extent that “frost fairs” would spring up, with people playing soccer, watching bearbaiting, or competing in archery contests amid a backdrop of stalls selling everything from hot chocolate to pies.

The freezing of the Thames might have spelled disaster for the city’s watermen, who “essentially offered a water taxi service along the river,” Hessayon explained in an interview. In response, he says, they took advantage of the frost fairs to develop alternative income streams: “They adapted, because they would become shopkeepers on the ice, and they wouldn’t have to pay rent on the frozen Thames.”

Meanwhile the Mojave people in modern-day California responded to greater climatic variability in the 16th and 17th centuries by “developing a remarkably decentralized trading culture,” says Degroot. They also created resilient baskets, pottery, and other containers to transport goods over long distances, “so that if there was a food shortfall in one region, they could compensate by trading with another.”

The Mojave’s response to the changing climate was mirrored several thousand miles away by the Dutch Republic, which actually enjoyed a “golden age” during the Little Ice Age’s most challenging years—largely, Degroot explains, by also developing a resilient and diverse trading infrastructure.

“They were able to transport commodities from many different regions—including, most importantly, grain from different ports in the Baltic,” he says. As a result, when extreme weather caused a grain shortfall, “the Dutch were actually able to exploit that by importing commodities from places where they were grown.”

In New England, the Wabanaki Nations took advantage of cold and snowy winters by using snowshoes to launch raids against English colonists—until, in the early 18th century, the interlopers adopted the Indigenous technology and expertise and sent out hundreds of “snowshoe men” to patrol Wabanaki hunting grounds.

Modern-day lessons

Surprisingly, says Degroot, one area where commerce improved and conflict lessened was the whaling grounds of the Arctic. “When it got colder and ice expanded, resources were more tightly packed together and more accessible,” he explains. As a consequence, he continues, the armed conflict that had characterized Arctic whaling actually diminished.

There might be a lesson in there for modern-day climate change watchers, he says, adding that it “is really the exact opposite of how the Arctic is often discussed in national security circles today, where people assume that as the Arctic thaws, there might be much more competition and conflict in the region.”

As significant as the effects of the Little Ice Age were, however, Degroot notes that the amount of cooling was less than the extent of warming we are presently experiencing. Hessayon argues this makes understanding the period and how people adapted even more important.

“There is a huge amount of potential material that we can study and learn a great deal about the past and hopefully inform how to deal with our current crisis,” he explains.

(Sources: National Geographic)

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Why developing countries must unite to protect the WTO’s dispute settlement system

 

Getty Images

The World Trade Organisation’s dispute settlement mechanism has, for decades, provided stability and predictability to the resolution of disputes between member countries. As escalating global crises increasingly affect world trade, however, the WTO needs to reform or risk becoming irrelevant.

Many are questioning whether the 2024 Ministerial Conference – the WTO’s highest decision making body – is the last chance to save the WTO. At the top of the agenda of the conference being held in Abu Dhabi is the blocking by the US of new Appellate Body member appointments. The Appellate Body of seven persons deals with appeals against panel findings in disputes brought by WTO members.

The WTO’s dispute settlement system isn’t perfect. It is overly technocratic and expensive; and the Appellate Body was often accused of overreaching its authority.

The dispute settlement mechanism was designed to provide a safeguard against unfair trade practices by treating all countries equally and regardless of their economic power. Once seen as the “jewel in the crown” of the WTO, the two-tier dispute settlement system has not been fully functional since December 2019The Appellate Body collapsed when the terms of two of its three remaining members expired. Due to the requirement for three members to hear an appeal, there was no longer a standing body that could decide on appealed panel findings. This put cases on hold, threatening to undermine the WTO’s legitimacy.

In the hope of solving the current crisis, WTO members have put forward alternative models for resolving disputes. One is a multi-party interim arrangement. It provides a temporary alternative for appealing trade disputes. Originally set up by 16 WTO members, the arrangement quickly expanded to include 54 of the 164 WTO members. This reflected broad support for a final-stage arbitral process and the binding nature of the arbitral award issued by the panel.

However, its use appears to have stalled as more countries have opted to either settle their disputes bilaterally or even suspend them.

Developing countries, such as India, have been critical of the interim arrangement. They have argued that it sidesteps their right to appeal under WTO rules. They want the standing Appellate Body to be reinstated.

Among the most controversial proposals for reform is an idea tabled by the US. It proposes a dispute settlement system with an “opt-out” clause for countries that only wish to accept the jurisdiction of the Appellate Body on a case-by-case basis. This is similar to the International Court of Justice: countries choose to “opt in” and be subject to the jurisdiction of the court.

What’s at stake

A fully functioning dispute settlement mechanism with an appellate tribunal is indispensable for creating a just and equitable global economy. The US proposals for an opt-out system of dispute resolution would allow countries to disregard unfavourable decisions of the appellate tribunal.

This is problematic for several reasons.

First, it would weaken the WTO’s credibility and effectiveness by making the current crisis permanent. It contributes to a move towards bilateral dispute settlement, exemplified by the US-India deal to end six of their ongoing WTO disputes. This signals a worrying departure from multilateralism, a recent trend which risks sidelining the most vulnerable developing countries even more.

Second, being allowed to sidestep rulings would further marginalise developing countries, undermining the WTO’s mission to foster equal competitive conditions. It risks leaving less economically developed countries unable to challenge trade rule violations and seek remedies against unfair trade practices.

Two cases illustrate the dangers of a system where powerful countries ignore rulings without fear of repercussions.

  • The first example is the long-running bananas dispute between the European Community and some developing countries in Latin America. They successfully challenged the European Community’s banana import rules, claiming they were discriminatory and violated the most favoured nation principle. The principle states that countries cannot generally discriminate between their trading partners. The European Community vetoed two panel reports, leading to a lengthy legal battle. The process was complicated by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’s requirement for decisions based on consensus, which drained the limited resources of the developing countries involved.

  • The second example is the notorious US-Gambling dispute, where the US was found to have violated WTO rules. Antigua and Barbuda were granted permission to retaliate, but the Appellate Body’s recommendations have still not been upheld. For small island nations like Antigua and Barbuda, the cost of this litigation has been far-reaching, harming their economies. Meanwhile, the US, insisting that its laws comply, has not faced any significant or negative economic consequences from either the dispute or its outright non-compliance with the outcome.

Third, an “opt out” approach could allow economically stronger members to sidestep rulings, exacerbating power imbalances. Such a trend jeopardises the economic development prospect of poorer countries by affecting long-term investment and trade decisions.

Most African countries have rarely used the WTO’s dispute process. But addressing the reasons for this may enable them to engage with the system in future.

To-do list for developing countries

A functioning dispute settlement system would resonate with the WTO’s broader vision of fairness, equality and sovereignty in global trade.

To achieve this, developing countries must:

  • reject the opt-out model

  • call for greater support, including technical assistance and capacity-building, to ensure effective participation in the dispute settlement process

  • collaborate with each other and with developed countries to strengthen their collective voice in reform discussions.

Adopting a unified stance and getting commitment among all members to compulsory jurisdiction is the only way the WTO can remain a cornerstone of the international trade system.

(Sources: The Conversation)

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Red Sea politics: why Turkey is helping Somalia defend its waters

 February 28, 2024

Somali soldiers at a military training given by the Turkish Armed Forces in Mogadishu. Ercin Erturk/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images

Somalia and Turkey recently announced that they would expand the terms of a defence agreement first signed on 8 February 2024 to include the maritime sector. This came as tensions rose between Somalia and landlocked Ethiopia. Ethiopia is seeking access to the Red Sea through Somaliland, a breakaway state of Somalia. Federico Donelli, an international relations professor whose research covers Red Sea security and politics, puts this defence agreement into context.

What’s the scope of the relationship between Turkey and Somalia?

Turkey’s entry into Somalia in 2011 started out as a humanitarian partnership but soon turned into a strategic one. Its support since has been economic and infrastructural and has increasingly included the military.

The Turkish government saw Somalia’s failed statehood and the lack of other major international stakeholders as an opportunity to increase its popularity across Africa.

Turkey aimed to:

  • gain international visibility

  • test its ability to intervene in conflict and post-conflict scenarios

  • increase market diversification into east Africa

  • cultivate its image as a benevolent Muslim middle power by promoting Islamic solidarity.

Several Turkish faith-based associations and NGOs already active in Africa became directly involved in development and relief projects. Major national brands, such as Turkish Airlines, promoted campaigns to raise funds for Somalia.

Within a few years, Turkey’s involvement in Somalia was portrayed by the government and perceived by the Turkish public as a domestic issue.

Turkey’s early efforts to bring Somalia back to the table of the international community were successful.

With the reopening of Mogadishu’s port and airport in 2014, both managed by Turkish companies, the economic situation in Somalia improved compared to the previous decade. Turkish political elites began to present their involvement in Somalia as a success story. This is despite some remaining critical problems, including failing to root out the terrorist organisation Al-Shabaab.

Turkey took responsibility for training the Somali National Army in partnership with other stakeholders, including the European Union and the United States. It opened a military base in Mogadishu in 2017. The base trains one of the army’s elite units, the Gorgor Brigades, and serves as a Turkish military outpost in the region.

Al-Shabaab’s persistence has convinced Turkey that it needs to provide more active military support for Somalia’s development. Ankara also wants to protect its economic and political investments in Somalia.

Finally, behind the Turkish deal with Somalia is the politics around the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato).

Over the past 12 months, Turkey has moved closer to the United States. It’s positioned itself as an effective ally in Africa to counteract the negative effects of France’s withdrawal – such as the increasing influence of Russia. Turkey’s commitment to Somalia follows its efforts in Libya.

In both cases, Turkey has proven willing to take on the security burden that other Nato members, particularly Italy, have refused to meet.

Turkey’s engagement in Somalia is, therefore, part of a broader foreign policy strategy to gain more autonomy in global politics. Increased relevance within Nato would help achieve this.

What’s the context of the maritime defence pact between Turkey and Somalia?

Turkey and Somalia began working on an agreement between November 2023 and January 2024. Turkey agreed to train and equip Somalia’s naval force and help patrol the country’s 3,333km coastline.

Turkey’s defence sector has had increasing influence in Ankara’s foreign policy decisions. Turkey sees itself as an exporter of defence industry products, and as a partner in training special forces and police. African countries are among the main targets for the Turkish defence sector.

Somalia, therefore, provides an opportunity to spread more Turkish production and items.

In 2022, Turkey became, along with the United States, the main backer of a new offensive against Al-Shabaab. It provided logistical support to the Gorgor forces and air cover to the national army. This cooperation has led to the 10-year defence agreement, including maritime security, signed in February 2024.

Turkey and Somalia have been working on the accord for some time, but recent regional events have undoubtedly affected the announcement’s timing.

An Ethiopia-Somaliland memorandum of understanding in January 2024 is one such event. Turkey has good relations with Somaliland, but considers the territorial integrity of Somalia to be essential for its stability.

At the same time, the Horn of Africa’s political dynamics are shifting. Mounting tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia have led to new coalitions involving regional and extra-regional players.

It’s important not to oversimplify, but two factions are emerging. On one side are Ethiopia, Somaliland and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). On the other are Somalia, Egypt, Eritrea and Saudi Arabia.

At first, Turkey sought to mediate between the factions to defuse tensions.

But its agreement with Somalia reduces Turkey’s room for manoeuvre. Although the relationship with Ethiopian prime minister Abiy Ahmed appears to be unaffected, there could be negative repercussions, especially for the many Turkish economic interests in Ethiopia.

What is the UAE factor?

When it comes to the Horn of Africa, the UAE plays a pivotal role. Turkey and Somalia each have a relationship with the Emirates.

From 2014 to 2020, Turkey engaged in bitter rivalry with the Emirates in the wider Red Sea area. This was driven by the two countries’ different visions for the region’s future.

Relations improved from 2020. During the 2020-2022 war in Tigray, both Turkey and the UAE supported the Ethiopian government.

But recent developments in the Horn of Africa, such as the UAE-backed Ethiopia-Somaliland deal, threaten to create new friction between Turkey and the Emirates. Turkey doesn’t have the political will or material capacity to sustain this. In the past three years, the UAE has supported the Turkish economy with direct investment, changing the balance of the relationship.

The situation is similar for Somalia.

From a commercial and security perspective, the Emirates is important in Somalia. The UAE manages two key Somali ports – Berbera and Bosaso. It’s also moving to take over Kismayo. And the Emirates has been one of Somali president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s principal backers. It would be risky for the Somali president to break ties with Abu Dhabi.

What happens next?

There is still much uncertainty about how the Ethiopia-Somaliland memorandum of understanding and the Turkey-Somalia defence cooperation agreements will be put into practice. What’s clear is that both the UAE and Turkey are becoming more active and influential in the region. And that African dynamics within and between states are closely intertwined with regional and global trends.

(Sources: The Conversation)

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