Focus on Arts and Ecology

This week’s big environmental story, December 8-14 

On 30 November, China published its third air pollution control plan, aiming to further cut airborne pollutants and to transition toward clean industry.

The plan emphasises reducing emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOx) and volatile organic compounds (VOCs), setting emission caps for both pollutants. The plan mentions methods including using fewer materials containing high VOCs in products such as paint and detergent, and upgarding boilers that emit high NOx.

Specific targets include: by 2025, cities at the prefecture level and above should reduce their fine particulate matter pollution (PM2.5) levels by 10% compared to 2020, and heavily polluted days should account for less than 1% of the year. (Levels may have fallen a little bit lower in 2020 than the prevailing trend due to reduced industrial output caused by the pandemic.)

Moreover, the PM2.5 levels of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region should decrease by 20%, and by 2025 the Fenwei Plain area should be 15% lower, again compared to 2020. Beijing’s PM2.5 level should be controlled below 32 micrograms per cubic metre by 2025. This is a little lower than the national standard, but remains much higher than the World Health Organisation (WHO) guideline. 

China’s first national air pollution control plan was released in 2013. It was succeeded in 2018 by another on “defending the blue sky”, which put more cities under air quality management targets.

Between 2013 and 2021, China’s air pollution levels fell 42.3%, according to this year’s Air Quality Life Index from the University of Chicago’s Energy Policy Institute.

Despite significant improvements over the last decade,  at the end of 2022 nearly a third of China’s cities fell short of the national air quality standard. This year’s situation has worsened due to economic activity rebounding, climate change, and other factors. 

“The turning point for air quality, shifting from quantitative to qualitative change, has not yet arrived. Heavy pollution is still frequent. As we all know, the three major structures have not been fundamentally improved: the industrial structure focuses on heavy and chemical industry, the energy structure relies heavily on coal, and the transportation structure prioritises roads,” said Liu Bingjiang, director of the department of atmospheric environment at the Ministry of Ecology and Environment, during a press conference on the new plan on 11 December.

Given these circumstances, the newly released plan outlines nine major tasks to be achieved by 2025, such as eliminating outdated steel production capacity, promoting a transition to green industry, boosting renewable energy installation, and developing green transportation.  

“[The plan] clearly defines the foundation of collaborative governance for pollution and carbon reduction,” Dr Wan Wei, China program director of Clean Air Asia, told The Paper.

(Sources: China Dialogue)

Local herders bear the brunt of salt sandstorms and waning pastures on the lower reaches of the Wulagai River in Inner Mongolia 

By Yuan Ye, December 14, 2023

In early April, a strong gale built up near Daoleed Sharina’s home. She rushed her sheep into a pen and ran home. By the time she got inside, her eyes were in excruciating pain.

Livestock are Sharina’s family’s livelihood. They manage over 400 hectares of pasture and are responsible for thousands of sheep and cattle on their ranch in Bayan Gaobi Gacha, a herder’s settlement in East Ujimqin Banner on China’s border with Mongolia.

In recent decades, human activity up here on this section of the Mongolian Plateau, which contains the largest contiguous temperate grasslands in the world, has severely degraded the landscape. Now, due to desertification, residents of East Ujimqin, which is a county in Xilingol League (prefecture), often face strong winds laden with dust and sand during the spring.

Sharina’s sister-in-law, Sim (not her real name), notes that the sandstorms at the ranch are out of the ordinary. Now living in the county town, Sim regularly returns to her old home dozens of kilometres away to help her brother with the ranch. “The sand at [the ranch] really hurts when it hits you in the face. It’s not as painful over in town,” she tells China Dialogue.  

“Here in the north, there’s so much salt. When the wind blows, the salt comes straight to our home,” Sim says.  

Sim is referring to the salt dust carried by salt storms. Different from dust in typical sandstorms, the salt is particulate matter rich in fine sulphates and chlorides, lifted from dried-out parts of former lakes, salt-alkali land and desert. Salt storms are considered a direct threat to human health, and insufficient protection against them can cause respiratory diseases. Sharina’s family, for example, are constantly bothered by rhinitis.

The family lives on the lower reaches of the Wulagai River, the largest inland river in Inner Mongolia. A few kilometres north sits the Wulagai Gaobi, a desertified expanse stretching as far as the eye can see. It was one of the largest lakes on the Wulagai, until it completely dried up when the river’s upper stream was dammed decades ago, leading to reduced flow that exacerbates the impacts of drought and excessive herding.

Disappearing wetlands

In May, Sharina’s husband Baorjigen Burentegusi drives to the former lake. The 52 year old passes large, sparse expanses of grass, eventually reaching a dry riverbed. Standing on the pale, hardened ground, he says: “This all used to be water.” When he was young, the area was a lake surrounded by reeds and lush grassland, he recalls. Now, it is a dried-up lake bed, surrounded by large swathes of salinised terrain covered in needlegrass and other salt-tolerant plants.

The 670 hectares of the Wulagai Gaobi are now a desert. Some parts of the former lake bed have hardened to the point that vehicles can drive on it. You can judge the water content of the soil by the colour of the grass: the driest earth is bare; where there is some moisture, large patches of black grass emerge; in moister areas, a dark-yellow grass can be found.

It is not only the Wulagai Gaobi that has dried up. So have other places on the river’s lower reaches, like the Yihe Nur. In Mongolian, nur means “big pond”, indicating these places were once lakes and wetlands. Within the Wulagai nature reserve, these have now practically disappeared. According to a 2011 study by the Wulagai reserve’s grassland management authority, by that year, the Wulagai grasslands had receded, desertified or salinised by a total of 98,800 hectares, accounting for just over 20% of the total grassland area.

Sharply contrasting with the desolation around the Wulagai River’s middle and lower reaches, upstream of the dam, thriving wetlands with diverse vegetation can still be found. Jiuquwan (Nine River Bends) is one such spot that has become a famous tourist attraction. The floodplain there is full of wetland plants such as the common reed, cockspur grass and wormwood.

Controversy over the causes of deterioration

According to environmental groups and ecologists, wetland degradation on the lower reaches is a direct result of the Wulagai dam, which has reduced the river’s normal flow. The dam was built in 1980, with a severe flood destroying it in 1998. It was rebuilt and enlarged in 2004, and today the reservoir behind the dam can hold up to 250 million cubic metres of water. After the rebuild, the lower reaches of the river received little water for six successive years, according to a 2010 report in state media Oriental Outlook. Officials from East Ujimqin Banner sought help from authorities in Xilingol to coordinate water release, but the efforts were rejected by the reservoir management body.

The Wulagai management authority, which manages both the reserve and the reservoir, is affiliated with Xilingol League, and is equivalent to the county of East Ujimqin in terms of administrative jurisdiction. The reservoir’s water supply is key to the authority being able to further carry out its economic development plan, which includes building water-intensive heavy industry such as new coal mines and petrochemical plants. According to Caixin, although the coal-to-chemical base originally planned for the area is not yet operational due to a lack of funds, a new coal power project was completed in 2021, with the reservoir as its back-up water source.

A 2015 report by CCTV News, China’s largest TV news channel, noted that, to meet the industrial developmental needs of the Wulagai nature reserve and even the entirety of Xilingol League, the dam rarely released water downstream after its reconstruction. Due to high evaporation rates on the Mongolia Plateau, the watercourse downstream dried up very quickly, with many wetlands shrinking severely and even degrading into deserts. 

After public exposure and criticism from state media about the degradation, the government of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region launched an internal investigation into its causes. According to the resulting report released in 2015, parts of which were published by the media, the authors said the reservoir hadn’t actually been supplying water to the industrial users, as “no project had sought a permit for water consumption”. Instead, it had been mainly functioning to simply “hold water”. It also said that wetland degradation could be related to various factors, but “natural impacts should be the main ones”.

The Wulagai dam on the upper reaches of the river. Water was being released when this photo was taken in April 2023. However, it is not clear how often this happens, nor if the amount of water released is sufficient to meet the ecological needs of downstream wetlands. (Image: Yuan Ye / China Dialogue)

The government report has not been accepted by ecologists who follow this issue closely. “At that time, many voices claimed that grassland degradation was due to the climate. Our research suggests that it was caused by humans,” said Yi Jin, a retired professor at Inner Mongolia Agricultural University who studies grassland ecology on the Mongolian Plateau. She told China Dialogue that the drying up of the Wulagai Gaobi, the Yihe Nur and other lakes is “directly related” to the damming of the river. According to Caixin, since 1998, the Wulagai reservoir has only released water downstream between 2012-2014 and between 2018-2021. The Baorjigen family also told China Dialogue that herders near their home had approached authorities in Xilingol to demand water, after which it temporarily flowed.

From 2006 onwards, a research team led by Yi Jin conducted several surveys on vegetation in the Wulagai River Basin. They found that within five years of cutting off the river flow, vegetation in wetlands on the middle and lower reaches of the Wulagai was already showing signs of rapid degradation, and that plant diversity had been severely reduced. Signs of desertification were also more obvious downstream.

Yi Jin and her students published a paper in 2011 based on their fieldwork. Vegetation had almost completely disappeared in all six of the ranchers’ settlements they had studied on wetlands along the Wulagai’s middle and lower reaches. With desertification, salt-tolerant vegetation, as well as those that thrive in sand, had gradually replaced the once-rich plant communities, and the number and proportion of annual herbaceous plants were significantly higher than that of perennial herbaceous plants – an indication of degradation. The paper also warned that the disappearance of several lakes had led to the exposed lake basins becoming a major source of local sandstorms.

The fencing in of grasslands in Inner Mongolia has resulted in sedentary grazing practices that are more intensive. Some ecologists point to this as another cause of land degradation in the region. (Image: Yuan Ye / China Dialogue)

In addition to dams cutting off water, overgrazing is also considered by researchers to be an important factor in wetland degradation. This issue is closely linked to the policy of “enclosed grazing” – the fencing in of livestock – that has been in place for years. Wu Enqi, a doctor of botany at Inner Mongolia Agricultural University, has compared grasslands on both sides of the China–Mongolia border. He believes that Inner Mongolia, dominated by sedentary grazing and relying mainly on underground water resources, has seen far more serious grassland degradation than Mongolia, where most grazing is nomadic and mainly uses water at ground level. Land in the former is much more severely overloaded than in Mongolia.

In the herder settlements closer to the Wulagai Gaobi, pastures show obvious signs of degradation. Vegetation was still scarce on Sharina and Burentegusi’s pastures at the end of April, with dust taking off whenever the wind picked up. When Burentegusi was driving the sheep back to the pasture, the clouds of dust they kicked up made it difficult for him to breathe.

Ranchers in Inner Mongolia rely mainly on underground sources of water. Burentegusi and his family water their animals using a pump, which is kept safe in this hut. (Image: Yuan Ye / China Dialogue)

Sometimes a truck is needed to transport water from the pump out onto the pastures where lifestock are being kept (Image: Yuan Ye / China Dialogue)

A 2022 joint study by researchers from Arizona State University and Beijing Normal University, which drew on satellite data, noted that in 1979-2016, the Wulagai River Basin lost about 55% of its wetlands, 76% of its shrubbery and 46% of its sand vegetation. Its main vegetation had also changed from that of meadow steppe to dry steppe. They found that the building of the dam, as well as coal mining and overgrazing, were all direct drivers of this environmental change.

After decades of contention, in November 2021, Inner Mongolia’s Forestry and Grassland Bureau stated in a reply to the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) that it was carrying out a feasibility assessment into dismantling the Wulagai dam. Previously, Inner Mongolian ecologist and CPPCC member Liang Cunzhu had submitted a proposal at a conference meeting recommending that the dam’s impact on Wulagai wetland ecology be evaluated, along with the feasibility of dismantling it.

Two years later, the bureau has still not announced the conclusion of its assessment.

Another governmental department’s attitude to the reservoir was much clearer. In 2021, the Inner Mongolian Department of Ecology and Environment said that, after consulting the autonomous region’s Department of Water Resources, it believed the reservoir was an integral part of the river basin’s flood-control system. It argued that demolishing it would have “catastrophic consequences for the lives, property, and ecological security” of residents downstream.

The Wulagai River was dammed to create a reservoir that would provide water to local industries. Since then, the planned growth of industry has not occurred, and the reservoir reportedly has few uses. Calls to dismantle the dam have not been answered. (Image: Yuan Ye / China Dialogue)

Life in salt-alkali sandstorms

Zhou Zhen (not their real name), an ecological researcher and director of the habitat project at the environmental foundation Let Birds Fly, notes that the Wulagai wetlands and river basin lie on an important flight path for migratory birds. Wetland degradation and desertification have damaged this habitat, affecting the birds’ food sources and ability to rest.

In May of this year, Zhou went to the Wulagai Gaobi to investigate local vegetation and salt storms. They saw how, not far from the herders’ homes, dust formed a belt of white smoke in the wind. Echoing experts such as Yi Jin, Zhou believes that since turning into a dry basin, the Wulagai Gaobi has become a source of salt-alkali dust whenever it encounters strong winds.

The Wulagai Gaobi is covered in a fine layer of salt dust, which is easily picked up by the wind. Strong winds are common in the spring across northern China, and with vegetation sparse after snow melts, it’s the worst season for sandstorms. (Image: Yuan Ye / China Dialogue)

There are many factors behind the formation of salt-alkali land, but the most important is a lack of water, whether because of evaporation causing lakes to dry up, over-irrigation for agriculture in arid areas, or overextraction for industrial purposes. “More water is evaporating than being replenished, resulting in a continued concentration of salt,” said Zhou.

Living on salinised land, residents need to face the harsh reality brought about by the changing environment. In addition to the salt storms that frequently arise in spring, as salinisation spreads, finding healthy grass has also become a problem. Orduqin Buyinmanduh, 21, told China Dialogue that since 2016, the grass in front of his home, just a few kilometres from the Wulagai Gaobi, has stopped growing.

His neighbour says that local herders often discuss this year’s stronger winds and smaller supply of water. When water is released upstream during rainy seasons, the lakes seem to reappear, but this is only ever a temporary occurrence, the neighbour notes.

Nowadays, Sharina and Burentegusi have to buy hay to feed their livestock due to insufficient growth on their own pastures. They said that in the spring, within a month, their animals had almost finished 100 purchased bales.

With the degradation of their land, Burentegusi and his family now have to buy hay to keep their sheep fed during the spring (Image: Yuan Ye / China Dialogue)

In previous years, once the winter snows had melted, their animals could feed sufficiently on the pastures (Image: Yuan Ye / China Dialogue)

Upstream of the Wulagai dam, grasslands are still healthy. Meanwhile, ranchers’ need for hay on the lower reaches of the river has created a thriving local market. (Image: Yuan Ye / China Dialogue)

Sharina’s sister-in-law says that in previous springs, there was no need for them to specially source hay and fodder for the animals because there was enough grass in the pastures left over from the year before, both for harvesting and grazing. Now, not only do they need to buy grass, but must also give the animals fodder. “I don’t know why the animals are losing weight after eating the grass,” she says. “The grass is not as good as before.”

The lack of local grass has given rise to a market for it. People have created businesses selling cut grass and hay bales; there are even specialist delivery services. These days, the Baorjigen family spend at least 70,000 yuan (US$9,700) on buying and processing grass in one season alone.

Since 2021, Zhou has come to the Wulagai Gaobi twice to conduct research into the impact of salt sandstorms on the loss of pasture grass. While salt dust does not comprise the majority of dust in the sandstorms, it has a direct impact on air quality and human health in the surrounding environment. This has not been paid sufficient attention for a long time, according to Zhou.

Beyond the fenced-off pastures on the road to East Ujimqin town, dust is thrown up by the wind on the salinised expanse of the Wulagai Gaobi (Image: Yuan Ye / China Dialogue)

Zhou believes there are still big gaps in China’s understanding of salt sandstorms. Even when it comes to the Wulagai Gaobi, a massive area of salt-alkali land covering 670 hectares, there is yet to be any systematic research conducted on the risks and incidence of such storms.

“For example, under what meteorological conditions can salt storms occur on the Wulagai Gaobi? At what scale will different wind speeds affect pastures and herders?” asks Zhou. “We still haven’t clarified these basic questions. The succession of vegetation around salt-alkali land and the changing extent of salinisation on the gaobi all need urgent attention.”

As for the question of whether to keep or dismantle the Wulagai dam, Zhou believes more scientific research is needed first to determine the current degree to which it affects salinisation downstream, and its impact on herders. This can inform a decision over whether to get rid of it or implement ecological-revitalisation measures to restore degraded wetlands and pastures, they note.

Yuan Ye

Yuan Ye is a freelance journalist based in Guangzhou, writing about society and the environment.

(Sources: China Dialogue)

The renewables target is achievable but other elements would be much more difficult, say Chinese experts. 

By Lin Zi, December 13, 2023

On day three of the COP28 UN climate negotiations in Dubai, applause greeted the news that Mexico had signed up to a global commitment to triple renewable power capacity and double energy efficiency by 2030. It brought the number of countries making the commitment up to 118. That has since swelled to 123.

China Dialogue asked experts why China, despite being a world leader in renewables, has not signed. The general picture they gave is that the tripling is achievable, but the doubling is a sticking point. Energy efficiency is the size of an economy divided by its energy use. Although China has been making strides in cutting the amount of energy required to produce a unit of GDP, reducing this “energy intensity” a further 4% every year to 2030 would be extremely challenging. This is because China’s economy is still at a stage where it relies on energy-intense sectors such as heavy industry.

The renewables target: Achievable

The tripling goal comes from a report published by the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) in the summer. World Energy Transitions Outlook 2023 found that renewable power capacity must triple by 2030 if global heating is to be limited to 1.5C. That’s calculated on a baseline of the end of 2022, when the capacity was 3,400 gigawatts (GW). In other words, 11,000 GW of capacity will be needed by the end of the decade.

Three months after the report was published, the G20 New Delhi Leaders’ Declaration adopted the target, along with others including a faster phasedown of unabated coal power. China, as a G20 nation, was part of that consensus.

Moreover, just last month, China and the US published the Sunnylands Statement on enhancing climate action. The agreement stated that: “Both countries support the G20 Leaders Declaration to pursue efforts to triple renewable energy capacity globally by 2030 and intend to sufficiently accelerate renewable energy deployment in their respective economies through 2030 from 2020 levels.” (The wording suggests use of a 2020 base line domestically, rather than 2022.)

It’s worth noting that the target does not apply to all countries equally. That is, not all are expected to triple renewables capacity by 2030, as some are developing faster than others. The four biggest renewables generators in 2022 were China, the US, Brazil and India – with China at three times the capacity of the US in second place.

Despite this, a tripling of renewables capacity would not present a problem for China, on either the 2020 or 2022 baseline.

Using the 2020 baseline of 934 GW would mean China needs about 2,800 GW of renewables capacity by 2030. All the experts consulted by China Dialogue were confident this can be achieved. Dr Yang Fuqiang, a senior advisor to Peking University’s Climate Change and Energy Transition Program, predicts the figure will stand at 2,800 to 3,000 GW.

At a COP28 side event, Wang Yi, deputy chair of the National Expert Committee on Climate Change, said: “The current tripling target is a global target. If China was to do that, and we suggest only considering non-hydropower renewables, we calculate a 2022 baseline of 800 gigawatts, which would mean tripling to 2,400 gigawatts by 2030. That would take work, but it’s achievable.”

The energy efficiency target: A sticking point

One possible reason that China and India, biggest and fourth-biggest renewables generators respectively, did not sign the pledge is the bundling of the headline target of tripling renewables with doubling energy efficiency. Experts said the countries were keen not to over pledge and under deliver, aware that whatever targets they commit to, even if not binding on individual countries to achieve, may invite international pressure.

According to calculations by the International Energy Agency (IEA), doubling energy efficiency globally would require an annual 4% fall in energy intensity, or an overall fall of 32% on 2022 levels by 2030.

Currently, among the G20 members, only China, Japan, France, the UK and Indonesia have managed 4% falls in energy intensity over any period of five consecutive years.

The energy efficiency target is a much tougher ask, says Professor Teng Fei, of Tsinghua University’s Institute of Energy, Environment and Economy.

“IRENA asking China to achieve that goal is like “whipping a willing ox”, as countries with higher baselines will end up with much tougher goals,” he told China Dialogue.

“Whip a willing ox” is an old Chinese saying meaning ask for more from one who has already fulfilled their obligations, or ask someone to go beyond the call of duty.

He went on: “China has already achieved 4% falls in energy intensity. In the last decade, we’ve seen a cumulative fall of 26%. But maintaining that rate of change is no easy task.”

China has seen a shift in its thinking on achieving peak carbon, says Lauri Myllyvirta, lead analyst at think-tank the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA). Previously, it encouraged “dual controls” – on energy intensity and total energy consumption. Now, it promotes energy saving and emissions reductions, he explained.

Last year, due to the pandemic, the less energy-intensive services and consumer sectors were hit hard. Meanwhile, energy consumption grew 2.9% on the previous year, with coal consumption going up by 4.3%. That meant energy intensity for 2022 was virtually unchanged on 2021, dropping by only 0.1%.

“China is  promoting very large-scale deployment of clean energy while doing little to curb energy demand growth. This means that it should be quite plausible for China to agree to the global tripling goal but the energy efficiency goal is harder to sign up to,” said Myllyvirta.

Professor Sun Yongping, deputy head of the Institute of State Government at Huazhong University of Science and Technology, says that the main route to reducing the energy intensity of China’s economy is improving the electrification rate (meaning the share of electricity in energy demand, relative to the share of direct fossil fuel burning). This, he says, requires an industrial transition, as coal power and other energy-intensive industries could still cause overall energy intensity to rise.

“Last year, the National Development and Reform Commission called for an electrification rate of 30%, which is already very good, higher than some developed nations,” he said. “Developed parts of the east coast, like Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Shanghai, are already at almost 40%, while central and western China are at 20%. That reflects structural issues in the economy. A faster restructuring would bring the energy efficiency target within reach.”

Chinese business: Big opportunities, smaller challenges

If the renewables target is to be achieved, business will need to play its part. At COP28, China Dialogue interviewed the world’s largest photovoltaic (PV) solar firm, LONGi. Founded in 2000, it now has manufacturing or sales operations in over 150 countries and has sold more solar modules than any other firm for the last three years running.

Huo Yan, LONGi’s global marketing head, said the tripling target could act as a spur to countries that had been slower to deploy renewables. For a country like China, already rapidly rolling out clean energy, it was a conservative goal, he added.

“IRENA reviewed international trends in renewable energy and found rapid growth, particularly in solar,” he said. “But over the last five years, we’ve seen some international organisations, including IRENA, make the same mistake when predicting future capacity: they underestimate.”

He told China Dialogue that the global solar market is booming. According to LONGi’s own figures, 38 countries installed 1 GW or more of new PV solar capacity this year.

And, according to data from LONGi and Jinko Solar (China’s second biggest solar firm), they alone have produced a total of 490 GW of solar silicon wafers in their histories, equivalent to almost half of overall installed capacity.

Currently, Chinese manufactures hold 97% of the market for silicon wafers, and 80% of all solar panels are supplied by China. Demand for solar modules is greatest in China, the EU and the US. Recently, the EU and US have moved to repatriate supply chains and put anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures in place on Chinese solar power products. These include the EU’s Net Zero Industry Act, Critical Raw Materials Act, and a new Batteries Regulation; and the Inflation Reduction Act in the US.

“The EU and US don’t have the manufacturing capacity or the competitiveness. These measures are a huge barrier to solar deployment, and possibly the IRENA renewables capacity target,” said Pan Jiahua, member of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and deputy chair of the National Expert Committee on Climate Change. “To remove those barriers, we need dialogues. At the same time, Chinese companies need to step up and commit and contribute to global targets.”

“Changes in market demand, regional policy barriers, being punished for breaking WTO rules – companies in many sectors face these kinds of challenges,” Huo Yan told China Dialogue. “If companies do well on environmental, social and corporate governance, and communicate to dispel misunderstandings and prejudice, then we will all be working in the same direction, with the same targets, to tackle climate change.”

China’s contribution: Teaching people to fish

China’s rapid roll out of renewables has provided impetus to the global energy transition. Cecilia Springer, a senior fellow at Boston University’s Global Development Policy Center, thinks China has an important role to play as the world tries to achieve IRENA’s targets.

At the recent Third Belt and Road Forum, the country announced a number of new decisions, including the establishment of the Green Investment and Finance Partnership, “innovative blended finance”, and better support for renewables projects in their earliest stages, Springer said. She also noted a change in the language used, indicating a shift towards supporting smaller-scale and greener projects. “This all shows China will work hard to hit its existing targets, and give strong support to green and low-carbon development.”

“One big remaining question is if this support will emerge on the timeline needed to reach the 2030 RE capacity goal,” Springer added.

Pan Jiahua thinks China could act as a role model for the world by hitting that goal. He pointed out that China is a developing nation, with per-head GDP below the global average, and 600 million people having only around 1,000 yuan (US$140) in disposable income per month. If China can hit the target, so can other developing nations – not to mention developed ones.

“China has already got the cost of solar power down to under 0.10 yuan per kilowatt hour, something which will be of great help to both the EU and the US, not to mention the rest of the world, allowing them to triple renewables capacity at minimum cost,” said Pan.

Although China’s renewables tech has reduced the cost of installing generation capacity, Springer thinks the country could do more to transfer its experience to developing nations, helping them to build out their own manufacturing.

“Chinese solar manufacturers in other countries are mainly bringing down costs for end-users (like the US) rather than the developing countries where the manufacturing is occurring,” said Springer. “I think China could do much more to safeguard local benefits, train local workforces, and help build out solar installations in those countries,” she added.

The two-week climate conference in Dubai closed with a landmark deal to transition away from fossil fuels, but loopholes could hamper delivery of the commitments. 

By Fermín Koop, Joydeep Gupta, Cui Qiwen, December 13, 2023

For the first time, countries have agreed to transition away from fossil fuels to avert the worst consequences of the climate crisis. The deal made at this year’s United Nations climate change summit, COP28, calls for countries to shift their energy systems in a “just and orderly manner”, but includes loopholes that could affect emissions reductions.

Sultan Al Jaber, the summit’s president, and CEO of the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company, said the oil and gas sector was “stepping up for the first time” to deliver ambitious goals. “We have the basis to make transformation happen. It’s a balanced and historic package to accelerate climate action,” he added.

Countries met for two weeks in Dubai to conclude the Global Stocktake, intended to evaluate progress on climate action and to outline what more is needed to limit global warming to 1.5C – the high ambition target included in the 2015 Paris Agreement. Global average temperature has already increased by 1.2C since pre-industrial times.

COP28 had a strong start on day one with the operationalisation and capitalisation of the loss and damage fund, a global financial package to compensate the most vulnerable nations for climate change impacts. Developed countries pledged US$700 million to the fund, though this is less than 0.5% of the estimated losses facing developing countries each year. 

The future of fossil fuels

Negotiations had stalled when countries could not agree on language in the COP28 agreement on the future of fossil fuels. More than 100 nations were pushing for strong language to “phase out” oil, gas and coal use. They were met with opposition from OPEC, the umbrella organisation of major fossil fuel producing and exporting countries. It argued that the world should focus on reducing emissions rather than phasing out all fossil fuels. 

The protracted discussions led the summit to conclude a full day later than expected. The final text “calls on” countries to “Accelerat[e] efforts globally towards net zero emission energy systems, utilizing zero- and low-carbon fuels well before or by around mid-century.” It mentions phasing out “inefficient” fossil subsidies that “do not address energy poverty or just transitions”. 

The text recognises the need to reduce other greenhouse gases, such as methane, and the role that “low-carbon” fuels, such as natural gas, can play in facilitating the energy transition, which was questioned by campaigners. 

“Economic realities will kill some of the false solutions that this text still gives room to, such as CCS [carbon capture and storage] and so called ‘transition fuels’, but these cannot be allowed to distract from the job at hand,” said Linda Kalcher, executive director of Strategic Perspectives, a European thinktank.

Countries are also asked in the text to triple renewable energy capacity and double the annual rate of energy efficiency improvements by 2030. But the target doesn’t mention how this should happen or give clarity on the financial support needed for developing countries to achieve it. 

Lacking climate finance

Insufficient climate finance was one of the main issues of contention across the two weeks. Joab Okanda, senior climate advisor at Christian Aid, said: “There is a gaping hole on climate finance to actually fund the transition from dirty to clean energy in developing countries. Without that, we risk the global shift being much slower.”

The agreement urges countries to more than double their climate finance for adaptation to developing countries by 2025 and ensure they meet the existing goal of US$100 billion per year. It also calls for reform of international financial institutions.

Climate finance is expected to be a major theme of next year’s climate conference, when agreement is set to be reached on a new, quantifiable target for the amount of financial support developed countries will provide to developing countries to help them mitigate and adapt to climate change. 

Harjeet Singh, head of global political strategy at Climate Action Network International, said: “Final outcomes fall disappointingly short of compelling wealthy nations to fulfil their financial responsibilities.”

“While parties did not achieve as strong a Global Goal on Adaptation framework as vulnerable countries wanted, there is now a pathway forward to improve adaptation actions, marking the beginning of a formal coordinated global effort for adaptation and resilience,” said Ana Mulio Alvarez, a researcher at environmental thinktank E3G.

Pushing an agreement through

The resolution was a compromise reached after hours of patient negotiations extending into two sleepless nights for thousands of government delegates, and there were hugs on the dais when it was adopted at the final plenary without any country making a formal objection. 

However, Anne Rasmussen, Samoa’s natural resources and environment minister, complained that the agreement had been gavelled before its delegates had even arrived in the room, preventing any chance to object. She called the agreement an “incremental advancement over business as usual, when what we really need is an exponential step change in our actions.”

The Marshall Islands delegate in the closing plenary of COP28. Many Pacific Island nations were disappointed with the outcome of the conference, saying that is “does not advance us beyond the status quo.” (Image: Christopher Edralin / UN Climate Change, CC BY-NC-SA)

She drew loud cheers when she said: “It’s not enough to reference science, then not do what science asks us to do.” Al Jaber’s response: “We understand your concerns”.

For Simon Stiell, executive secretary of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), COP28 delivered “some genuine strides forward” but he warned that countries are still far from the finish line. “We must get on with the job of putting the Paris Agreement at full work. We needed this COP to send crystal clear signals on many fronts.” 

He also defended the multilateral process itself, which has come under repeated attack for failing to deliver climate action commensurate with what the science shows is necessary: “Without COPs, we’d be headed to 5C. We’re currently headed to just under 3C,” he said. Although he conceded that “COP28 needed to move the needle further”.

Arunabha Ghosh, CEO of the New Delhi-based Council on Energy, Environment and Water, said: “The urgency of the climate crisis demands immediate reforms be made to the COP process to ensure that accountability, implementation, and climate justice become central to all efforts. Otherwise, future COPs risk becoming obsolete.”

China and the US may have further methane and energy-related news soon. US Climate Envoy John Kerry said the US and China intend to update their long-term strategies and invite other countries to do the same. “We’ve reached the starting line, if not the finish line,” he said.

Liu Zhenmin, senior advisor to the Chinese special envoy for climate change, told Reuters on Wednesday that the proposed COP28 climate deal “is not perfect. Some issues still remain.”

When asked if China would consider phasing out coal, climate envoy Xie Zhenhua’s response was in line with China’s previously stated position: “We will strictly control coal consumption before 2025. After 2025, we will gradually reduce it. We will also not build new coal-fired power plants overseas, as we have already announced.”

Similarly, Zhao Yingmin, China’s vice minister for ecology and environment reiterated China’s longstanding position: “Developed countries have an unshakeable historical responsibility for climate change and must take the lead to materialise net zero as soon as possible.”

He added that the promotion of the energy transition should fully respect the capabilities and national conditions of different countries, and should not implement a “one-size-fits-all” transition requirement for countries.

Hosting of the climate change conference rotates among five regional groups. Next year’s talks will take place in November 2024 in Azerbaijan, a country that derives two thirds of its income from oil and gas. So discussions on energy transition are likely to continue to take centre stage. Then it will be Latin America’s turn, with Brazil hosting COP30 in the city of Belem in 2025, where countries will be expected to submit new climate plans.

Fermín Koop

Joydeep Gupta

Cui Qiwen

(Sources: China Dialogue)