Focus on Arts and Ecology

As the national government cautiously navigates its relationship with China, Argentina’s subnational powers are using their own ties to nurture development. 

By Javier Lewkowicz, February 7, 2025

While diplomatic relations between Argentina’s national government and China remain ambiguous, provincial leaders have been bypassing Buenos Aires to bolster links with Beijing. These subnational efforts are mobilising investment opportunities in natural resources, energy, infrastructure and trade expansion.

They have been yielding varying degrees of success as the provinces navigate several challenges, including a lack of China knowledge among provincial leaders, as well as preparation on the part of trade missions headed to China. Economic constraints at the national level also continue to cast a shadow.

An ambiguous relationship

During his 2022-2023 election campaign, Argentina’s president Javier Milei said he would not maintain diplomatic ties with China, dismissing it as “business with communists”. Upon assuming the presidency in December 2023, Milei cancelled Argentina’s entry into the Brics bloc (made up of 10 countries including Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) at the eleventh hour. As Milei’s term has progressed, however, pragmatism has recomposed the China-Argentina relationship.

During his first year in office, Milei benefitted from several of China’s actions. For example, following initial hesitancy over the new government’s stance, in June 2024 China accepted the renewal of its multi-billion-dollar currency swap line, which had been negotiated with Argentina’s previous administration. This allowed Argentina to delay the repayment of USD 5 billion in dues. Milei later declared China “a very interesting trading partner, because they don’t demand anything”. And during Brazil’s G20 summit in November, Milei met China’s president Xi Jinping for the first time, bolstering their relations.

However, the close ties between Milei and US president Donald Trump cast doubt upon the extent of Argentina’s near-term relations with China. For example, the new Atucha III nuclear power plant uses Chinese technology, and so may be seen to conflict with US interests. An existing Chinese aerospace base in the western province of Neuquén, and the suggestion that Huawei could work on Argentina’s 5G network, have thrown up similar tensions.

Provincial pragmatism

Dialogue Earth spoke to Stella Maris Juste, an international relations expert and researcher at Argentina’s National Scientific and Technical Research Council (Conicet). She says that the relationship between the provinces and China “has managed to weather the shifts in national politics and even in the provinces themselves, not only during the presidency of Milei, but also previously under [former president] Macri”.

Juste chalks this down to complementary interests: “The provinces need to attract investment, create jobs and improve infrastructure, while China seeks to improve access to key natural resources, such as lithium and other minerals, and also greater penetration of renewable energy and ports industries.”

In 2024, provinces’ finances became more strained as the state’s defunding measures grew. Total transfers to provincial and municipal governments fell by 19% year on year, according to the congressional budget office.

“In the provinces, China has found reliable interlocutors to sustain the relationship in these turbulent times,” explains Diego Cagliolo, who manages Asia relations at Argentina Global, a sustainable development NGO. “That is why Wang Wei – the Chinese ambassador – visits the provinces, and the governors in turn visit the [Chinese] embassy.”

Indeed, throughout 2024, there were numerous overtures from provincial leadership to China, usually via Argentina’s Chinese embassy.

For example, in August, the vice-governor of Catamarca province toured Zijin Mining’s copper facilities, including its clean energy and battery research centre.

In September, Córdoba’s governor led the Institutional and Commercial Linkage Meeting between his province and Chinese businesses, where Ambassador Wang announced a Chinese car company’s interest in establishing a factory in Córdoba. Representatives of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) and China Energy International Group attended.

In October, the governor of Santa Cruz visited China, signing an agreement with fishing company Hong Dong to develop fisheries in his province. Subsequently, a delegation from the Fujian Chamber of Commerce visited Santa Cruz to discuss a coal export agreement with Chinese state-owned coal mining firm YCRT.

Wang also visited La Pampa province to meet its governor at the end of May, accompanied by representatives of companies including Shanghai Electric Power, wind turbine manufacturer Goldwind, and ICBC.

The governor of Buenos Aires province met with Wang in February after agreeing in November 2023 to a USD 1.25 billion investment by China Potassium Chemical Group. The company is set to construct two fertiliser plants in the port city of Bahía Blanca. In addition, investments in Buenos Aires’ renewable energy, agricultural development and ports have been discussed with officials from Sichuan province, and the Chinese agricultural machinery firm Ruiyuan Holdings is considering an investment. In November, Wang was in Neuquén province to meet its governor. Also in attendance were representatives from large Chinese companies covering construction, railways and roads, engineering and equipment manufacture, oil and gas, and telecommunications.

Multi-level relations

“China has a long tradition of establishing multi-level relations with countries, including subnational agreements, but also through links with universities and think-tanks,” explains Oriana Cherini, an international relations researcher at Conicet. “In this context, China found Argentina’s provinces to be fundamental and stable allies.”

According to 2023 data compiled by Argentina’s Rosario Stock Exchange, China was the primary international trading partner of Jujuy, Chaco, Santiago del Estero, Catamarca, La Pampa and Entre Ríos. It was also the second-biggest trading partner of Santa Fe and Buenos Aires provinces.

Case study: Jujuy

The province of Jujuy in the north-west is often cited as a test case for Argentina’s subnational relationship with China. It is home to one of China’s biggest renewable energy projects in Argentina, the 315-megawatt Cauchari solar park. The project was mostly financed by the Export-Import Bank of China, and built by PowerChina, Shanghai Electric Construction and eastern China’s Talesun.

Pablo Palomares, Jujuy’s secretary of international relations, calls Cauchari a substantial step forward for the province in its relationship with China. “Jujuy knew how to approach and respond… in terms of commitment and seriousness,” he says. “A good project was drawn up, which is why it was able to overcome [Argentina’s] macroeconomic crisis.”

This relationship has also been reflected in other types of agreements, such as the Safe and Interconnected Jujuy initiative. Signed off in 2019, this programme involves the Chinese telecommunications company ZTE providing Jujuy with security cameras, fibre-optic cables, software and hardware.

In 2020, expert in China-Latin America relations, Margaret Myers, noted: “Chinese officials and other actors made upwards of 13 trips to Jujuy province, and Jujuy and Argentine national government officials made at least 11 visits to China” in the preceding five years.

Key to the relationship between Jujuy and China is lithium. For example, the Cauchari-Olaroz salt lake lithium project is controlled by Ganfeng Lithium, a company based in east China. The project has a production capacity of 40,000 tonnes of lithium carbonate equivalent per year.

Another project Jujuy embarked upon with China is its solar-powered tourist train, which runs through the Quebrada de Humahuaca Valley. And in May 2024, a diplomatic delegation from Jujuy signed an agreement with Gotion, headquartered in the eastern Chinese city of Hefei, to build a 200-megawatt solar plant in southern Jujuy.

Lithium and other minerals

Argentina’s strong federal character extends to the provinces being in control of their own natural resources. This means the strong growth experienced by the lithium sector and the rest of the metalliferous mining industry is having a direct impact on subnational relationships. This contrasts with Chile, for example, where the national government ultimately controls natural resources.

Other mining provinces besides Jujuy are also experiencing more dynamic links with China. In neighbouring Salta, the Mariana lithium-potassium brine project, under construction since 2022, is controlled by Ganfeng Lithium.

Ganfeng also part-owns the Pozuelos-Pastos Grandes lithium project in Salta, which is in the feasibility stage; in September, Ganfeng’s home province, Jiangxi, signed a letter of intent to deepen its cooperation with Salta. In addition, China is participating in lithium extraction at Salta’s Arizaro and Diablillo salt flats through Tibet Summit Resources, while Revotech Asia owns the Sal de los Ángeles project at Diablillo.

In Catamarca, north-western Argentina, a large lithium project is being developed: Tres Quebradas, owned by Zijin Mining. Catamarca has also been discussing improvements to the San Francisco Pass with Zijin, which would facilitate lithium exports from Coquimbo port in Chile.

Catamarca Mining and Energy (Camyen), which is owned by the provincial government, announced in 2022 that PowerChina would finance four solar plants in the province. Built by Shanghai Electric Power Construction, they will have a combined capacity of 600 megawatts. Construction is expected to begin this year.

In Argentina’s west-central San Juan province, China’s Jinko Solar developed the Iglesia-Estancia Guañizuil solar park, inaugurated in 2019. In addition, the Chinese company Shandong Gold has a 50% stake in the province’s Veladero gold and silver mine.

The challenges

Diego Guelar, the Argentine ambassador to China from 2016-2019, believes the provinces have a fundamental role to play in making an investment attractive to China. He says they have the capacity to provide local support and insights, helping to smoothen cooperation. However, he adds that “a large number of trade and business missions from provinces [that go] to China are not properly prepared”.

Guelar says while the provinces have control over their resources and foreign policy, and that China is generally interested in investing and trading with Argentina, getting projects off the ground is complex: “It requires prior preparation and, in many cases, sovereign guarantees from [Argentina’s national government], which also need to be negotiated. But it also requires knowledge of how the Chinese operate. This expertise is often lacking in the leadership at the national level, let alone in the provinces.”

From a more structural point of view, Stella Maris Juste sees the relational asymmetries deepening between Argentina and China at the subnational level, to China’s advantage: “The flipside of investments in territorial connectivity, energy production and currency swaps can be seen in trade deficits, extractive agriculture, the difficulty of expanding the basket of exportable value-added products, and financial dependence.”

Javier Lewkowicz

Two experts call on companies to calculate and report ‘scope 3’ emissions along their value chain as soon as possible. 

By Zhang Nan, Li Dianyi, February 6, 2025

We recently published a review of how China’s major firms are disclosing greenhouse gas emissions. Here we summarise our findings and offer recommendations to companies.

We found that nearly 80% of major firms are not yet disclosing any scope 3 emissions, meaning indirect emissions along their value chain. Our advice for them includes reporting such emissions as well as the calculation methodology and data sources they use. They should set emissions targets alongside clear action plans for achieving them. And they should work with companies across their supply chain to ensure it becomes zero-carbon.

A pressing issue

In the first nine months of 2024, the global average surface air temperature was 1.54C above the pre-industrial level. The goal of the Paris Agreement is to keep the long-term average below 1.5C. Current national policies worldwide could see a rise of 3.1C by the end of the century.

As listed firms may account for over 40% of global greenhouse gas emissions, their decarbonisation is a key part of climate governance. Emissions in the value chains of those firms – known as scope 3 emissions – have become an obstacle to goal-setting and disclosures.

What are scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions?

Efforts by Chinese firms in this regard are only just starting to get attention. Less than a quarter of the 667 major Chinese companies that we sampled in our recent review disclosed any scope 3 emissions in 2024.

From in-house operations to the value chain

At Carbon Mind, we selected all 667 companies from the CSI 300 Index, H shares, and the Hang Seng Composite LargeCap Index (HSLI), representing the largest and most influential listed companies in China. Our research found that 84% of those firms were disclosing scope 1 and 2 emissions, yet only 22% were revealing scope 3 emissions. Firms on the HSLI were doing better than average, with a disclosure rate of 51%, compared to 21% on the CSI 300 Index. This is due in part to differences in the sustainability disclosure rules across the exchanges.

Globally, 47% of listed companies disclosed at least some upstream scope 3 emissions in the first eight months of 2024, accompanied by 28% for downstream, according to research by Morgan Stanley Capital International. So, China’s listed firms are lagging badly on climate disclosure and need to work hard to catch up.

In 2023, the International Sustainability Standards Board issued its first International Financial Reporting Standards, IFRS S1 and IFRS S2. These made clear that firms must disclose sustainability-related risks and opportunities, and related information. This includes reporting on corporate emissions, such as scope 3. That provided firms around the world with a clear framework, putting carbon accounting and reporting on a more standardised footing.

For Chinese firms, 2024 saw a shift from voluntary to mandatory sustainability disclosures: in April, the three major stock exchanges – Shanghai, Shenzhen and Beijing – published guidance on sustainability reporting, encouraging firms to make scope 3 disclosures.

At the same time, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange toughened up its mandatory requirements, setting out a staged implementation of the ISSB rules, meaning scope 3 disclosures would become required for all HSLI firms from 2026. Then, on 10 December, the Hong Kong government published its Roadmap on Sustainability Disclosure, requiring publicly accountable entities – defined as listed companies and some financial institutions – to adopt ISSB standards. By 2028, all large, listed companies, and non-listed financial institutions with significant operations in Hong Kong, must be fully implementing ISSB standards.

From accounting to disclosure to setting goals

Companies are starting to work on making scope 3 disclosures, but many challenges lie ahead.

According to our sample, about 80% of China’s major listed firms are not yet making scope 3 disclosures. That figure may have been even lower if our research had included listed companies of all sizes.

Of those making scope 3 disclosures, many are still doing so selectively; disclosing only the emissions that are easier to calculate, such as those arising from their employees’ commutes or business travel. Other factors, with greater impact on the company’s carbon footprint, are missed out.

For example, purchased products and services are a major source of scope 3 emissions for most firms. But only 7% of the firms we looked at disclosed this data. Such data can be calculated by the “supplier-specific” method, which means collecting data from the suppliers. But it can be hard to obtain the data this way. Companies often prefer to use “spend-based” or “average-data” methods, which rely on industry-average “emission factors”. There are concerns about the accuracy of these two methods.

What are spend-based and average-data methods? And emission factors?

Moreover, of the 102 financial institutions we looked at, less than 7% disclosed emissions from their investment and financing portfolios.

A more serious challenge is a failure to disclose accounting methodologies. Most firms do not say which methodology they apply, or the emission factors or data sources used. That means a serious lack of reliability and comparability. If firms use different definitions, methodologies and sources, comparing data across companies becomes harder. There is also a lack of transparency when methodologies are adjusted, making it hard to track trends across time.

Even when disclosures are made, there is more work to do. The real challenge is setting tough goals and taking effective action to cut emissions and achieve long-term climate targets. We found that less than 5% of firms have set targets for scope 3 emissions. Only 3% set that target at net zero. There is much work to be done on accounting, disclosure and then target-setting.

Building a net-zero value chain

Firms that have taken the lead on scope 3 reporting often turn out to be more competitive. Transparency and disclosures remove barriers to financing, reduce operational risks, improve corporate reputations and send positive signals to stakeholders. To avoid future regulatory risks and improve competitiveness on the global market, Chinese firms should recognise the importance of scope 3 disclosures and get to work as soon as possible.

Based on the findings of our review, we make the following recommendations.

First, they should adopt common international and domestic accounting standards, such as the Greenhouse Gas Protocol, to ensure data is accurate, transparent and comparable.

Second, once disclosures are made, companies should identity and prioritise those sources of emissions that have the biggest impact and the greatest potential for change. This requires firms not just to focus on numbers going up and down. They need to explain if they are using a spend-based, average-data or supplier-specific method. They need to explain where emission factors are coming from, and which emissions sources are not yet covered and why. There should also be a gradual improvement in scope 3 calculations. For example, shifting from spend-based methods to physical data and supplier data for major emissions sources.

More importantly, companies should set emission targets and make those concrete, with practical and achievable timetables. They should be benchmarked against firms that lead on emissions disclosures. Clear medium- and long-term targets and action plans should be established, with progress regularly tracked and disclosed.

Finally, companies cannot cut their scope 3 emissions alone. Cooperation is necessary to build stronger zero-carbon value chains. Companies need to actively work with all parts of their supply chain, promoting and empowering suppliers to calculate their emissions, to boost accuracy of the company’s own scope 3 data.

When emissions hotspots are identified anywhere along the value chain, companies should share knowledge and cooperate on innovation with stakeholders to tackle those. This will promote the development and application of new green technology and solutions, accelerating the low-carbon transition of the entire system.

Heavy industry is linked to higher mortality rates in the regions where it is concentrated, highlighting a need for increased monitoring and actions to reduce emissions. 

By Thiago Lima, January 30, 2025

Municipalities located in regions with heavy industrial activity are recording some of Brazil’s highest mortality rates linked to air pollution, data from a new government monitoring platform shows.

Several cities home to significant industrial activity in São Paulo, the country’s most developed state, top the national rankings on Painel Vigiar, launched by the federal government in 2024 to monitor pollution and its impacts in the country. For example, São Caetano do Sul, located in the ABC Paulista industrial region south of the state capital, recorded 320 deaths directly attributable to air pollution per 100,000 inhabitants between 2021 and 2023, while the Brazilian average for the period was 83 per 100,000 inhabitants. Other cities with notably high rates include Osasco, Guarulhos and the capital São Paulo itself, which are also among the most polluted cities in the country, according to the World Air Quality platform.

In Brazil, the biggest emitters of greenhouse gases are agricultural activities and changes in land use, which include forest fires related to deforestation in the Amazon, together accounting for almost 80% of domestic emissions. However, data from the Painel Vigiar underscores the greater impact on human health generated by the pollution from industries. Other factors such as emissions from transport systems could also influence the result.

“I would say that both types of pollution [from fires and industries] are bad, but industrialised and transport pollution have a long-term effect, it’s continuous,” said Ethel Maciel, secretary of health surveillance and environment at the Ministry of Health, who was responsible for launching the panel.

The platform counts deaths associated with air pollution, including cases of lung cancer, lung diseases that affect the circulatory and respiratory systems, as well as infections of the lower airways. Among other factors, these conditions are related to exposure to fine particulate matter known as PM2.5, released by vehicles, industrial processes, forest fires and other human activities.

Until last year, Brazil did not have a policy to tackle the problem. After 35 years of debate, the country finally instituted the National Air Quality Policy in May, which includes initiatives such as the launch of the panel.

“Monitoring allows for the creation of public policies,” said Maciel, highlighting as an example the city of Paris, which adopts measures such as restricting the circulation of vehicles when pollution levels reach critical levels. “All of this [must be] debated with society and implemented through laws,” she added.

Pollution deaths and the task of decarbonisation

A 2022 study published in the Lancet showed that air pollution was responsible for 6.7 million deaths worldwide in 2019.

Paulo Saldiva, a professor at the University of São Paulo’s Faculty of Medicine and a specialist in atmospheric pollution, explains that prolonged exposure to pollution can cause severe damage to health. He describes particles accumulating in the body acting like a “lung tattoo”, spreading through the tissues and triggering chronic inflammation. “This makes our biological time run faster,” he said.

Even though the industrial sector has made progress in reducing its emissions, contamination is still high. The cement, steel, glass, chemical, aluminium, paper and cellulose industries are finding it more difficult as they need to use high temperatures in industrial processes, requiring greater energy use that results in higher emissions.

“There are sectors that have already invested a lot in decarbonisation, such as cement, and others that still need to evolve,” said Davi Bomtempo, executive manager for the environment at the National Confederation of Industry (CNI).

A study by the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, published in 2017, revealed that air pollution in Volta Redonda – the city that is home to steel giant Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional (CSN), part of the largest industrial sector in the country – exceeds the limits of Brazilian legislation. The rates were established in 1990 by the National Environmental Council (CONAMA), which is responsible for standardising environmental policy in Brazil.

The author of the study, environmental engineer Náthaly Tonon, said that seven years after its publication, there has been no significant progress in Volta Redonda. In fact, she said, “A resurgence in air quality issues is visible, since pollution has now reached more distant neighbourhoods.”

According to Tonon, CSN had until September 2024 to comply with a conduct adjustment agreement with the state government that required it to modernise its equipment to reduce pollutant emissions. However, the measures were only partially complied with, leading the authorities to extend the deadline to 2026.

Tonon emphasises that industrial pollutants cause as many impacts on health as they do on the environment. Health conditions include those monitored by the Painel Vigiar, such as asthma, chronic bronchitis, pulmonary emphysema, among others. In terms of environmental impacts, air pollution is associated with acid rain, damage to biodiversity and the intensification of climate change.

The environmental engineer also described air pollution as creating urban heat islands, as well as affecting wind circulation and local rainfall patterns.

Efficiency reduces pollution

Venilton Tadini, president of the Brazilian Association of Infrastructure and Basic Industries, told Dialogue Earth that in order to reduce industrial pollution, it is essential to increase the sector’s efficiency –a challenge for which manufacturers are increasingly eyeing solutions in digital innovation and artificial intelligence. However, this can have a side effect: increased demand for electricity.

“The more you increase the automation capacity and efficiency of your industry, the greater the energy consumption by the servers,” explains Tadini.

He explained that it is possible to improve the efficiency of a steel mill by adopting new furnaces or modernising the rolling mill structure, for example. However, these changes also demand more energy from data processing centres.

Driven by the artificial intelligence and cryptocurrency sectors, the global energy demand of data centres could double by 2026, according to a 2024 report by the International Energy Agency.

Bomtempo, from CNI, emphasises that in order to meet such an increase in demand for electricity, Brazil needs to plan the expansion of its installed capacity, avoiding the use of thermal power plants that rely on fossil sources to generate energy.

Most data servers are currently located in the United States and Europe. This means that for Brazilian industries to become greener, they also need to consider the energy consumption of these international servers, which is usually provided by fossil sources.

Industrial logistics also pollutes

Logistics around both industrial parks and freight transport bring other challenges to the sector. A report with 2019 data from the World Economic Forum highlighted that Brazil ranks 85th out of 141 countries in terms of the overall quality of its transport infrastructure. This position reflects its difficulties in modernising logistics, which compromises its efforts to reduce the sector’s carbon footprint.

Around 65% of freight transport in Brazil is carried out by road, and the majority of trucks run on fossil fuels.

The Brazilian government is trying to reduce transport emissions through the Fuel for the Future Law, which came into force in October 2024. It aims to increase the percentage of biodiesel – derived from vegetable oils – included in diesel oils to 20% by 2030; this mandatory mixing is set at 15% for 2025. Meanwhile, Brazil is struggling to expand its railway network, which is predominantly used to transport iron ore.

Expert João Victor Marques, from the FGV Energia research centre, believes that the law is an important step towards reducing the country’s emissions: “We haven’t had such an ambitious policy for the biofuels market for a long time. There are undoubtedly improvements in the inclusion of new green alternatives. Overall, I see it as a positive policy for reducing emissions in the Brazilian transport matrix.”

In 1989, CONAMA set up a programme to control air quality in Brazil. The plan provided for the creation of air pollution monitoring network, with equipment for measurements, as well as strategies for dealing with critical episodes. But monitoring still does not cover the whole of the country. The state of Rio de Janeiro has more than 120 stations, the highest in the country, followed by São Paulo, with almost 80 points. However, in Brazil’s northern region, which is home to the Amazon biome, there are no such stations at all.

“In the north of Brazil and in some other states, there is no official monitoring, only what we call low-cost monitoring,” said Helen Sousa, a researcher at the Institute for Energy and Environment (IEMA).

Another major problem is that air quality is not properly assessed or considered during the licensing process for new industries, Sousa added: “It’s often not taken into account that the area may already be saturated with high concentrations of pollutants.”

At the broader level, Brazil’s emissions and plans for decarbonisation are likely to attract global attention this year with the country set to host the United Nations’ COP30 climate summit in the northern city of Belém. Brazil is among the first to have submitted its updated nationally determined contribution – its plan detailing its commitments and targets to 2035 as part of the Paris Agreement – though this has been met with a mixed reception by environmentalists, who have raised concerns over its level of ambition and the country’s plans to increase oil and gas production.

Thiago Lima

• Scientists have described three new frog species that dwell exclusively in the spiky leaves of pandan trees in Madagascar’s eastern rainforests.
• While the frogs are new to science, locals have observed them for generations, and they’ve been given names in Malagasy.
• The frogs have a unique life cycle completely restricted to the trees, meaning they entirely depend entirely on intact pandan trees.
• Pandan trees, from the genus Pandanus, are threatened by deforestation driven by mining, agriculture and development, while slashing, burning and deforestation threaten Madagascar’s extraordinary biodiversity in general.

Scientists have described three new frog species that dwell exclusively in the spiky leaves of pandan trees in Madagascar’s eastern rainforests.

Lead researcher Hugh Gabriel, from the Technical University of Braunschweig in Germany, described the frogs’ sounds as “soft clicks that sound like rain falling on leaves.” And he would know. Gabriel and his team spent years braving the razor-sharp leaves to reveal not just the new frogs but entire communities dependent on the water that collects in the grooves and nooks of Pandanus trees.

“Each tree was like a treasure chest; once we got past the jagged, barbed leaves, there was a wealth of biodiversity within each plant,” Gabriel told Mongabay in an email. “I spent my research days crashing towards the center of these trees where the water collects, alongside my guide Evariste.”

While the frogs are new to science, many locals, including Gabriel’s local guide Evariste Desire were already aware of the frogs. “They’ve been seen by Malagasy people for thousands of years, known as the secretive Sahona vakoa, or ‘frogs of the Pandanus,'” Gabriel said.

Recognizing the frogs as new species, Gabriel said, was “a gradual event — a slow assembly of different observations that culminated in the declaration that it was, indeed, a new species.” While studying frogs in the Guibemantis genus, he noticed an unusual specimen that didn’t match known species descriptions. Further investigation over several years with mentor Miguel Vences, also at Braunschweig, led to the naming of three new Pandanus-dwelling frog species — Guibemantis rianasoa, G. vakoa and G. ambakoana — in the journal Zootaxa.

“The frogs were all given names in Malagasy to enable their description to be more accessible by local guides and frog-enthusiasts,” Gabriel said. “Rianasoa is named for a beautiful waterfall in Mantadia National Park, where the frogs can also be found. The clear water of the waterfall’s pool, reflecting the blue and green shadows of the forest, reminded Evariste [Desire] and I of the coloration of the beautiful new frog. Vakoa is the Malagasy word for Pandanus, and ambakoana means ‘living within Pandanus.’”

The frogs have a unique life cycle completely restricted to the trees. Up in the foliage, the frogs lay their eggs in gel masses on the leaves. When the tadpoles hatch, they drop into tiny pools of rainwater trapped by the leaves. The tadpoles grow into froglets that mature among the spiky leaves, coming out only to breed following the same unusual cycle, known only in one other genus of frogs.

This arboreal lifestyle means the frogs depend entirely on intact Pandanus trees. “If Pandanus trees are removed, all three species will suffer,” Gabriel said.

Pandanus trees are themselves a unique ecosystem. The rainwater in their leaf axils provides habitat not just for frogs and tadpoles. Crabs, spiders, day geckos, snakes, katydids, ant colonies and fungi are also regularly found within these trees.

They’re also widespread enough that logging poses less of an immediate threat than deforestation driven by mining, agriculture and development. Slashing, burning and deforestation threaten the island’s extraordinary biodiversity.

Climate change presents another conservation challenge for the rare frogs. Their life cycle depends on sufficient rainfall to fill Pandanus leaf pools, but shifting precipitation patterns and increased droughts due to climate change could quickly render their arboreal homes uninhabitable.

What’s needed to protect the frogs? “The simple answer is the preservation of rainforest habitat in Eastern Madagascar,” Gabriel said. But Madagascar’s economy is struggling, and “it’s not easy to tell struggling farmers not to clear land to make a living.”

He cited Mitsinjo, a small ecotourism initiative focused on forest restoration, frog conservation, environmental education, lemur monitoring, and improvement of the members livelihoods, as, “a good example of local-led tourism and sustainable development.”

“Mitsinjo means look into the future,” Desire said.

Banner image of Guibemantis rianasoa, a new frog species from Madagascar. Image courtesy of Hugh Gabriel

Liz Kimbrough is a staff writer for Mongabay and holds a Ph.D. in ecology and evolutionary biology from Tulane University, where she studied the microbiomes of trees. View more of her reporting here.

Citation:

Gabriel, H., Rothe, L.-D., Köhler, J., Rakotomanga, S., Edmonds, D., Galán, P., … Vences, M. (2024). Unexpected diversity and co-occurrence of phytotelmic frogs (Guibemantis) around Andasibe, one of the most intensively surveyed amphibian hotspots of Madagascar, and descriptions of three new species. Zootaxa, 5397(4), 451-485. doi:10.11646/zootaxa.5397.4.1

Credits:

Lizkimbrough, Editor

(Sources: Mongabay)